Event Notification Report for May 11, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO RAD WORKER

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On May 11, 2016, the licensee called the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] to report a potential overexposure. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) had only initial information at the time of the report. He reported one of the licensee's radiographers had taped the guide tube (with collimator attached) to a jig in order to perform an exposure. During the exposure, the guide tube fell. The radiographer failed to retract the source before he walked to the end of the guide tube, picked it up, and taped it back on the jig. The RSO is investigating to get the details of the event. The radiographer's dosimetry badge has been sent for immediate processing. The radiographer was using a QSA 880D device with a 34.8 Curie iridium-192 source. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9402

* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO VINCE KLCO AT 5/13/16 AT 1700 EDT * * *

The following information was received from the State of Texas by email:

"UPDATE: Licensee completed a re-enactment of the situation using video tape and empty camera with attachments. The re-enactment demonstrated that the person placed his left hand on the collimator and included inserting his middle finger into the port hole on the collimator. The RSO completed dose calculations of 467 Rem to the finger. The badge results displayed 307 mRem whole body dose. The badge was worn for approximately eight days for this month. The finger appears to show slight redness, otherwise no visible effects at present time (3 days after event). Blood work was drawn and the person is scheduled for another doctor visit on Monday. The Agency has not received the detailed calculations and has not concurred with this dose estimate. Another update will be provided as information is acquired."

Notified the R4DO (Campbell). Notified NMSS Events, Angela McIntosh and Patricia Milligan via email.

FARLEY UNIT 2 TRIP ON HI HI STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL

"At 0653 [CDT] on 5/11/16, Farley Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped from 29 [percent] power. The initiating event was hi-hi Steam Generator level. Steam Generator levels began to rise following the start of a second condensate pump. The hi-hi steam generator level setpoint was reached causing the only running main feedwater pump to trip, a main feedwater isolation, and an automatic turbine trip. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected. The reactor was manually tripped per procedure. All other systems responded properly for the event and there were no complications.

"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - POTENTIAL DEFECT APPLICABLE TO HYTORK XL1126 PNEUMATIC ACTUATORS

The following information was provided by Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via fax:

"On March 16, 2016, Curtiss-Wright was notified by one of our commercial suppliers that they had received an Important Product Safety Notice (safety notice) from Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork concerning Hytork models XL1371 and XL1126 pneumatic rack and pinion actuators, manufactured after 2005 and before June 2015. Curtiss-Wright began evaluating any possible impact at that time. On May 11, 2016 Curtiss-Wright made the decision that the defect was reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. A total of four (4) Hytork XL1126 pneumatic actuators had been dedicated by Curtiss-Wright and provided as safety-related. Two (2) of the actuators were supplied to the PSEG, Salem Generating Station and the other two (2) were supplied to MOX Services. Both Salem Generating Station and MOX Services have been notified of this potential defect. Curtiss-Wright has not supplied any of the XL 1371 actuators.

"Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork states that there is a small possibility that a crack may develop in the actuator body under normal operation. The Emerson/Hytork investigation determined that a combination of actuator body structural design and material specifications along with manufacturer processes, could lead to material properties that are not within stated specifications. This condition may cause higher than allowable stresses to occur in the actuator body, which could lead to crack initiation. If a crack does develop and the actuator continues to operate, the crack may propagate to the end of the body and the end caps could be forcefully ejected. In addition to operational concerns, this condition may present a personnel safety hazard.

"Based on phone conversations with Hytork it was learned that only one model XL1126 actuator failure has been reported out of approximately 10,000 supplied. Hytork stated that the failed actuator was in a 'severe' (mechanical, operational) application with very high cycle frequency and likely experienced high impact loading.

"The list below identifies the affected customers, approximate ship dates, applicable purchase orders and actuator details.

PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment November, 2011, Customer PO Number 4500606542, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80AH0 Actuator Damper Tag 1CAA14

MOX, approximate date of shipment June, 2014, Customer PO Number 10888-P-6374, Affected Equipment Two Hytork XL1126SR80 Actuators Catalog ID 14306 (HDE*AOD 0142B) & Catalog ID 14309 (HDE*AOD 0197B)

PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment September 2015, Customer PO Number 4500826720, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80-A00 Actuator Damper Tag 2CAA14

"Hytork ceased production of the XL1126 and XL1371 actuators in June 2015 due to the described problem. Hytork is revising the design to connect the defect and will issue new model numbers for the re-designed actuators.

"Hytork expects to begin production of the new models in June of this year. Although Curtiss-Wright has successfully seismically tested two Hytork model XL1126 actuators under load, providing reasonable assurance that the actuators will survive and operate under normal and seismic loading, it is still recommended that the actuators be replaced as soon as practical. In the interim it is recommended that operating plants perform periodic (recommend weekly or if infrequently operated, following each operation) visual and/or soap-bubble inspections. The recommended actions provided below are considered to provide adequate indication of onset of this potential condition since instantaneous failures have not been identified and are not projected.

a) For all persons who are or could be in the area where the affected equipment is present, ensure they are warned of the potential danger.
b) Visually inspect all affected models for cracks, especially underneath the dual stroke adjustment pad and on top of the actuator body in the pinion area.
c) If you are unsure whether a crack is present, perform a soap bubble test.
d) If you identify a crack or leak, immediately remove this actuator from service.

"For additional information please contact the following personnel.

"Steve Willard, Engineering: 256-924-7463 (office); swillard@curtisswright.com (e-mail)
Tony Gill, QA Manager: 256-924-7438 (office); 256-426-4558 (cell); tgill@curtisswright.com (e-mail)"