Event Notification Report for May 23, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/22/2016 - 05/23/2016
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 51953
Rep Org: DBI, INC.
Licensee: DBI, INC.
Region: 4
City: OVERLAND PARK State: KS
County:
License #: 15-29301-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT SLAYMAKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: DBI, INC.
Region: 4
City: OVERLAND PARK State: KS
County:
License #: 15-29301-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT SLAYMAKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/24/2016
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2016
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE CABLE NOT ENGAGED TO SOURCE
"On May 23, 2016 DBI Inc. (Lic# 15-29301-02) had an Industrial radiography crew working outside of Elmer, MO (Approx. 3hrs from Overland Park, KS Office). At approximately 1315 [CDT] during the crews first source retraction it was determined that the source had become disconnected from the driver cable. The crew immediately recognized the situation though the use of their dosimetry equipment. The Corporate Radiation Safety
Officer [RSO], was immediately notified of the issue. [The RSO] informed the crew to establish the emergency barricades and to not attempt anything further with the exposure device. [The RSO] arrived at the job site at approximately [1620] to retrieve the source. The source was secured back into the exposure device by [1645].
"Dosimeter readings were taken immediately upon discovery of the disconnect and monitored throughout the end of the day. Total recorded dose for the individuals involved was as follows:
[Worker 1] 18mR
[Worker 2] 12mR
[RSO] 3mR
"Doses recorded fall within the normal expectations for the work that was performed.
"Listed below are the relevant materials & equipment involved:
QSA Global 880 Delta exposure device. (S/N D6707)
QSA Global model A424-9 lr-192 Source (S/N 27422G) 33 Curies
QSA Global extreme weather 35' cranks (S/N KC-009)
QSA Global extreme weather 7' source tube with a 4hvl collimator (S/N KC-009)"
"On May 23, 2016 DBI Inc. (Lic# 15-29301-02) had an Industrial radiography crew working outside of Elmer, MO (Approx. 3hrs from Overland Park, KS Office). At approximately 1315 [CDT] during the crews first source retraction it was determined that the source had become disconnected from the driver cable. The crew immediately recognized the situation though the use of their dosimetry equipment. The Corporate Radiation Safety
Officer [RSO], was immediately notified of the issue. [The RSO] informed the crew to establish the emergency barricades and to not attempt anything further with the exposure device. [The RSO] arrived at the job site at approximately [1620] to retrieve the source. The source was secured back into the exposure device by [1645].
"Dosimeter readings were taken immediately upon discovery of the disconnect and monitored throughout the end of the day. Total recorded dose for the individuals involved was as follows:
[Worker 1] 18mR
[Worker 2] 12mR
[RSO] 3mR
"Doses recorded fall within the normal expectations for the work that was performed.
"Listed below are the relevant materials & equipment involved:
QSA Global 880 Delta exposure device. (S/N D6707)
QSA Global model A424-9 lr-192 Source (S/N 27422G) 33 Curies
QSA Global extreme weather 35' cranks (S/N KC-009)
QSA Global extreme weather 7' source tube with a 4hvl collimator (S/N KC-009)"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51949
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD SHORT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD SHORT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 11:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 11:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FFD GRP (EMAI)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FFD GRP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR
"A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51950
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 10:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 10:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PLANT HATCH UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ACTUATION
"On May 23, 2016, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were performing turbine testing with Unit 2 offline for planned maintenance, an event resulted in the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. In response to this unexpected signal, 2B21F016 (Steam Line Drain Line Inboard Isolation Valve), 2B21F019 (Steam Line Drain Line Outboard Isolation Valve), and 2B31F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) went closed, all of which are primary containment isolation valves actuated by Group 1 Isolation. The Group 1 Isolation signal initiated based on low condenser vacuum during the turbine testing procedure, a valid condition that was expected to have been bypassed in the logic during the performance of this procedure. Human performance is believed to be the cause of these systems having actuated in a way that was not part of the planned evolution. Although the Unit was shut down when this signal was received, and primary containment isolation was not required to mitigate the consequences of an event, this Isolation signal has been determined to have been valid due to the initiation in response to actual plant conditions or parameters which satisfy the requirements for initiation of the system.
"The event is reportable as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(2):
(A) Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
(2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam Isolation valves (MSIVs).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On May 23, 2016, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were performing turbine testing with Unit 2 offline for planned maintenance, an event resulted in the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. In response to this unexpected signal, 2B21F016 (Steam Line Drain Line Inboard Isolation Valve), 2B21F019 (Steam Line Drain Line Outboard Isolation Valve), and 2B31F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) went closed, all of which are primary containment isolation valves actuated by Group 1 Isolation. The Group 1 Isolation signal initiated based on low condenser vacuum during the turbine testing procedure, a valid condition that was expected to have been bypassed in the logic during the performance of this procedure. Human performance is believed to be the cause of these systems having actuated in a way that was not part of the planned evolution. Although the Unit was shut down when this signal was received, and primary containment isolation was not required to mitigate the consequences of an event, this Isolation signal has been determined to have been valid due to the initiation in response to actual plant conditions or parameters which satisfy the requirements for initiation of the system.
"The event is reportable as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(2):
(A) Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
(2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam Isolation valves (MSIVs).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."