Event Notification Report for July 08, 2016

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SPILL

"Oil reported in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent after the start of 3rd circulating water pump. The source of the oil is believed to be from oil entrained in the discharge canal from oil leak previously reported in EN#52045. One circulating water pump was removed from service to mitigate the source. The United States Coast Guard Response Center, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. James A. Fitzpatrick Control Room was notified of the issue at 0645, off site agencies were first notified at 0743."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NOT MET

"On July 8 2016, at 19:09 [EDT] a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm for a duration time of 2 seconds total (one second for each event).

"At 20:05:21 Secondary Containment pressure went positive (0.22 inches of water gauge) and at 20:05:22 returned back below plant TS limits (-0.35 inches of water gauge).

"At 20:06:33 Secondary Containment pressure went greater than TS limits (-0.10 inches of water gauge) and at 20:06:34 returned below TS limits (-0.28 inches of water gauge).

"All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned the secondary containment pressure below the TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The severe thunderstorm warning for the area was cancelled at 20:30.

"The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below.

"The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.'

"In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event.

"In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On July 9, 2016, the licensee reported that on July 8, 2016, at approximately 1630 hours (CDT), one of its InstroTek 3500 Xplorer (SN: 1845) moisture/density gauges had been lost at a temporary job site. The licensee reported its technician had completed work for the day. The gauge was muddy so the technician placed it inside its transport case in the back of his pickup and left the case's lid up. He then got busy finishing up paperwork and talked to a site supervisor. The technician failed to close the case lid, secure the case in the vehicle, or raise the tailgate before leaving the site. When he got to the main road, he realized this and checked the gauge. It was not in the truck. He backtracked his route and checked at the work site but his search was unsuccessful. The source rod on the device is locked. The licensee stated there is a lot of oilfield traffic in the area the gauge was lost. The licensee's name and phone numbers are on the device and they are hopeful it may have been picked up and will be returned on Monday. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.

"Event Location: County Road 285, approximately 15 miles northwest of Mentone, Texas.

"Notifications: County Sheriff's Offices (both Loving and Reeves Counties)."

The State reported that the gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/11/16 AT 0919 EDT FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following updated information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"Texas has assigned its incident number I-9419 to this event.

"Also, correct spelling of gauge manufacturer is InstroTek."

R4DO (Gaddy), NMSS Events, and CNSNS (Mexico) have been notified by email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT INTO RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

While conducting radiography at a field location in Indiana, the radiographer determined that the source could not be retracted. He immediately contacted the company's radiation safety officer (RSO), located in Pennsylvania. The RSO, who is licensed to retrieve sources, directed the radiographer to establish a 2 mR/hr boundary and await his arrival. Additionally, another crew was dispatched to assist the original crew in maintaining the boundary secure.

Upon the RSO's arrival, the RSO and radiographers determined that the source was still in the collimator. They then used sandbags to reduce the work area dose rates. The RSO was able to retrieve the source and return it to the shielded position in the camera. The RSO conducted field testing and found no mechanical issues with the camera and could not replicate the problem. The RSO believes the problem was due to a source misconnect. The camera is currently enroute to the company's Ohio facility for additional testing prior to returning it to service. The RSO received 2 mR during the retrieval. The radiographer and assistant radiographer received 20 mR and 5 mR, respectively, during the retrieval.

The camera was a QSA 880 Delta containing a 55 Ci Ir-192 source.

No members of the public received any dose due to this event.