Event Notification Report for September 21, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/20/2016 - 09/21/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
5225652254522585231252325
Agreement State
Event Number: 52256
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CIVIL & ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS INC.
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1147
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Licensee: CIVIL & ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS INC.
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1147
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 09/22/2016
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2016
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"A Troxler nuclear gauge was hit by an asphalt road compactor while on a temporary job site. Impact rendered the gauge unusable. The area was secured and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer determined that the gauge was not leaking. The gauge was then secured for shipment back to Troxler for possible repair or replacement. There was no exposure to workers or the public.
"The gauge has been secured for transport to Troxler. The Department [PA Department Bureau of Radiation Protection] was also onsite to verify radiation measurements and perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided when available.
"Radionuclides: Cs-137 / Am-241:Be
Manufacturer: Troxler
Model: 3430
Serial Number: 21864
Activity: 9 mCi (Cs-137) / 44 mCi (Am-241)
"Event Report ID No: PA 160026"
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"A Troxler nuclear gauge was hit by an asphalt road compactor while on a temporary job site. Impact rendered the gauge unusable. The area was secured and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer determined that the gauge was not leaking. The gauge was then secured for shipment back to Troxler for possible repair or replacement. There was no exposure to workers or the public.
"The gauge has been secured for transport to Troxler. The Department [PA Department Bureau of Radiation Protection] was also onsite to verify radiation measurements and perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided when available.
"Radionuclides: Cs-137 / Am-241:Be
Manufacturer: Troxler
Model: 3430
Serial Number: 21864
Activity: 9 mCi (Cs-137) / 44 mCi (Am-241)
"Event Report ID No: PA 160026"
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52254
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS HASSENBEIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS HASSENBEIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 09/21/2016
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 02:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2016
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 02:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE FAILURE TO SEAT CAUSES TRIP OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP
"At 0221 [EDT] on 9/21/16, Operators at Unit 2 Secured the 21 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump for planned maintenance while 22 and 23 CCW pumps were in operation. When the 21 pump was secured, the discharge check valve failed to seat. This resulted in a low system pressure and reverse rotation of the 21 CCW Pump due to the discharge of the 22 and 23 CCW pumps to a common header. When system pressure dropped below 107 psig the 21 CCW pump received an auto start signal. Due to the reverse rotation, the 21 CCW pump tripped on overcurrent. Reactor Operators directed Field Operators to manually shut the 21 CCW Pump discharge valve. The 21 CCW pump Discharge Valve was closed at 0223 [EDT]. This action was successful in stopping the reverse flow and restoring system parameters. During this two minute period the CCW system was declared inoperable and LCO 3.0.3 was entered. Unit 2 exited LCO 3.0.3 at 0223 [EDT] after observing system pressure and flow return to normal. The declaration of inoperability on the CCW system is considered a Loss of Safety Function for purposes of reporting under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There was no reduction in power while in LCO 3.0.3 and no other issues arose."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Licensee notified the Public Service Commission.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES ROKES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1108 EST ON 11/18/16 * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on September 21, 2016, at 0920 EDT (EN#52254). The notification on September 21, 2016, reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of declaring the Component Cooling Water System (CCW) inoperable due to failure of the 21 CCW pump discharge check valve (761C) to close. This condition was discovered during planned maintenance after securing the 21 CCW pump while the 22 and 23 CCW pumps were in operation. When the 21 CCW pump was secured, the discharge check valve failed to seat. This resulted in a low system pressure and reverse rotation of the 21 CCW pump due to the discharge of the 22 and 23 CCW pumps to a common header. Condition was reported as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"After further investigation of the condition, a revised calculation was prepared for the CCW hydraulic model which is used to analyze CCW system performance for normal and DBA [design basis accident] modes of operation and documented in a calculation. The new calculation included the as-found condition of the 21 CCW pump discharge check valve failure to seat. Based on the results of the new calculation, the CCW system is capable of performing its design basis heat removal function during a design basis accident. Calculated flow rates with CCW aligned for Post-LOCA recirculation demonstrates that with failed open check valve 761C, the 22 CCW pump and 23 CCW pump have adequate NPSH margin, are operating below analyzed pump run out and deliver flow to the CCW system that is significantly greater than the flow required for post-LOCA recirculation. Therefore the CCW system was operable and a safety system functional failure (SSFF) did not occur as a result of failed open 21 CCW pump discharge check valve 761C."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the New York Public Service Commission.
Notified R1DO (Bickett).
"At 0221 [EDT] on 9/21/16, Operators at Unit 2 Secured the 21 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump for planned maintenance while 22 and 23 CCW pumps were in operation. When the 21 pump was secured, the discharge check valve failed to seat. This resulted in a low system pressure and reverse rotation of the 21 CCW Pump due to the discharge of the 22 and 23 CCW pumps to a common header. When system pressure dropped below 107 psig the 21 CCW pump received an auto start signal. Due to the reverse rotation, the 21 CCW pump tripped on overcurrent. Reactor Operators directed Field Operators to manually shut the 21 CCW Pump discharge valve. The 21 CCW pump Discharge Valve was closed at 0223 [EDT]. This action was successful in stopping the reverse flow and restoring system parameters. During this two minute period the CCW system was declared inoperable and LCO 3.0.3 was entered. Unit 2 exited LCO 3.0.3 at 0223 [EDT] after observing system pressure and flow return to normal. The declaration of inoperability on the CCW system is considered a Loss of Safety Function for purposes of reporting under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There was no reduction in power while in LCO 3.0.3 and no other issues arose."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Licensee notified the Public Service Commission.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES ROKES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1108 EST ON 11/18/16 * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on September 21, 2016, at 0920 EDT (EN#52254). The notification on September 21, 2016, reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of declaring the Component Cooling Water System (CCW) inoperable due to failure of the 21 CCW pump discharge check valve (761C) to close. This condition was discovered during planned maintenance after securing the 21 CCW pump while the 22 and 23 CCW pumps were in operation. When the 21 CCW pump was secured, the discharge check valve failed to seat. This resulted in a low system pressure and reverse rotation of the 21 CCW pump due to the discharge of the 22 and 23 CCW pumps to a common header. Condition was reported as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"After further investigation of the condition, a revised calculation was prepared for the CCW hydraulic model which is used to analyze CCW system performance for normal and DBA [design basis accident] modes of operation and documented in a calculation. The new calculation included the as-found condition of the 21 CCW pump discharge check valve failure to seat. Based on the results of the new calculation, the CCW system is capable of performing its design basis heat removal function during a design basis accident. Calculated flow rates with CCW aligned for Post-LOCA recirculation demonstrates that with failed open check valve 761C, the 22 CCW pump and 23 CCW pump have adequate NPSH margin, are operating below analyzed pump run out and deliver flow to the CCW system that is significantly greater than the flow required for post-LOCA recirculation. Therefore the CCW system was operable and a safety system functional failure (SSFF) did not occur as a result of failed open 21 CCW pump discharge check valve 761C."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the New York Public Service Commission.
Notified R1DO (Bickett).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52258
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICALS, LP
Region: 3
City: MORRIS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01737-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICALS, LP
Region: 3
City: MORRIS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01737-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/23/2016
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following was received by the State of Illinois via email:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Equistar Chemical notified the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] via email that while performing routine shutter tests of fixed gauges at their Morris, IL location, it became known that for one of the gauges, a shutter was stuck in the 'open' position. The affected Ohmart Vega model SH-F2 gauge contains 300 milliCi of Cs-137 and is mounted on a reactor vessel within a secure area at the plant. The associated process line for the vessel does not have any maintenance scheduled to occur until next year, therefore, no entry into the vessel should be necessary and the gauge is expected to remain in the 'on' position due to operational need. The gauge manufacturer has been contacted and advised of the situation. Equistar and Vega Americans are currently attempting to schedule a field service engineer to come on site to investigate the matter and make necessary repairs/replacement. The licensee has previous experience with events of this type due to the large number of devices in use and the stressful environment that exists at this site. The licensee is prepared to respond to any further deterioration that, although not likely, may occur. Plant personnel have been advised of the matter and the process line supervisors have been instructed to contact the RSO should any abnormal events associated with the reactor processes becomes known. No on-site investigation is planned by the Agency at this time."
Illinois Item Number: IL16008
The following was received by the State of Illinois via email:
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Equistar Chemical notified the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] via email that while performing routine shutter tests of fixed gauges at their Morris, IL location, it became known that for one of the gauges, a shutter was stuck in the 'open' position. The affected Ohmart Vega model SH-F2 gauge contains 300 milliCi of Cs-137 and is mounted on a reactor vessel within a secure area at the plant. The associated process line for the vessel does not have any maintenance scheduled to occur until next year, therefore, no entry into the vessel should be necessary and the gauge is expected to remain in the 'on' position due to operational need. The gauge manufacturer has been contacted and advised of the situation. Equistar and Vega Americans are currently attempting to schedule a field service engineer to come on site to investigate the matter and make necessary repairs/replacement. The licensee has previous experience with events of this type due to the large number of devices in use and the stressful environment that exists at this site. The licensee is prepared to respond to any further deterioration that, although not likely, may occur. Plant personnel have been advised of the matter and the process line supervisors have been instructed to contact the RSO should any abnormal events associated with the reactor processes becomes known. No on-site investigation is planned by the Agency at this time."
Illinois Item Number: IL16008
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52312
Rep Org: AGILENT
Licensee: AGILENT
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: DE
County:
License #: 07-28762-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: AGILENT
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: DE
County:
License #: 07-28762-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/21/2016
Notification Time: 08:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2017
Notification Time: 08:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
LOST ELECTRON CAPTURE DEVICE
Four electron capture detectors (ECDs) were shipped at the same time from Shanghai to Wilmington, DE. The ECDs were shipped by air freight and three of the ECDs arrived at the beginning of October. The remaining ECD has not arrived and a search is ongoing.
Source: Ni-63, 15 mCi fully encapsulated
* * * UPDATE ON 1/27/17 AT 1457 EST FROM DAVID BENNETT TO DONG PARK * * *
As a corrective action, the licensee has changed warehouse operations to a different warehouse used to receive devices manufactured in China.
Notified R1DO (Welling) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Four electron capture detectors (ECDs) were shipped at the same time from Shanghai to Wilmington, DE. The ECDs were shipped by air freight and three of the ECDs arrived at the beginning of October. The remaining ECD has not arrived and a search is ongoing.
Source: Ni-63, 15 mCi fully encapsulated
* * * UPDATE ON 1/27/17 AT 1457 EST FROM DAVID BENNETT TO DONG PARK * * *
As a corrective action, the licensee has changed warehouse operations to a different warehouse used to receive devices manufactured in China.
Notified R1DO (Welling) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 52325
Rep Org: INTERTEK ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
Licensee: INTERTEK ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: Morgan City State: LA
County:
License #: 17-2930801
Agreement: Y
Docket: 03037816
NRC Notified By: ALAN PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: INTERTEK ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: Morgan City State: LA
County:
License #: 17-2930801
Agreement: Y
Docket: 03037816
NRC Notified By: ALAN PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILED TO FUNCTION - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
"On 09/21/2016, a radiography crew was working on a pipeline ROW [right of way] located off of Wolf Run-Poplar Springs Road near Cameron, WV. After developing film shot earlier in the morning, the crew reattached the control cables and guide tube to the exposure device and moved to the next weld. After setup an attempt to make an exposure was made. The radiographer recalled the source assembly felt slightly obstructed upon entry into the guide tube. Upon verification that the guide tube was not kinked, an attempt to retract the source was made. Based on survey meter readings, it was determined the source was not retracting back into the camera, and somehow became disconnected. At this point the radiographer 'pushed' the source out to the collimator to provide some shielding. The crew then established a new 2 mR/hr boundary, advised site personnel of the situation, and notified [the] Pittsburgh site [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO. The [Corporate Assistant RSO] was notified and immediately dispatched [a source retriever] to the site for source retrieval.
"At approximately 1430 EDT [the source retriever, who is also] the site RSO in Dover, OH, arrived at the location. After reviewing the circumstances leading to the disconnect and an inspection of the area, a plan to safely retrieve the source was [successfully] enacted.
"All personnel involved acted as safely as possible considering the situation. The radiographer and their assistant immediately established a restricted area around the source and maintained visual surveillance of the area. At no time was any member of the public exposed to greater than 2 mR/hr. The three technicians involved with the monitoring and retrieval of the source followed company procedures and all were wearing the required radiation PPE. No one received a dose greater than 100 mrem during the entire operation. Film badge readings for the period were all within normal range."
"On 09/21/2016, a radiography crew was working on a pipeline ROW [right of way] located off of Wolf Run-Poplar Springs Road near Cameron, WV. After developing film shot earlier in the morning, the crew reattached the control cables and guide tube to the exposure device and moved to the next weld. After setup an attempt to make an exposure was made. The radiographer recalled the source assembly felt slightly obstructed upon entry into the guide tube. Upon verification that the guide tube was not kinked, an attempt to retract the source was made. Based on survey meter readings, it was determined the source was not retracting back into the camera, and somehow became disconnected. At this point the radiographer 'pushed' the source out to the collimator to provide some shielding. The crew then established a new 2 mR/hr boundary, advised site personnel of the situation, and notified [the] Pittsburgh site [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO. The [Corporate Assistant RSO] was notified and immediately dispatched [a source retriever] to the site for source retrieval.
"At approximately 1430 EDT [the source retriever, who is also] the site RSO in Dover, OH, arrived at the location. After reviewing the circumstances leading to the disconnect and an inspection of the area, a plan to safely retrieve the source was [successfully] enacted.
"All personnel involved acted as safely as possible considering the situation. The radiographer and their assistant immediately established a restricted area around the source and maintained visual surveillance of the area. At no time was any member of the public exposed to greater than 2 mR/hr. The three technicians involved with the monitoring and retrieval of the source followed company procedures and all were wearing the required radiation PPE. No one received a dose greater than 100 mrem during the entire operation. Film badge readings for the period were all within normal range."