Event Notification Report for March 17, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/16/2016 - 03/17/2016
Agreement State
Event Number: 51805
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, INC
Region: 1
City: COLLINGDALE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, INC
Region: 1
City: COLLINGDALE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 03/18/2016
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2016
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED RADIUM 226 SOURCE FOUND
The following was received from Pennsylvania via email:
"Lost or abandoned licensed material in a quantity greater than or equal to 1000 times the Appendix C quantities in part 20, reportable as per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).
"A new owner of a facility in Collingdale, Pennsylvania came across a locked room that contained an old lead pig, stamped with a label stating radium-226, 100 mg. The owner contacted Ecology Services, a local radioactive waste management company, who confirmed a dose rate outside the pig. Ecology Services called the Department [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection].
"The previous occupant of this facility, Universal Technical Equipment Inc., was licensed by the Department (PA-0187) to possess up to 110 mCi of Ra-226 sealed sources and contracted the removal of the radium source. The Certificate of Disposition documentation was submitted to the Department for license termination. The license was ultimately terminated on January 14, 2015.
"[PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] Southeast regional inspectors visited the facility today, March 18, 2016, and verified there is a source within the locked pig. A smear test revealed no leakage was detected on the outside of the pig. The source remains in a secured and locked location. More information will be provided upon receipt."
PA incident # PA160011
The following was received from Pennsylvania via email:
"Lost or abandoned licensed material in a quantity greater than or equal to 1000 times the Appendix C quantities in part 20, reportable as per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).
"A new owner of a facility in Collingdale, Pennsylvania came across a locked room that contained an old lead pig, stamped with a label stating radium-226, 100 mg. The owner contacted Ecology Services, a local radioactive waste management company, who confirmed a dose rate outside the pig. Ecology Services called the Department [PA Bureau of Radiation Protection].
"The previous occupant of this facility, Universal Technical Equipment Inc., was licensed by the Department (PA-0187) to possess up to 110 mCi of Ra-226 sealed sources and contracted the removal of the radium source. The Certificate of Disposition documentation was submitted to the Department for license termination. The license was ultimately terminated on January 14, 2015.
"[PA Bureau of Radiation Protection] Southeast regional inspectors visited the facility today, March 18, 2016, and verified there is a source within the locked pig. A smear test revealed no leakage was detected on the outside of the pig. The source remains in a secured and locked location. More information will be provided upon receipt."
PA incident # PA160011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51800
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: SEAN DUNFEE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: SEAN DUNFEE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 03/17/2016
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 15:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2016
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 15:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
VALID ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 1515 [CDT] on March 17th 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station received a valid actuation signal of the Division 2 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Load Shedding and Sequencing system. The actuation signal was most likely caused by a lightning strike to the offsite power source supplying this ESF bus. This caused a loss of the in service shutdown cooling system and associated system actuations.
"Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 5 at 85 [degrees] F coolant temperature. Reactor Cavity was flooded to High Water Level with a time to reach 200 [degrees] F of 7.5hrs. GGNS is conducting a planned refuel outage with core alterations in progress. Systems were aligned as follows:
"Division 2 Diesel Generator was OPERABLE and the associated ESF bus aligned to transformer ESF12 (115KV Port Gibson offsite feeder). Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system 'B' was in service in shutdown cooling being supplied from this ESF bus (16AB) with Alternate Decay Heat Removal available as a backup.
"Division 3 Diesel Generator was unavailable due to planned maintenance on support systems. The associated ESF bus was also aligned to transformer ESF12 (115KV Port Gibson offsite feeder).
"Division 1 Diesel Generator was available and the associated ESF bus aligned to the transformer ESF 11 (Switchyard offsite power feeders Baxter-Wilson and Franklin). Power was never lost to this bus. RHR 'A' and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) were not available due to planned maintenance (tagged out of service).
"ESF 21 Transformer was out of service for planned maintenance.
"A suspected lightning strike caused a momentary perturbation in power in the 115KV Port Gibson line causing the Division 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) system to actuate. This actuation caused a loss of Residual Heat Removal system 'B' due to being shed (expected). The Division 2 Diesel Generator started and tied onto the bus as expected, restoring power in 7 seconds. Shutdown cooling was restored at 1518 [CDT] and was out of service for 3 mins 13 sec. Reactor coolant and spent fuel pool temperatures remained at 85 [degrees] F throughout this scenario. Core Alterations were suspended and fuel placed in its designated location per the approved movement plan. Division 3 systems; High Pressure Core Spray, Standby Service Water System 'C', and Division 3 Diesel Generator were tagged out of service for planned maintenance. Division 3 Diesel Generator received a valid actuation signal but did not start due to being out of service. The Division 3 bus was restored manually to ESF 11.
"All safety systems operated as expected for the loss of power to ESF 12 and Division 2 LSS actuation.
"This is being reported under:
1. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)-Specified system actuation; Division 2 LSS and Division 3 Diesel Generator start logic.
2. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)-RHR Capability; Loss of shutdown cooling."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 1515 [CDT] on March 17th 2016, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station received a valid actuation signal of the Division 2 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Load Shedding and Sequencing system. The actuation signal was most likely caused by a lightning strike to the offsite power source supplying this ESF bus. This caused a loss of the in service shutdown cooling system and associated system actuations.
"Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 5 at 85 [degrees] F coolant temperature. Reactor Cavity was flooded to High Water Level with a time to reach 200 [degrees] F of 7.5hrs. GGNS is conducting a planned refuel outage with core alterations in progress. Systems were aligned as follows:
"Division 2 Diesel Generator was OPERABLE and the associated ESF bus aligned to transformer ESF12 (115KV Port Gibson offsite feeder). Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system 'B' was in service in shutdown cooling being supplied from this ESF bus (16AB) with Alternate Decay Heat Removal available as a backup.
"Division 3 Diesel Generator was unavailable due to planned maintenance on support systems. The associated ESF bus was also aligned to transformer ESF12 (115KV Port Gibson offsite feeder).
"Division 1 Diesel Generator was available and the associated ESF bus aligned to the transformer ESF 11 (Switchyard offsite power feeders Baxter-Wilson and Franklin). Power was never lost to this bus. RHR 'A' and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) were not available due to planned maintenance (tagged out of service).
"ESF 21 Transformer was out of service for planned maintenance.
"A suspected lightning strike caused a momentary perturbation in power in the 115KV Port Gibson line causing the Division 2 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) system to actuate. This actuation caused a loss of Residual Heat Removal system 'B' due to being shed (expected). The Division 2 Diesel Generator started and tied onto the bus as expected, restoring power in 7 seconds. Shutdown cooling was restored at 1518 [CDT] and was out of service for 3 mins 13 sec. Reactor coolant and spent fuel pool temperatures remained at 85 [degrees] F throughout this scenario. Core Alterations were suspended and fuel placed in its designated location per the approved movement plan. Division 3 systems; High Pressure Core Spray, Standby Service Water System 'C', and Division 3 Diesel Generator were tagged out of service for planned maintenance. Division 3 Diesel Generator received a valid actuation signal but did not start due to being out of service. The Division 3 bus was restored manually to ESF 11.
"All safety systems operated as expected for the loss of power to ESF 12 and Division 2 LSS actuation.
"This is being reported under:
1. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)-Specified system actuation; Division 2 LSS and Division 3 Diesel Generator start logic.
2. 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)-RHR Capability; Loss of shutdown cooling."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51795
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/17/2016
Notification Time: 08:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Notification Time: 08:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2016
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY AND AUXILIARY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEMS
"On March 17, 2016, at 0115 [EDT], Watts Bar Unit 1 (WBN1) entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of both trains of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). TS LCO 3.7.12 Condition B was also entered at this time due to the inoperability of both trains of the Auxiliary Gas Treatment System (ABGTS). The train B EGTS and train B ABGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, when at 0115, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor became inoperable. On March 17, 2016, at 0133, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor was declared OPERABLE, and TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B were exited.
"The auxiliary air system supports the EGTS by providing a safety grade air supply. When train A auxiliary air became inoperable, the supported train A EGTS and ABGTS became inoperable, creating a condition where both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were unavailable. In the event of an accident, the EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel and the ABGTS establishes a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). Filters in these system mitigate the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.
"WBN1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power and no safety functions were required during the event.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1518 EDT ON 04/19/16 FROM BRIAN MCILNAY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract event report no. 51795 made on 3/17/16 at 0802 (EDT). Previously, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported a loss of the Emergency and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment Systems (EGTS/ABGTS) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1). Both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were declared INOPERABLE when the train A auxiliary air system cooling water supply bypass valve was isolated, prior to completing the requisite post maintenance testing following repairs to the normal cooling water supply solenoid valve. Upon recognition, WBN1 operations personnel declared the train A auxiliary air system INOPERABLE, resulting in inoperability of Train A EGTS and ABGTS and forcing entry into TS LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 (from TS LCO 3.6.9 EGTS) and 3.7.12 Condition B for ABGTS. At the time the condition was recognized, train B EGTS and train B ABGTS were INOPERABLE for scheduled maintenance.
"Subsequently, TVA completed the post maintenance testing of the train A auxiliary air system ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] normal supply solenoid valve and determined that the valve, while not fully qualified at the time, was in fact operable and capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B was not necessary and the event is no longer reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R2DO (McCoy).
"On March 17, 2016, at 0115 [EDT], Watts Bar Unit 1 (WBN1) entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of both trains of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). TS LCO 3.7.12 Condition B was also entered at this time due to the inoperability of both trains of the Auxiliary Gas Treatment System (ABGTS). The train B EGTS and train B ABGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, when at 0115, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor became inoperable. On March 17, 2016, at 0133, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor was declared OPERABLE, and TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B were exited.
"The auxiliary air system supports the EGTS by providing a safety grade air supply. When train A auxiliary air became inoperable, the supported train A EGTS and ABGTS became inoperable, creating a condition where both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were unavailable. In the event of an accident, the EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel and the ABGTS establishes a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). Filters in these system mitigate the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.
"WBN1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power and no safety functions were required during the event.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1518 EDT ON 04/19/16 FROM BRIAN MCILNAY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract event report no. 51795 made on 3/17/16 at 0802 (EDT). Previously, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported a loss of the Emergency and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment Systems (EGTS/ABGTS) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1). Both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were declared INOPERABLE when the train A auxiliary air system cooling water supply bypass valve was isolated, prior to completing the requisite post maintenance testing following repairs to the normal cooling water supply solenoid valve. Upon recognition, WBN1 operations personnel declared the train A auxiliary air system INOPERABLE, resulting in inoperability of Train A EGTS and ABGTS and forcing entry into TS LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 (from TS LCO 3.6.9 EGTS) and 3.7.12 Condition B for ABGTS. At the time the condition was recognized, train B EGTS and train B ABGTS were INOPERABLE for scheduled maintenance.
"Subsequently, TVA completed the post maintenance testing of the train A auxiliary air system ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] normal supply solenoid valve and determined that the valve, while not fully qualified at the time, was in fact operable and capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B was not necessary and the event is no longer reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R2DO (McCoy).