Event Notification Report for October 26, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/25/2016 - 10/26/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5232252319523205233552384
Agreement State
Event Number: 52322
Rep Org: NJ DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Licensee: RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: NEWARK State: NJ
County:
License #: 450669
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCCULLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: NEWARK State: NJ
County:
License #: 450669
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCCULLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2016
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RESEARCH IRRADIATOR SAMPLE DOOR FAILED TO OPEN
"A specific licensee reported a malfunction with one self-shielded irradiator, J.L. Shepherd model Mark I-68A, Serial # 1083 containing two Cs-137 sources with a total current activity of 6822 Ci. At approximately 2PM [EDT] on 10/26/16 [the licensee performed] an irradiation of 8 mice and were unable to open the sample port. They reported that both visual indicators and survey instruments show the source in the safe, shielded position.
"The licensee is in contact with the manufacturer to assist with a repair.
"This is a 24-hour reportable incident under N.J.A.C. 7:28-51.1 (10 CFR 30.50(b)2). NJDEP is tracking this incident internally as incident ID# C620765. NMED Report No. is yet to be assigned and will be reported later."
* * * UPDATE ON 12/06/16 AT 1431 EST FROM JAMES MCCULLOUGH TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"The licensee provided a timely update on 11/18/2016 and a final report on 11/30/2016. On November 21, 2016, the device manufacturer replaced a component of the interlock system, a solenoid with spring and lockdown bolt. A preventative maintenance inspection was also performed, confirming the device was restored to normal operation."
NJ Event # NJ-C620765, NMED Item Number: 160448
Notified R1DO (Burritt) and NMSS Events Resource via email.
"A specific licensee reported a malfunction with one self-shielded irradiator, J.L. Shepherd model Mark I-68A, Serial # 1083 containing two Cs-137 sources with a total current activity of 6822 Ci. At approximately 2PM [EDT] on 10/26/16 [the licensee performed] an irradiation of 8 mice and were unable to open the sample port. They reported that both visual indicators and survey instruments show the source in the safe, shielded position.
"The licensee is in contact with the manufacturer to assist with a repair.
"This is a 24-hour reportable incident under N.J.A.C. 7:28-51.1 (10 CFR 30.50(b)2). NJDEP is tracking this incident internally as incident ID# C620765. NMED Report No. is yet to be assigned and will be reported later."
* * * UPDATE ON 12/06/16 AT 1431 EST FROM JAMES MCCULLOUGH TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"The licensee provided a timely update on 11/18/2016 and a final report on 11/30/2016. On November 21, 2016, the device manufacturer replaced a component of the interlock system, a solenoid with spring and lockdown bolt. A preventative maintenance inspection was also performed, confirming the device was restored to normal operation."
NJ Event # NJ-C620765, NMED Item Number: 160448
Notified R1DO (Burritt) and NMSS Events Resource via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52319
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: R.T. NIX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: R.T. NIX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 10/26/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TORNADO MISSILE VULNERABILITIES
"During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs [Structures, Systems, and Components] were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles:
"The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable.
"The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable.
"These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified."
"During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs [Structures, Systems, and Components] were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles:
"The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable.
"The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable.
"These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52320
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 00:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Notification Time: 00:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET
"On October 26, 2016, at 2300 EDT, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance.
"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 2300 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. A review indicates that this condition occurred earlier this shift during the high wind condition.
"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector ."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.
"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'
"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.
"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
"On October 26, 2016, at 2300 EDT, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance.
"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 2300 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. A review indicates that this condition occurred earlier this shift during the high wind condition.
"Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector ."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.
"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'
"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.
"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52335
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK YARLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK YARLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 11:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 11:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CONTAINMENT SUMP SUCTION VALVE OPENED DURING CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TESTING
"On October 26, 2016, the Harris Nuclear Plant was in Mode 6 with core reload complete, the reactor head removed, and reactor cavity water level greater than 23 feet. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) was less than 23.4% level as expected for the refueling conditions.
"During surveillance testing to adjust the eductor flow throttle position, the containment spray pump was started in recirculation mode with the discharge valve shut. With RWST level less than 23.4%, logic was satisfied to actuate Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Functional Unit 8, containment spray switchover to containment sump. The containment sump suction valve opened in accordance with the design, however the action was unexpected by the operators. Therefore, operators secured the containment spray pump and shut the containment sump suction valve. ESFAS Functional Unit 2, Containment Spray, was not actuated and water did not flow through the containment spray nozzles. This event is reported as a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the opening of the containment sump suction valve.
"This event did not impact the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 26, 2016, the Harris Nuclear Plant was in Mode 6 with core reload complete, the reactor head removed, and reactor cavity water level greater than 23 feet. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) was less than 23.4% level as expected for the refueling conditions.
"During surveillance testing to adjust the eductor flow throttle position, the containment spray pump was started in recirculation mode with the discharge valve shut. With RWST level less than 23.4%, logic was satisfied to actuate Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Functional Unit 8, containment spray switchover to containment sump. The containment sump suction valve opened in accordance with the design, however the action was unexpected by the operators. Therefore, operators secured the containment spray pump and shut the containment sump suction valve. ESFAS Functional Unit 2, Containment Spray, was not actuated and water did not flow through the containment spray nozzles. This event is reported as a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the opening of the containment sump suction valve.
"This event did not impact the health and safety of the public."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Part 21
Event Number: 52384
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: AMETEK SOLID STATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/21/2016
Notification Time: 12:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016
Notification Time: 12:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART-21 - INCORRECT CAPACITOR USED ON CIRCUIT BOARDS
The following report was excerpted from an e-mail:
"Product: Ametek Solidstate Controls Analog Oscillator, printed circuit board part number 80-9230404-90
"A single unit, Ametek part number 80-9230404-90, was shipped to Exelon Dresden Station on the reference purchase order has an incorrect capacitor installed. This error was identified during testing of a subsequent identical part. Ametek reviewed all printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016. Ametek contacted Exelon Dresden immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from their inventory. Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting this notification as a precaution under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, but considers it a limited incident as the single defective part was isolated and the board is in the process of being returned. No further action is required and this notification does not affect any other installation, client, inventory, or equipment provided by Ametek."
* * * UPDATE AT 0921 ON 11/23/16 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following report is an excerpt from an email received:
"Dresden was incorrectly identified as the recipient of the printed circuit board in question. Byron warehouse was the correct recipient and was the facility notified upon identification of the issue.
"Ametek reviewed all the printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. The single affected board was shipped to Exelon Generation Company, Byron warehouse on purchase order # 00588294 and Ametek sales order #46001912. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016.
"Ametek contacted Exelon Byron immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from the inventory."
Notified R3DO (McCraw) and Part 21/50.55 (via email).
The following report was excerpted from an e-mail:
"Product: Ametek Solidstate Controls Analog Oscillator, printed circuit board part number 80-9230404-90
"A single unit, Ametek part number 80-9230404-90, was shipped to Exelon Dresden Station on the reference purchase order has an incorrect capacitor installed. This error was identified during testing of a subsequent identical part. Ametek reviewed all printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016. Ametek contacted Exelon Dresden immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from their inventory. Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting this notification as a precaution under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, but considers it a limited incident as the single defective part was isolated and the board is in the process of being returned. No further action is required and this notification does not affect any other installation, client, inventory, or equipment provided by Ametek."
* * * UPDATE AT 0921 ON 11/23/16 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following report is an excerpt from an email received:
"Dresden was incorrectly identified as the recipient of the printed circuit board in question. Byron warehouse was the correct recipient and was the facility notified upon identification of the issue.
"Ametek reviewed all the printed circuit boards built under that run and verified all affected printed circuits boards less one, were still in house. The single affected board was shipped to Exelon Generation Company, Byron warehouse on purchase order # 00588294 and Ametek sales order #46001912. This shipment was made on October 26, 2016.
"Ametek contacted Exelon Byron immediately upon identification of the incorrect part installation and Exelon was able to have the board retrieved from the inventory."
Notified R3DO (McCraw) and Part 21/50.55 (via email).