Event Notification Report for April 25, 2016

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On April 25, 2016, at 0607 hours [CDT], HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] was isolated via the HPCI MO 2-2301-4 (HPCI Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve) to stop a packing leak on the HPCI MO 2-2301-5 (HPCI Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve). The packing leak was causing a steam plume potentially impacting the motor operator on the 2-2301-5 valve. HPCI was declared inoperable and T.S. 3.5.1 Condition G was entered.

"Since HPCI is a single train safety system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

LOST DENSITY GAUGES

The licensee has determined that two food product density gauges, previously in storage, cannot be accounted for and are considered lost. The density gauges, installed by Berthold in January, 1992, were last inventoried in April, 2015. They were removed from service in 2008.

An extensive search of the facility was conducted and the devices were not located. It is believed they were sent out as scrap metal. Each gauge contained 30 mCi Cs-137 sources. Their serial numbers are 920-2-92 and 59-1-92.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/3/16 AT 1009 EDT FROM PEGGY DORTCH TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Following an extensive licensee search of the warehouse, the gauges were found undamaged.

Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS EVENTS via email; notified CNSC (CANADA) via fax.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"8-hour report due to HPCI inoperability.

"At approximately 2109 [CDT] on 04/25/16, a licensed operator performing a control room panel walkdown noted the green light for HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) was not illuminated. The bulb was replaced and the replacement bulb did not illuminate. A non-licensed operator was dispatched to the local 250VDC starter rack. Both the green and red power indicating lights on the starter rack were found extinguished. An attempt was made to start the AOP with the control switch. The pump did not start. The AOP is required to start in order to open the steam admission valves for the HPCI turbine.

"HPCI was declared inoperable at time 2117 [CDT], resulting in entry into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RCIC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with HPCl declaration.

"Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned.

"HPCI is a single train system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC [Structures, Systems, and Components] needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RELEASE OF LICENSED MATERIAL AND CONTAMINATION

The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email:

"The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health received a call at 1350 CDT on 4/25/2016 from a consultant for Clinical Pharmacy Services in Gray, Tennessee. He stated that a vial containing 290 milliCuries of stabilized Iodine-131 had been dropped in the pharmacy onto the floor. The vial broke, splattering the liquid onto two pharmacists and objects in the room. Employees were stripped of their clothing. Thyroid count results are zero for both individuals. The Iodine-131 had been stabilized with a buffering agent making it non-volatile. Plastic sheeting and thick pieces of lead were placed over the contaminated areas. All personnel badges were overnighted to Landauer. The corporate compliance officers for Clinical Pharmacy were contacted and will arrive today. The consultant stated that the maximum dose rate at the point where the vial hit the floor was 66 mR/hr. through the lead sheeting. He stated a dose rate at 6 to 7 R/hr. Personnel were placing surface contaminated objects into a large leaded disposal bin."

Tennessee Report No.: TN-16-059

PART 21 REPORT - RELAY FAILURE DUE TO OPEN COIL

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) concerning a defect in an Allen-Bradley 700DC-P220Z2 relay received at Cooper Nuclear Station.

"On August 28, 2017, NPPD completed a 10 CFR 21 evaluation of a condition that was identified on April 25, 2016, associated with an Allen-Bradley 700DC-P220Z2 relay delivered by NuTherm. The evaluation was performed to determine the applications where the relays were approved for installation, where they were installed in the plant, and determine if the failure of the relays could result in a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21.

"A model 700DC-P220Z2 relay failed after 133 hours of service. An independent laboratory determined the relay contained a wound wire fault at the beginning of the spool near the spool edge. The wire that faulted was connected to the right coil terminal. The fault was at a stress point where the wire came out of the insulating material channel and started onto the spool. Continuity testing indicated that the wire was open between the fault area and the terminal, within the potting material. The relay failure was a case of component infant mortality. It appeared the fault was caused by a manufacturing flaw that likely occurred due to a tensioning issue at the start of the coil wire winding process.

"This deviation presents a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21, as this relay model was approved for use in safety related applications. The relay that failed was installed in the starter for the HPCI auxiliary lube oil pump and caused the HPCI system to be inoperable. This was reported to the NRC in ENS Notification 51882 at 0154 EDT on April 26, 2016 as a loss of safety function, but was not characterized as a 10 CFR Part 21 issue at that time. The relay model was approved for use in numerous HPCI starters and the Recirculation Pump discharge valves."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.