Event Notification Report for August 04, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/03/2016 - 08/04/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
52153521545216452152
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52153
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LORI KIFFMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LORI KIFFMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/04/2016
Notification Time: 22:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 22:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1415 CDT on August 4, 2016, while performing a scheduled fire protection surveillance, it was discovered that a component within fire panel FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION had failed resulting in the inability of the installed fire detectors to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2, 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 2, 250 VDC battery room. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a Loss Of Emergency Assessment Capability as the Control Room would not receive automatic notification of a fire in these areas for evaluation of HU2.1 and HA2.1 for fire within impacted battery rooms which are located within the Protected Area. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. A 15 minute fire watch has been established for the affected fire zones.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM MARTIN RAJKOWSKI TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1050 EDT ON 08/05/2016 * * *
"Event Notification 52153 completed at 2204 EDT on 8/4/2016 shown above contains an error. The failure of FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION, resulted in the inability to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 1 250 VDC battery room. The Division 2 250 VDC battery room was not affected by this issue. Additionally, the State of Minnesota was notified of this issue. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update."
Notified R3DO (Skokowski)
"At 1415 CDT on August 4, 2016, while performing a scheduled fire protection surveillance, it was discovered that a component within fire panel FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION had failed resulting in the inability of the installed fire detectors to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2, 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 2, 250 VDC battery room. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a Loss Of Emergency Assessment Capability as the Control Room would not receive automatic notification of a fire in these areas for evaluation of HU2.1 and HA2.1 for fire within impacted battery rooms which are located within the Protected Area. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. A 15 minute fire watch has been established for the affected fire zones.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM MARTIN RAJKOWSKI TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1050 EDT ON 08/05/2016 * * *
"Event Notification 52153 completed at 2204 EDT on 8/4/2016 shown above contains an error. The failure of FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION, resulted in the inability to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 1 250 VDC battery room. The Division 2 250 VDC battery room was not affected by this issue. Additionally, the State of Minnesota was notified of this issue. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update."
Notified R3DO (Skokowski)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52154
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 06:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 22:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Notification Time: 06:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 22:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED FIRE BARRIER
"At 2240 CDT on August 4, 2016, it was discovered that the floor between the cable spreading room and the plant administration building (PAB) basement is not a credited Appendix R fire barrier. Because the cable spreading room and the plant administration building are located in the same fire area, a fire in the PAB could spread to the cable spreading room requiring evacuation of the control room. The travel path used to access the Alternate Shutdown Panel following control room evacuation traverses the same fire area in the PAB. Therefore, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) for Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition as a fire in the PAB could have the potential to impact Division 1 equipment as well as impede the Operators ability to access Division 2 safe shutdown equipment. Fire watches have been established. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota.
"At 2240 CDT on August 4, 2016, it was discovered that the floor between the cable spreading room and the plant administration building (PAB) basement is not a credited Appendix R fire barrier. Because the cable spreading room and the plant administration building are located in the same fire area, a fire in the PAB could spread to the cable spreading room requiring evacuation of the control room. The travel path used to access the Alternate Shutdown Panel following control room evacuation traverses the same fire area in the PAB. Therefore, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) for Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition as a fire in the PAB could have the potential to impact Division 1 equipment as well as impede the Operators ability to access Division 2 safe shutdown equipment. Fire watches have been established. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota.
Agreement State
Event Number: 52164
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SPENCER WICKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SPENCER WICKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 08/09/2016
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2016
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM (H-3) EXIT SIGN
The following was received from the State of Utah via email:
"On July 19, 2016, the licensee [University of Utah] was performing a 6-month inventory of the H-3 exit signs, when the individual performing the inventory noticed that one of the signs was missing. The licensee left a message with the University's facilities management office to see if the sign was removed by them. On August 4, 2016, the licensee was informed by the [facilities] management group that they had not removed the sign. The licensee then determined that the sign was missing and presumed stolen. The licensee notified the DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] of the missing sign on August 9, 2016. The licensee will continue to investigate the incident, and will submit a written report to the DWMRC. The DWMRC will possibly perform an investigation on August 10, 2016.
"Manufacturer: Safety Lite Corporation
"Model: unknown
"Serial #: 025297
"Activity on manufacture date: 20 Ci of H-3"
Utah Event Report Number: UT160003
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following was received from the State of Utah via email:
"On July 19, 2016, the licensee [University of Utah] was performing a 6-month inventory of the H-3 exit signs, when the individual performing the inventory noticed that one of the signs was missing. The licensee left a message with the University's facilities management office to see if the sign was removed by them. On August 4, 2016, the licensee was informed by the [facilities] management group that they had not removed the sign. The licensee then determined that the sign was missing and presumed stolen. The licensee notified the DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] of the missing sign on August 9, 2016. The licensee will continue to investigate the incident, and will submit a written report to the DWMRC. The DWMRC will possibly perform an investigation on August 10, 2016.
"Manufacturer: Safety Lite Corporation
"Model: unknown
"Serial #: 025297
"Activity on manufacture date: 20 Ci of H-3"
Utah Event Report Number: UT160003
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52152
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK YARLEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK YARLEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/04/2016
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2016
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2016
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT-OF-SERVICE
"This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete.
"If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures.
"The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete.
"If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures.
"The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."