Event Notification Report for September 19, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/18/2016 - 09/19/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
52251522525225352248
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 52251
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
UF6 SCRUBBER EXHAUST SYSTEM NOT OPERATING AS REQUIRED
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: It was determined at approximately 6 AM today (Eastern) that an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with a Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) exhaust system was not operating as required. An FMO scrubber exhaust system blower was determined to be not operating and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"The safety function of the scrubber exhaust system is to limit the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its byproducts to the environment in the unlikely event of an accidental airborne release in a process area. Other upstream controls remained available and reliable and prevented significant quantities of UF6 and its byproducts from being released into the scrubber exhaust system. There was no release of material and at no time was an unsafe condition present.
"The Dry Conversion Process has been shutdown. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: At no time was an unsafe condition present
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was shutdown.
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated.
There was no offsite release of UF6 as a result of the IROF failure.
The licensee will inform the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: It was determined at approximately 6 AM today (Eastern) that an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with a Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) exhaust system was not operating as required. An FMO scrubber exhaust system blower was determined to be not operating and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"The safety function of the scrubber exhaust system is to limit the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its byproducts to the environment in the unlikely event of an accidental airborne release in a process area. Other upstream controls remained available and reliable and prevented significant quantities of UF6 and its byproducts from being released into the scrubber exhaust system. There was no release of material and at no time was an unsafe condition present.
"The Dry Conversion Process has been shutdown. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: At no time was an unsafe condition present
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was shutdown.
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated.
There was no offsite release of UF6 as a result of the IROF failure.
The licensee will inform the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52252
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: PHYLLIS DOMINGUEZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: PHYLLIS DOMINGUEZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO SAN DIEGO REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD
"At 1230 [PDT] on 9/19/16, SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] made an offsite notification to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board in regards to an oily waste water release to the environment in excess of allowable limits.
"On 9/15/16, the Unit 3 oily waste sump overflowed. An estimated 1500 gallons was released to the intake which is pumped to the outfall. A sample was taken during the end of the overflow; no visual indication of oil and grease was noted. The sample analysis completed on 9/19/16 indicated a result that exceeded SONGS' NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] instantaneous maximum limit of 20 ppm; results were 34.4 ppm."
The licensee will inform NRC Region IV staff.
"At 1230 [PDT] on 9/19/16, SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] made an offsite notification to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board in regards to an oily waste water release to the environment in excess of allowable limits.
"On 9/15/16, the Unit 3 oily waste sump overflowed. An estimated 1500 gallons was released to the intake which is pumped to the outfall. A sample was taken during the end of the overflow; no visual indication of oil and grease was noted. The sample analysis completed on 9/19/16 indicated a result that exceeded SONGS' NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] instantaneous maximum limit of 20 ppm; results were 34.4 ppm."
The licensee will inform NRC Region IV staff.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52253
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: HENRY WATERS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: HENRY WATERS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 87 | Power Operation | 87 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION CHARCOAL NOT MEETING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
"At 1550 [CDT] on September 19, 2016, Dresden received the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) charcoal. The test results did not meet technical specification acceptance criteria. This results in the inoperability of CREVS. CREVS is a single train system and therefore is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) is required to operate during a design basis accident to maintain Main Control Room habitability. This places unit 2 and unit 3 in a 7 day LCORA [Limiting Condition of Operation Required Action] per Tech Spec 3.7.4 Required Action A.1."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1635 EDT ON 03/23/17 FROM HENRY WATERS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52253 made on September 19th, 2016, for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. After further evaluation and testing, it has been determined that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) charcoal would have fulfilled its safety function given the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results. The initial tests were performed with a 2 inch bed depth due to a difference in batches used in each charcoal filter, but testing at a 4 inch bed depth is the correct testing methodology for Dresden's configuration. At a 4 inch bed depth, the test results met the Technical Specification acceptance criteria with significant margin. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and the ENS report is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).
"At 1550 [CDT] on September 19, 2016, Dresden received the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) charcoal. The test results did not meet technical specification acceptance criteria. This results in the inoperability of CREVS. CREVS is a single train system and therefore is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) is required to operate during a design basis accident to maintain Main Control Room habitability. This places unit 2 and unit 3 in a 7 day LCORA [Limiting Condition of Operation Required Action] per Tech Spec 3.7.4 Required Action A.1."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1635 EDT ON 03/23/17 FROM HENRY WATERS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52253 made on September 19th, 2016, for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. After further evaluation and testing, it has been determined that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) charcoal would have fulfilled its safety function given the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results. The initial tests were performed with a 2 inch bed depth due to a difference in batches used in each charcoal filter, but testing at a 4 inch bed depth is the correct testing methodology for Dresden's configuration. At a 4 inch bed depth, the test results met the Technical Specification acceptance criteria with significant margin. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and the ENS report is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52248
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY COOK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TONY COOK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 12:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2016
Event Time: 12:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION - JOSLYN CLARK OVERLOAD HEATER ELEMENT PART NUMBER 2455
"This is a non-emergency facsimile notification required by 10 CPR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.
"Duke Energy McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) has determined there is evidence of a departure from technical requirements, a Deviation, associated with Joslyn Clark overload heater element Part Number (PIN) 2455. This part was procured in accordance with the Duke Energy Commercial Grade Program (CGP) and dedicated for use in safety related applications. Three of 18 overload heater elements, purchased as a lot, had insufficient top weld material. One failed in-service during a post maintenance test, the second and third failed during a visual and mechanical inspection. An extent of condition review inspected over 500 similar Joslyn Clark overload heater elements. No other inventory was found with a top weld issue.
"These overload heater elements are used in motor starters for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) ventilation fans. This condition was discovered during post maintenance testing of the 2A EDG on July 27, 2016. None of the suspect overload heater elements were installed in Operable EDG ventilation fan motor starters. The dedicated overload heater elements, from this lot, were not transferred or sold to any third party customers. Specialty Product Technologies, manufacturer of the Joslyn Clark overload heater elements, has been notified of the deviation and is investigating their welding process.
"The Evaluation of the deviation determined that a Substantial Safety Hazard would have been created if the overload heater elements were installed and left uncorrected.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This is a non-emergency facsimile notification required by 10 CPR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.
"Duke Energy McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) has determined there is evidence of a departure from technical requirements, a Deviation, associated with Joslyn Clark overload heater element Part Number (PIN) 2455. This part was procured in accordance with the Duke Energy Commercial Grade Program (CGP) and dedicated for use in safety related applications. Three of 18 overload heater elements, purchased as a lot, had insufficient top weld material. One failed in-service during a post maintenance test, the second and third failed during a visual and mechanical inspection. An extent of condition review inspected over 500 similar Joslyn Clark overload heater elements. No other inventory was found with a top weld issue.
"These overload heater elements are used in motor starters for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) ventilation fans. This condition was discovered during post maintenance testing of the 2A EDG on July 27, 2016. None of the suspect overload heater elements were installed in Operable EDG ventilation fan motor starters. The dedicated overload heater elements, from this lot, were not transferred or sold to any third party customers. Specialty Product Technologies, manufacturer of the Joslyn Clark overload heater elements, has been notified of the deviation and is investigating their welding process.
"The Evaluation of the deviation determined that a Substantial Safety Hazard would have been created if the overload heater elements were installed and left uncorrected.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."