Event Notification Report for April 26, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/25/2016 - 04/26/2016
EVENT NUMBERS
51885518865204151980
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51885
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN TUITE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN TUITE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/27/2016
Notification Time: 00:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 22:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2016
Notification Time: 00:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 22:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM FEEDBACK SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On April 26, 2016 at 2213 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant authorized notification of State agencies for the partial loss of the WBN Alert and Notification System (ANS) feedback system. The ANS feedback system provides monitoring capability of the off-site sirens surrounding the facility in the event of a plant Emergency. Without the feedback system in service, sirens may be activated remotely from State and local facilities but verification of successful activation is impaired. State agencies were notified to evaluate if other methods of alerting the public were warranted.
"No compensatory methods are required for this failure, as the ANS activation feedback systems remain fully functional at the State and local facilities.
"The cause for the loss of the ANS feedback system is under investigation.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 4/29/16 AT 1103 EDT FROM MATTHEW MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"The cause of the partial loss of WBN ANS Feedback System was determined to be an equipment failure. AT&T has completed the work and the modem has been reset. The Corporate TVA Operational Duty Specialist (ODS) has been monitoring [the system] and there have been no issues identified with the feedback system. Therefore, the issue has been repaired.
"In addition, further confirmation from the State of Tennessee and Rhea County was received that the sirens were fully functional at all times. The Feedback Monitoring System for the ANS was not available to the ODS only. Therefore, TVA Watts Bar is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) notification for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt).
"On April 26, 2016 at 2213 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant authorized notification of State agencies for the partial loss of the WBN Alert and Notification System (ANS) feedback system. The ANS feedback system provides monitoring capability of the off-site sirens surrounding the facility in the event of a plant Emergency. Without the feedback system in service, sirens may be activated remotely from State and local facilities but verification of successful activation is impaired. State agencies were notified to evaluate if other methods of alerting the public were warranted.
"No compensatory methods are required for this failure, as the ANS activation feedback systems remain fully functional at the State and local facilities.
"The cause for the loss of the ANS feedback system is under investigation.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 4/29/16 AT 1103 EDT FROM MATTHEW MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"The cause of the partial loss of WBN ANS Feedback System was determined to be an equipment failure. AT&T has completed the work and the modem has been reset. The Corporate TVA Operational Duty Specialist (ODS) has been monitoring [the system] and there have been no issues identified with the feedback system. Therefore, the issue has been repaired.
"In addition, further confirmation from the State of Tennessee and Rhea County was received that the sirens were fully functional at all times. The Feedback Monitoring System for the ANS was not available to the ODS only. Therefore, TVA Watts Bar is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) notification for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51886
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARIC HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARIC HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/27/2016
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 17:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2016
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 17:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1736 [CDT] on 26 April 2016, a licensed operator performing a control room panel walkdown noted the green standby light for the HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) was not illuminated. The bulb was replaced and the replacement bulb did not illuminate. A non-licensed operator (NLO) was dispatched to the local 250VDC starter rack. The NLO discovered the green standby light on the 250VDC starter rack had failed. An attempt was made to start the AOP with the control switch. The pump did not start. The AOP is required to start in order to open the steam admission valves for the HPCI turbine.
"HPCI was declared inoperable at time 1754 [CDT] on 26 April 2016. Tech Spec LCO Conditions were entered and required actions completed.
"HPCI is a single train system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [Structure, System, and Component] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"A similar condition was discovered on 25 April 2016 [see NRC Event #51882]. Corrective maintenance was performed and HPCI was declared operable following satisfactory completion of post work testing of the AOP.
"Initial investigation indicates that the fault which occurred on 26 April is not the same as that which occurred 25 April.
"Investigation is on going."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1736 [CDT] on 26 April 2016, a licensed operator performing a control room panel walkdown noted the green standby light for the HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) was not illuminated. The bulb was replaced and the replacement bulb did not illuminate. A non-licensed operator (NLO) was dispatched to the local 250VDC starter rack. The NLO discovered the green standby light on the 250VDC starter rack had failed. An attempt was made to start the AOP with the control switch. The pump did not start. The AOP is required to start in order to open the steam admission valves for the HPCI turbine.
"HPCI was declared inoperable at time 1754 [CDT] on 26 April 2016. Tech Spec LCO Conditions were entered and required actions completed.
"HPCI is a single train system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [Structure, System, and Component] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"A similar condition was discovered on 25 April 2016 [see NRC Event #51882]. Corrective maintenance was performed and HPCI was declared operable following satisfactory completion of post work testing of the AOP.
"Initial investigation indicates that the fault which occurred on 26 April is not the same as that which occurred 25 April.
"Investigation is on going."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Part 21
Event Number: 52041
Rep Org: ABB INC.
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - DEVIATION FOR CLASS 1E SOLID STATE RELAYS (47H AND 60Q)
The following information was excerpted from a received licensee fax:
On April 26, 2016, ABB confirmed a customer complaint regarding a 60Q relay received with an internal short circuit. The cause was determined to be a manufacturing deviation from specification.
Records show a total of 53 suspect relays were provided to 2 customers (Prairie Island and Tennessee Valley Authority).
Based on the nature of the deviation, any installed relay would have failed upon application of power in the relay. Therefore, the primary concern is that any relay, either in storage or installed with no power applied, may have this defect and will create a system malfunction upon power application.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support at (954) 752-6700.
The following information was excerpted from a received licensee fax:
On April 26, 2016, ABB confirmed a customer complaint regarding a 60Q relay received with an internal short circuit. The cause was determined to be a manufacturing deviation from specification.
Records show a total of 53 suspect relays were provided to 2 customers (Prairie Island and Tennessee Valley Authority).
Based on the nature of the deviation, any installed relay would have failed upon application of power in the relay. Therefore, the primary concern is that any relay, either in storage or installed with no power applied, may have this defect and will create a system malfunction upon power application.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support at (954) 752-6700.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51980
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AKRON GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: AKRON State: OH
County:
License #: 02120780000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: AKRON GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: AKRON State: OH
County:
License #: 02120780000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SOURCE
The following information was received by the State of Ohio via email:
"On 4/26/2016, Physics reported that during prepping a return shipment the dosimetrist discovered one I-125 prostate seed was missing from the lead pig. The lead pig contained loose/broken seeds from the implant performed on 4/6/2016. There were three seeds in the vial where there should've been four. The RSO interviewed the dosimetrist and the physicist who worked this case. Inventory log and loading summary were audited. Inventory log recorded 28 seeds returned to storage. Of the 28 seeds returned, 24 were in the cartridge and 4 were loose/broken seeds stored in the lead pig. It was not until 4/26/2016 when Physics discovered only 3 seeds were in the lead pig. Radiation surveys records were audited. Surveys were performed accordingly and readings were background level.
"At this time, the seed has not been located. Based on the information provided by the medical physicist and the dosimetrist, it is still unclear as to precisely determine when and how the seed became missing. Licensee believes there was no radiation exposure to the individual(s) involved. To prevent a recurrence, two individuals shall visually count the seeds in the lead pig before leaving the operating room. Furthermore, two individuals shall review loading summary to confirm all seeds are accounted for.
"Licensee has previously observed that 1-125 seeds are prone to static buildup and have the tendency to cling to plastic, glass walls, and other surfaces. Most likely, the lost seed was swept up and discarded with normal trash. Based on the relatively low activity and low energy of the 1-125 seed and measured background readings in the operating room, there was no radiation exposure to workers or members of the public due to this loss."
Source/Radioactive Material: Sealed source brachytherapy
Manufacturer: Theragenics
Model Number: AgX100
Radionuclide: I-125, 0.000396 Ci
Ohio Item Number: OH160007
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received by the State of Ohio via email:
"On 4/26/2016, Physics reported that during prepping a return shipment the dosimetrist discovered one I-125 prostate seed was missing from the lead pig. The lead pig contained loose/broken seeds from the implant performed on 4/6/2016. There were three seeds in the vial where there should've been four. The RSO interviewed the dosimetrist and the physicist who worked this case. Inventory log and loading summary were audited. Inventory log recorded 28 seeds returned to storage. Of the 28 seeds returned, 24 were in the cartridge and 4 were loose/broken seeds stored in the lead pig. It was not until 4/26/2016 when Physics discovered only 3 seeds were in the lead pig. Radiation surveys records were audited. Surveys were performed accordingly and readings were background level.
"At this time, the seed has not been located. Based on the information provided by the medical physicist and the dosimetrist, it is still unclear as to precisely determine when and how the seed became missing. Licensee believes there was no radiation exposure to the individual(s) involved. To prevent a recurrence, two individuals shall visually count the seeds in the lead pig before leaving the operating room. Furthermore, two individuals shall review loading summary to confirm all seeds are accounted for.
"Licensee has previously observed that 1-125 seeds are prone to static buildup and have the tendency to cling to plastic, glass walls, and other surfaces. Most likely, the lost seed was swept up and discarded with normal trash. Based on the relatively low activity and low energy of the 1-125 seed and measured background readings in the operating room, there was no radiation exposure to workers or members of the public due to this loss."
Source/Radioactive Material: Sealed source brachytherapy
Manufacturer: Theragenics
Model Number: AgX100
Radionuclide: I-125, 0.000396 Ci
Ohio Item Number: OH160007
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf