Event Notification Report for September 28, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/27/2016 - 09/28/2016
Part 21
Event Number: 52394
Rep Org: ENERCON
Licensee: ENERCON
Region: 1
City: KENNESAW State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICK EGGEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ENERCON
Region: 1
City: KENNESAW State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICK EGGEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/23/2016
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2017
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART-21 NOTIFICATION - DESIGN BASIS ERRORS USING FLO-2D SOFTWARE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"This letter serves as an Interim Report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent to delivering this calculation, FLO-2D software errors were identified which resulted in erroneous outputs that affect the local intense precipitation calculation. These errors were discovered on September 28, 2016, at which time, ENERCON generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to address the issue. ENERCON has initiated a reevaluation of the calculation using the latest version of the software that will correct the errors in the calculation.
"An evaluation of the reportability of this issue in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 is not able to be completed within the 60-day evaluation period due the need to verify and validate the latest version of the software and then complete all the analysis required for updating the calculation. This evaluation is being tracked by CAR 2016-0335 and will be completed no later than February 10, 2017.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
* * * UPDATE AT 0910 EST ON 12/13/2016 FROM TIMOTHY CLEARY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following update was received via e-mail:
"This letter serves as an amendment to the 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report filed on November 23, 2016, pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent to delivery of the calculation, a standard, periodic review of the FLO-2D Pro software supplier website indicated that a new build of this software (version 16.06.16) had been issued. It replaced the software build (version 14.08.09) that was used for the above referenced design calculation. As a result of the model revision associated with FLO-2D, it was determined that the outputs were impacted which could affect this design basis calculation. These output changes were discovered on September 28, 2016, at which time ENERCON generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to address the issue. ENERCON has initiated a reevaluation of the calculation using this new build of the FLO-2D Pro software.
"An evaluation of the reportability of this issue in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 is not able to be completed within the 60-day evaluation period due the need to verify and validate the latest version of the software and then complete all the analysis required for updating the calculation. This evaluation is being tracked by CAR 2016-0335 and will be completed no later than February 10, 2017.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
Notified the R1DO (Schroeder), R3DO (Cameron), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE FROM TIMOTHY CLEARY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1602 EST ON 2/9/2017 * * *
The following information was received via E-mail:
"This letter serves as an evaluation summary in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report was filed on November 23, 2016. An Amendment to the 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report was filed on December 12, 2016.
"Subsequent to the filing of the Amendment to the Interim Report, the updated FLO-2D software, build 16.06.16, was verified and validated and a re-analysis performed. A comparison between the original analysis and the updated analysis using the updated software was then performed. This analysis indicates flood water level changes assumed in the Perry Nuclear Plant flooding analyses are small, -0.14 feet to +0.16 feet (-1.6 inches to +1.9 inches).
"The comparative results between the two analyses were provided to First Energy Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant on February 3, 2017. Perry Nuclear Plant staff are continuing to review these results in order to complete the determination of whether the change in flood water levels results in additional reporting requirements.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
Notified the R2DO (Sandal), R3DO (Kunowski), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
The following report was received via e-mail:
"This letter serves as an Interim Report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent to delivering this calculation, FLO-2D software errors were identified which resulted in erroneous outputs that affect the local intense precipitation calculation. These errors were discovered on September 28, 2016, at which time, ENERCON generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to address the issue. ENERCON has initiated a reevaluation of the calculation using the latest version of the software that will correct the errors in the calculation.
"An evaluation of the reportability of this issue in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 is not able to be completed within the 60-day evaluation period due the need to verify and validate the latest version of the software and then complete all the analysis required for updating the calculation. This evaluation is being tracked by CAR 2016-0335 and will be completed no later than February 10, 2017.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
* * * UPDATE AT 0910 EST ON 12/13/2016 FROM TIMOTHY CLEARY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following update was received via e-mail:
"This letter serves as an amendment to the 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report filed on November 23, 2016, pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent to delivery of the calculation, a standard, periodic review of the FLO-2D Pro software supplier website indicated that a new build of this software (version 16.06.16) had been issued. It replaced the software build (version 14.08.09) that was used for the above referenced design calculation. As a result of the model revision associated with FLO-2D, it was determined that the outputs were impacted which could affect this design basis calculation. These output changes were discovered on September 28, 2016, at which time ENERCON generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) to address the issue. ENERCON has initiated a reevaluation of the calculation using this new build of the FLO-2D Pro software.
"An evaluation of the reportability of this issue in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 is not able to be completed within the 60-day evaluation period due the need to verify and validate the latest version of the software and then complete all the analysis required for updating the calculation. This evaluation is being tracked by CAR 2016-0335 and will be completed no later than February 10, 2017.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
Notified the R1DO (Schroeder), R3DO (Cameron), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE FROM TIMOTHY CLEARY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1602 EST ON 2/9/2017 * * *
The following information was received via E-mail:
"This letter serves as an evaluation summary in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to a potential defect associated with a design basis calculation delivered to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report was filed on November 23, 2016. An Amendment to the 10 CFR 21.21 Interim Report was filed on December 12, 2016.
"Subsequent to the filing of the Amendment to the Interim Report, the updated FLO-2D software, build 16.06.16, was verified and validated and a re-analysis performed. A comparison between the original analysis and the updated analysis using the updated software was then performed. This analysis indicates flood water level changes assumed in the Perry Nuclear Plant flooding analyses are small, -0.14 feet to +0.16 feet (-1.6 inches to +1.9 inches).
"The comparative results between the two analyses were provided to First Energy Company's Perry Nuclear Power Plant on February 3, 2017. Perry Nuclear Plant staff are continuing to review these results in order to complete the determination of whether the change in flood water levels results in additional reporting requirements.
"If you have any questions or need further clarifying information, please contact Nick Eggemeyer, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, at (770) 590-2031."
Notified the R2DO (Sandal), R3DO (Kunowski), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
Part 21
Event Number: 52269
Rep Org: WECTEC LLC
Licensee: CB&I LAURENS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: CB&I LAURENS
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2017
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 REPORT REGARDING PIPE SPOOL FLANGES FOR VOGTLE UNIT 3
The following was excerpted from an email received from WECTEC LLC:
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The two flanges identified with deviations on Passive Core Cooling System pipe spools for the Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000r project had incorrect raised-face dimensions. This appears to have been caused by the two flanges being transposed due to an inadvertent fabrication error that occurred at the pipe spool supplier's facilities (CB&I Laurens). The error was subsequently discovered after delivery to the fabrication facility (Aecon Industrial).
"This error resulted in conditions where the two flanged connections would not have met the design configuration. If the flanged connections had been assembled in the delivered configuration, it is not known if system integrity and operability would have been maintained during operation. The incorrect configuration could have also led to subsequent failure after installation and operation. Hydrostatic testing of these connections is required, but had not yet been performed because the condition was discovered prior to the assembly and testing of these portions of the system. The condition is being corrected prior to the performance of that hydrostatic testing, therefore it is not known if the flanges in the incorrect configuration would have been able to pass hydrostatic testing.
"Due to the possibility that system integrity and operability could have been impacted by the use of the incorrect flanges, it has been conservatively concluded that this condition should be reported under 10 CFR Part 21. This conservative conclusion is based on the possibility that the Passive Core Cooling System could have been adversely impacted by the identified deviations, if the deviations had been left uncorrected.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
". . . The flange configuration was corrected and the Q223 Mechanical Module was delivered to the Vogtle Unit 3 site on September 23, 2016. A corrective action report has been entered into the Westinghouse/WECTEC system to further evaluate the circumstances that led to the identified deviations."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID DURHAM TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL AT 1535 EDT ON 3/15/17 * * *
WECTEC LLC determined that additional pipe spools with incorrect flange configurations were fabricated for V.C. Summer Unit 3 and Vogtle Unit 4. None of the pipe spools were installed in either of the facilities. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent re-occurrence.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and Part 21 group via email.
The following was excerpted from an email received from WECTEC LLC:
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The two flanges identified with deviations on Passive Core Cooling System pipe spools for the Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000r project had incorrect raised-face dimensions. This appears to have been caused by the two flanges being transposed due to an inadvertent fabrication error that occurred at the pipe spool supplier's facilities (CB&I Laurens). The error was subsequently discovered after delivery to the fabrication facility (Aecon Industrial).
"This error resulted in conditions where the two flanged connections would not have met the design configuration. If the flanged connections had been assembled in the delivered configuration, it is not known if system integrity and operability would have been maintained during operation. The incorrect configuration could have also led to subsequent failure after installation and operation. Hydrostatic testing of these connections is required, but had not yet been performed because the condition was discovered prior to the assembly and testing of these portions of the system. The condition is being corrected prior to the performance of that hydrostatic testing, therefore it is not known if the flanges in the incorrect configuration would have been able to pass hydrostatic testing.
"Due to the possibility that system integrity and operability could have been impacted by the use of the incorrect flanges, it has been conservatively concluded that this condition should be reported under 10 CFR Part 21. This conservative conclusion is based on the possibility that the Passive Core Cooling System could have been adversely impacted by the identified deviations, if the deviations had been left uncorrected.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
". . . The flange configuration was corrected and the Q223 Mechanical Module was delivered to the Vogtle Unit 3 site on September 23, 2016. A corrective action report has been entered into the Westinghouse/WECTEC system to further evaluate the circumstances that led to the identified deviations."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID DURHAM TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL AT 1535 EDT ON 3/15/17 * * *
WECTEC LLC determined that additional pipe spools with incorrect flange configurations were fabricated for V.C. Summer Unit 3 and Vogtle Unit 4. None of the pipe spools were installed in either of the facilities. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent re-occurrence.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and Part 21 group via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52267
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 07:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2016
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2016
Event Time: 07:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO INOPERABLE DIESEL GENERATOR
"On September 16, 2016, at 0036 [CDT], during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated.
"It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 [CDT], ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.
"On September 16, 2016, at 0036 [CDT], during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated.
"It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 [CDT], ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.