Event Notification Report for May 10, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/09/2016 - 05/10/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51917
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN WIEMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN WIEMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/10/2016
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2016
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO UNANALYZED CONDITION
"During scheduled maintenance, at 1138 CDT, the Fort Calhoun Station Shift Manager was notified via phone call and condition report of an unanalyzed condition which was the result of the maintenance on Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger valves. This condition could have led to the inability of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system to perform its design function of providing a cooling medium for the Containment atmosphere under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. This was identified by OPPD [Omaha Public Power District] staff engaged in Design Basis Reconstitution.
"As part of the maintenance, HCV-484, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger AC-4A CCW Outlet Valve, and HCV-481, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger AC-4B CCW Inlet Valve, were opened. Under these conditions, with the assumed single failure loss of DC control power and accident conditions of a LOCA, CCW would be allowed to flow through both shutdown cooling heat exchangers, effectively bypassing flow to the Containment Cooling Units. These conditions are not assumed under plant design basis calculations, and therefore placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
"Following clearance removal at 1535 CDT, both HCV-484 and HCV-481 were returned to service and the condition described above no longer exists."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/15/16 AT 1836 EDT FROM JOHN BLALOCK TO DONG PARK * * *
"Discovered 6/15/2016 at 1330 CDT: During the extent of condition review for the above ENS notification, it was discovered that the unanalyzed condition that occurred on 5/10/2016 also occurred five other times during the past 3 years. Details for these additional occurrences will be included in the 60-day Licensee Event Report associated with the original 5/10/2016 ENS notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Taylor).
"During scheduled maintenance, at 1138 CDT, the Fort Calhoun Station Shift Manager was notified via phone call and condition report of an unanalyzed condition which was the result of the maintenance on Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger valves. This condition could have led to the inability of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system to perform its design function of providing a cooling medium for the Containment atmosphere under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. This was identified by OPPD [Omaha Public Power District] staff engaged in Design Basis Reconstitution.
"As part of the maintenance, HCV-484, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger AC-4A CCW Outlet Valve, and HCV-481, Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger AC-4B CCW Inlet Valve, were opened. Under these conditions, with the assumed single failure loss of DC control power and accident conditions of a LOCA, CCW would be allowed to flow through both shutdown cooling heat exchangers, effectively bypassing flow to the Containment Cooling Units. These conditions are not assumed under plant design basis calculations, and therefore placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
"Following clearance removal at 1535 CDT, both HCV-484 and HCV-481 were returned to service and the condition described above no longer exists."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/15/16 AT 1836 EDT FROM JOHN BLALOCK TO DONG PARK * * *
"Discovered 6/15/2016 at 1330 CDT: During the extent of condition review for the above ENS notification, it was discovered that the unanalyzed condition that occurred on 5/10/2016 also occurred five other times during the past 3 years. Details for these additional occurrences will be included in the 60-day Licensee Event Report associated with the original 5/10/2016 ENS notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Taylor).
Part 21
Event Number: 51923
Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/12/2016
Notification Time: 19:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2016
Notification Time: 19:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF MASTERPACT BREAKER FAIL TO CLOSE
The following information was a licensee received facsimile;
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4):
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.
-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'.
Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics
Fort Worth, Texas 76118
"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.
"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.
"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.
"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.
"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.
"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.
"(vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised
technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.
"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.
"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.
"Please contact NLI with any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance"
* * * UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list.
"Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following information was received via facsimile:
Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016.
Additional facility identified as impacted:
St. Lucie - Issue identified
For additional information contact:
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics
7410 Pebble Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76118
Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1907 EDT ON 9/22/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers:
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has been identified.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NLI). This issue has not been identified.
Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly.
"The part numbers are:
847323 (100-130VAC/DC)
847324 (200-240VAC/DC)
Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB-12-007."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
The following information was a licensee received facsimile;
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4):
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers.
-The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'.
Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics
Fort Worth, Texas 76118
"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.
"PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load.
"NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies.
"Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close.
"PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016.
"The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers.
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified.
"(vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised
technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition.
"Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time.
"The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism.
"Please contact NLI with any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance"
* * * UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list.
"Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following information was received via facsimile:
Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016.
Additional facility identified as impacted:
St. Lucie - Issue identified
For additional information contact:
Tracy Bolt
Director of Quality Assurance
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics
7410 Pebble Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76118
Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1907 EDT ON 9/22/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation.
"Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers:
"PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style
River Bend - Issue identified for NT style
Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
St. Lucie - This issue has been identified.
Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NLI). This issue has not been identified.
Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated.
"NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly.
"The part numbers are:
847323 (100-130VAC/DC)
847324 (200-240VAC/DC)
Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB-12-007."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
Part 21
Event Number: 51915
Rep Org: ELECTROSWITCH
Licensee: ELECTROSWITCH
Region: 1
City: WEYMOUTH State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 99900833
NRC Notified By: LARRY FRIEDMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Licensee: ELECTROSWITCH
Region: 1
City: WEYMOUTH State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 99900833
NRC Notified By: LARRY FRIEDMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 05/10/2016
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2016
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART 21 REPORTING OF DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:
"Various Electroswitch products - Series 24 Instrument & Control (Part #24XX, 24XXX, 243XX, 74XXX), Series 24 LOR (part #78XX), Series 24 LOR/ER (part #78XX), Series 24 CSR (part #88XX), Series 24 LSR (part #92XX), Series 31 Instrument & Control (part #31XXX, 65XXX, 75XXX), Series 31 TR/LSR (part #93XX), Series 20 Cam (part #20KB, 20KD, 20LB, 20LD, 20MB, 20MD, 20MF, 20MG, 20PF, 20PG, 20PH, 20PJ, 20PL, 20PY), Series 20 Module (part #10XXX, 17XXX, 18XXX, 19XXX, 29XXX, 30XXX, 32XXX,38XXX,40XXX, 60XXX, 61XXX, 62XXX, 63XXX) [have a potential deviation (departure from the technical requirements included in the procure document)]
"It was determined on May 10, 2016 that Electroswitch does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect, which could create a substantial safety hazard, exists.
"Any Electroswitch product that has a part number listed above and was sold as a Safety-Related Class 1E product [may contain the deviation].
The two nonconformance issues are:
"Initial Product Qualification Tests for Dielectric Withstanding Voltage, Insulation Resistance and Contact Resistance as defined in Electroswitch's ESC-STD-1000 Rev. 3 dated 9/3/1984 General Specifications for Rotary Switches and Auxiliary Relays for Utility Applications including Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations was found to be in contradiction to IEEE C37.90-1978 Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus.
"Electroswitch did not procure materials, parts, equipment and/or services from an Appendix B supplier nor were applicable Commercial Grade Surveys, Source Inspections and Material Analyses performed for the following materials:
Precious metal blade overlay material
Red metal blade material
Precious metal overlay thickness of switch blade material
Molding compound of switch insulators (terminal decks and barriers)
Carbon steel for securing rods
Solenoids
Relays
Services (test labs) pertaining to product qualification
Electroswitch is attempting to determine which NRC licensees are potentially affected.
"The following personnel may be contacted regarding this notification:
Larry Friedman
Quality Assurance Manager
781-607-3309
Ed Reszenski
Engineering Manager
781-607-3341"
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1656 EDT ON 5/11/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
Below is the list of utilities (and plants where specified) which were notified of Electroswitch's decision to end the Appendix B Quality Assurance Program:
Ameren Energy
Dominion Energy
Duke Energy
Energy Northwest
Entergy Nuclear (Waterford 3 Nuclear)
Entergy Nuclear (Pilgrim Power Plant)
Entergy Nuclear (Indian Point Energy)
Xcel Energy (Monticello Nuclear)
MPR Associates for FPL
Nebraska Public Power (Cooper Nuclear)
Nextera (Point Beach Nuclear)
Xcel Energy (Prairie Island Gen)
Southern Power (Hatch)
Southern Power (Vogtle)
TVA
TVA (Watts Bar Nuclear)
Wolf Creek Nuclear
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan) and R4DO (Campbell) and via E-mail Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group.
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONG HWA PARK AT 1617 EDT ON 8/25/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Electroswitch is formally requesting a thirty (30) day extension to complete the evaluation by Sept. 24, 2016 in order to provide detailed answers to the questions and provide any needed updates to the Part 21 notification report."
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Michel), R3DO (Cameron) and R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group via E-mail.
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1349 EDT ON 10/21/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Subject: Response to questions about Electroswitch's response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report NO. 99900833/2016-201 and Notice of Nonconformance (Letter from Terry W. Jackson, Branch Chief dated August 5, 2016."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Masters), R3DO (Orth) and R4DO (Kramer) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group via E-mail.
The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:
"Various Electroswitch products - Series 24 Instrument & Control (Part #24XX, 24XXX, 243XX, 74XXX), Series 24 LOR (part #78XX), Series 24 LOR/ER (part #78XX), Series 24 CSR (part #88XX), Series 24 LSR (part #92XX), Series 31 Instrument & Control (part #31XXX, 65XXX, 75XXX), Series 31 TR/LSR (part #93XX), Series 20 Cam (part #20KB, 20KD, 20LB, 20LD, 20MB, 20MD, 20MF, 20MG, 20PF, 20PG, 20PH, 20PJ, 20PL, 20PY), Series 20 Module (part #10XXX, 17XXX, 18XXX, 19XXX, 29XXX, 30XXX, 32XXX,38XXX,40XXX, 60XXX, 61XXX, 62XXX, 63XXX) [have a potential deviation (departure from the technical requirements included in the procure document)]
"It was determined on May 10, 2016 that Electroswitch does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect, which could create a substantial safety hazard, exists.
"Any Electroswitch product that has a part number listed above and was sold as a Safety-Related Class 1E product [may contain the deviation].
The two nonconformance issues are:
"Initial Product Qualification Tests for Dielectric Withstanding Voltage, Insulation Resistance and Contact Resistance as defined in Electroswitch's ESC-STD-1000 Rev. 3 dated 9/3/1984 General Specifications for Rotary Switches and Auxiliary Relays for Utility Applications including Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations was found to be in contradiction to IEEE C37.90-1978 Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus.
"Electroswitch did not procure materials, parts, equipment and/or services from an Appendix B supplier nor were applicable Commercial Grade Surveys, Source Inspections and Material Analyses performed for the following materials:
Precious metal blade overlay material
Red metal blade material
Precious metal overlay thickness of switch blade material
Molding compound of switch insulators (terminal decks and barriers)
Carbon steel for securing rods
Solenoids
Relays
Services (test labs) pertaining to product qualification
Electroswitch is attempting to determine which NRC licensees are potentially affected.
"The following personnel may be contacted regarding this notification:
Larry Friedman
Quality Assurance Manager
781-607-3309
Ed Reszenski
Engineering Manager
781-607-3341"
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1656 EDT ON 5/11/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
Below is the list of utilities (and plants where specified) which were notified of Electroswitch's decision to end the Appendix B Quality Assurance Program:
Ameren Energy
Dominion Energy
Duke Energy
Energy Northwest
Entergy Nuclear (Waterford 3 Nuclear)
Entergy Nuclear (Pilgrim Power Plant)
Entergy Nuclear (Indian Point Energy)
Xcel Energy (Monticello Nuclear)
MPR Associates for FPL
Nebraska Public Power (Cooper Nuclear)
Nextera (Point Beach Nuclear)
Xcel Energy (Prairie Island Gen)
Southern Power (Hatch)
Southern Power (Vogtle)
TVA
TVA (Watts Bar Nuclear)
Wolf Creek Nuclear
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan) and R4DO (Campbell) and via E-mail Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group.
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO DONG HWA PARK AT 1617 EDT ON 8/25/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Electroswitch is formally requesting a thirty (30) day extension to complete the evaluation by Sept. 24, 2016 in order to provide detailed answers to the questions and provide any needed updates to the Part 21 notification report."
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Michel), R3DO (Cameron) and R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group via E-mail.
* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY FRIEDMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1349 EDT ON 10/21/2016 * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"Subject: Response to questions about Electroswitch's response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report NO. 99900833/2016-201 and Notice of Nonconformance (Letter from Terry W. Jackson, Branch Chief dated August 5, 2016."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Masters), R3DO (Orth) and R4DO (Kramer) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group via E-mail.