Event Notification Report for September 16, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/15/2016 - 09/16/2016
Agreement State
Event Number: 52249
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: PACIFIC ETHANOL, INC.
Region: 3
City: PEKIN State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01797-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: PACIFIC ETHANOL, INC.
Region: 3
City: PEKIN State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01797-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 13:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Notification Time: 13:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE
The following information was received from the State of Illinois by email:
"The licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] on September 16, 2016 to advise that while a licensed contractor was conducting calibration of sensors, the shutter failed on an older KayRay fixed gauge. The gauge is mounted on a process line in a remote location that is normally not accessible. Workers were putting the gauge back into service when it appeared that a shear pin broke on the lever that controls the shutter position. The area was cleared of workers and radiation measurements performed. Those measurements showed the shutter was not completely closed. No exposures to workers were noted. Arrangements are being made with a specifically licensed contractor to make repairs to the gauge as soon as can be managed."
Fixed gauge is manufactured by KayRay/Sensall; Model 7063P; Serial Number S98L2001; Sealed Source Gauge (.331 Ci of Cs-137).
Illinois Event: IL 16006
The following information was received from the State of Illinois by email:
"The licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] on September 16, 2016 to advise that while a licensed contractor was conducting calibration of sensors, the shutter failed on an older KayRay fixed gauge. The gauge is mounted on a process line in a remote location that is normally not accessible. Workers were putting the gauge back into service when it appeared that a shear pin broke on the lever that controls the shutter position. The area was cleared of workers and radiation measurements performed. Those measurements showed the shutter was not completely closed. No exposures to workers were noted. Arrangements are being made with a specifically licensed contractor to make repairs to the gauge as soon as can be managed."
Fixed gauge is manufactured by KayRay/Sensall; Model 7063P; Serial Number S98L2001; Sealed Source Gauge (.331 Ci of Cs-137).
Illinois Event: IL 16006
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52247
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDY MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDY MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/16/2016
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 16:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2016
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 16:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
ESSENTIAL BUSSES NOT ALIGNED TO POWER TRANSFORMERS DURING PLANT STARTUP
"At 1657 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the plant entered Mode 4 (from Mode 5), and subsequently, at 1710 EDT, it was discovered that 480V AC essential busses E1 and F1 were being supplied from the shutdown operations transformers. The essential busses E1 and F1 are required to be aligned to the power operations transformers in Mode 4 for operability in accordance with TS 3.8.9.
"With both E1 and F1 essential busses aligned to the shutdown operations transformers with the plant in Mode 4, both trains of the essential electrical power distribution system were inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. At 1733 EDT both E1 and F1 essential busses were aligned to the power operations transformers as required by TS 3.8.9.
"This issue is being reported as a loss of safety function of the essential electrical busses.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1315 EST ON 11/09/2016 FROM ANDY MILLER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Engineering reviewed the actual conditions during the approximate 36 minutes the 480V AC essential busses were being supplied from the shutdown operations transformers. Grid voltages were higher than assumed minimum voltages, and electrical loading during Mode 4 conditions were reduced from expected full power operation loading. As a result, Engineering determined that all equipment remained capable of performing its required functions while connected to the shutdown operations transformers.
"Because the equipment remained capable of satisfying the requirements for Operability, no condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, no loss of safety function existed for the 480V AC essential buses, and the notification made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A-D) by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 9/16/2016 (EN# 52247) is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction."
Notified the R3DO (Jeffers).
"At 1657 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the plant entered Mode 4 (from Mode 5), and subsequently, at 1710 EDT, it was discovered that 480V AC essential busses E1 and F1 were being supplied from the shutdown operations transformers. The essential busses E1 and F1 are required to be aligned to the power operations transformers in Mode 4 for operability in accordance with TS 3.8.9.
"With both E1 and F1 essential busses aligned to the shutdown operations transformers with the plant in Mode 4, both trains of the essential electrical power distribution system were inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. At 1733 EDT both E1 and F1 essential busses were aligned to the power operations transformers as required by TS 3.8.9.
"This issue is being reported as a loss of safety function of the essential electrical busses.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1315 EST ON 11/09/2016 FROM ANDY MILLER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Engineering reviewed the actual conditions during the approximate 36 minutes the 480V AC essential busses were being supplied from the shutdown operations transformers. Grid voltages were higher than assumed minimum voltages, and electrical loading during Mode 4 conditions were reduced from expected full power operation loading. As a result, Engineering determined that all equipment remained capable of performing its required functions while connected to the shutdown operations transformers.
"Because the equipment remained capable of satisfying the requirements for Operability, no condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, no loss of safety function existed for the 480V AC essential buses, and the notification made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A-D) by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 9/16/2016 (EN# 52247) is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction."
Notified the R3DO (Jeffers).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52245
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/16/2016
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 09:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2016
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2016
Event Time: 09:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HYDRAULIC FLUID (FISH OIL) SPILL
"At 0858 [EDT] on September 16th, 2016, approximately 3 ounces of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was spilled in front of the Unit Two Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit Two trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery.
"Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC, under RAL 11.8.2.a, was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0913 [EDT]. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department intends to retract the report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection based on the fluid remained within the Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake Structure."
The licensee has notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
"At 0858 [EDT] on September 16th, 2016, approximately 3 ounces of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was spilled in front of the Unit Two Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit Two trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery.
"Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC, under RAL 11.8.2.a, was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0913 [EDT]. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department intends to retract the report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection based on the fluid remained within the Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake Structure."
The licensee has notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.