Event Notification Report for August 25, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:

"NJDEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] received notification from New Jersey Transit Police at 1426 EDT on Saturday, 8/27/16, that a Niton xlp 300 series XRF with serial number 7710 belonging to New York licensee TRC Environmental Corporation was left on a New Jersey Transit bus on Thursday, 8/25/16 at approximately 1845 EDT. The licensee reported the loss of the device to New York State Department of Health on Friday, 8/26/16. The Cadmium-109 source in the device has a maximum activity of 50 mCi (per sealed source registry). This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) because it exceeds 1000 times the value for Cd-109 in Appendix C. The licensee employee who left the device on the bus was taking it home to have it for a job in New York the next day. They did not plan to use the device in New Jersey.

"NY DOH [New York Department of Health] officials indicated that they will provide NJDEP with more information on Monday, 8/28/16."

State Report #: NJ-16-02


* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN FLANIGAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1134 EDT ON 9/6/2016 * * *

"The device was found on a New Jersey Transit bus in Weehawken, New Jersey and was picked up by the licensee on 9/1/16.

"New York Department of Health provided New Jersey DEP with the following information from their licensee: New York License Number - C3264. Source S/N - TR3464. Device S/N - 22323. Activity at time source was lost - 26.8 mCi [Cd-109].

"This event is the same event as EN 52207 which was reported by NY DOH."

Notified R1DO (Gray), ILTAB (Whitney), and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The following report was received from the New York Department of Health:

"An employee of TRC [TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION] put a Niton XLP-300, XRF [X-Ray fluorescence analyzer] containing 40 milliCuries of Cadmium 109 on the overhead shelf of New Jersey Transit bus #8306 and then forgot to collect the case when he got off the bus and went home. The employee contacted the NJT [New Jersey Transit] offices at approximately 0845 [EDT] on Friday, 8/26/2016, to inquire about the lost case. He provided a description of the case and a photo of a similar case. Claim number L487457 was assigned to the matter by NJT. As of 1730 on 8/26/2016, NJT staff had not located the case. A TRC Project Manager visited the PABT [Port Authority Bus Terminal] in New York City at approximately 1430 on Friday 8/26/2016. When the bus arrived, the TRC Project Manager inquired with the driver if the case had been found and double checked the bus, but did not locate the case. The TRC Project Manager also went to Customer Service/Lost and Found at PABT for NJT and made an additional claim, number L487502, with his mobile contact number should device be returned to PABT. The TRC employee will check in with the NJT lost and found department later in the evening on 8/26/2016 to ask if the case has been located."

See also EN-52206.

New York Event # NY-16-05

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTED PACKAGE EXCEEDED CONTAMINATION LIMITS

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:

"On August 25, 2016, the Department [Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] was notified by Lancaster General Hospital that a package was received in which 5 of the 6 sides exceeded the contamination limits in 10 CFR 71.47. This is reportable per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).

"A package containing a vial of 5 milliCuries of iodine-123 in liquid form was received from GE Healthcare at approximately 0830 [EDT] this morning. The package was undamaged. The receipt survey was performed and noted removable contamination as follows: Front and handle 10,108 dpm; Right side 2,131 dpm; Front handle 4,977 dpm; Front 4,426 dpm; Top background; Top strap 4,577 dpm; Back/bottom 1,997 dpm.

"After completing wipe testing, the technologist performed an area survey. The area background was found to be 0.04 mR/hr. At 1 meter, the package was found to be 0.05 mR/hr. At the package surface the reading was found to be 0.4 mR/hr. The contamination identified as technetium-99m. Given this finding, package [was] opened to verify it was I-123. The contamination is believed to have been transferred from somewhere else. Upon return to the originator (GE) pharmacy, a survey of the delivery driver's hands, vehicle, and all packages in the vehicle was performed. None showed contamination. All hospital personnel involved and surrounding areas were surveyed and found to be contamination free. No one received a dose above regulatory limits."

Cause of the event is unknown at this time. The Department has an inspector onsite. More information will be provided when available.

Event Report ID No: PA160023

UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING POTENTIAL TORNADO MISSILE DAMAGE

"On August 25, 2016, Engineering staff were reviewing a proposed modification to install additional internal flooding protection for the Intake Building staircase down to the Raw Water Pump vault. Fort Calhoun Station determined that the existing Intake Building internal flooding and tornado-borne missile analyses did not sufficiently account for the potential of tornado-borne missiles striking Fire Protection piping in the Intake Building. A tornado-borne missile strike could potentially cause a double-ended rupture of Fire Protection piping in the vicinity of the stairwell down to the Raw Water Pump vault, which could cause flooding and subsequent failure of all four Raw Water Pump motors more quickly than bounded by the Engineering Analysis. The Engineering Analysis uses a postulated crack from a Moderate Energy Line Break per USNRC Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, vice postulating a double ended pipe rupture. The resulting flow rate from this postulated crack is less than that possible from a tornado-borne missile strike.

"This condition creates a potential loss of safety function from the Fort Calhoun Station Raw Water System (ultimate heat sink). All four Raw Water Pump motors could potentially become inoperable from flooding caused by a tornado-borne missile impacting the Fire Protection System Piping near the Raw Water vault stairwell prior to operator action to secure both Fire Pumps.

"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Interim compensatory measures are to isolate the Fire Protection piping in the vicinity of the Raw Water Pump vault stairwell when severe weather is forecast."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At 1629 EDT on August 25, 2016, it was determined that a Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fan should be declared inoperable if its associated fan brake is nonfunctional. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Currently, the MDCT fans and fan brakes are operable. A past operability evaluation is being performed and has initially identified that from 0855 EDT to 1738 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 1 'A' fan brake was nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Additionally, from 0856 EDT on April 6, 2016, to 1641 EDT on April 7, 2016, the Division 1 'C' fan brake was also nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Therefore, the Division 1 UHS and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) would have been inoperable. During this time, at 1347 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 2 EDG 14 was inoperable for 22 seconds for a planned testing.

"This resulted in an unanalyzed condition because the plant configuration during the 22 seconds when EDG 14 was inoperable would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. A past operability review is in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional results in any additional instances of unanalyzed condition within the past three years. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."