Event Notification Report for March 06, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/05/2016 - 03/06/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51770
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ARCHIE NEWBERRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ARCHIE NEWBERRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/06/2016
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 15:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2016
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 15:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2016
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BILL DEAN (NRR)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BILL DEAN (NRR)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DECLARATION DUE TO FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE MAIN TRANSFORMER
At 1512 EST, a fire/explosion occurred in the Unit 1 Main Transformer which resulted in a reactor trip. At 1520 EST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event. Offsite assistance was requested. At 1633 EST, smoke and flame were no longer visible. Fire brigade personnel were applying additional foam to prevent a re-flash. No personnel injuries occurred.
Offsite assistance was requested with three local fire departments responding.
All rods inserted on the trip. Steam generator feed is by the normal path. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWS and Nuclear SSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1711 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
At 1658 EST, the licensee declared an Alert based on EAL Alert A.1. The cause of entry was that the fire damaged an overhead power line that supplies emergency power to all three units at Oconee. Offsite power is still available to all units.
At 1708 EST, the fire is declared out.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1805 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
The licensee made notification of the RPS actuation as a result of the transformer fault.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2026 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
At 2016 EST, the licensee terminated all emergency declarations.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Morris), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.
At 1512 EST, a fire/explosion occurred in the Unit 1 Main Transformer which resulted in a reactor trip. At 1520 EST, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event. Offsite assistance was requested. At 1633 EST, smoke and flame were no longer visible. Fire brigade personnel were applying additional foam to prevent a re-flash. No personnel injuries occurred.
Offsite assistance was requested with three local fire departments responding.
All rods inserted on the trip. Steam generator feed is by the normal path. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWS and Nuclear SSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1711 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
At 1658 EST, the licensee declared an Alert based on EAL Alert A.1. The cause of entry was that the fire damaged an overhead power line that supplies emergency power to all three units at Oconee. Offsite power is still available to all units.
At 1708 EST, the fire is declared out.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1805 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
The licensee made notification of the RPS actuation as a result of the transformer fault.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HALE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2026 EST ON 03/06/16 * * *
At 2016 EST, the licensee terminated all emergency declarations.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Morris), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA. Notified FEMA NWS, FDA and Nuclear SSA via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51771
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETTY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETTY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 03/07/2016
Notification Time: 02:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 20:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2016
Notification Time: 02:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 20:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AIR INTAKES
"The Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system at Braidwood automatically supplies feedwater to the Steam Generators (SG) to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System following a loss of normal feedwater supply. The AF System consists of a motor driven pump (A) and a diesel driven pump (B) configured into two trains for each unit. Each pump provides 100% of the required AF capacity to the SGs as assumed in the accident analysis. One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) entry conditions. The diesel driven AF pump is powered from an independent diesel whose combustion air intake is located in the Seismic Category II (non-seismically qualified) Turbine Building but the diesel and pump are located in the Seismic Category I (seismically qualified) Auxiliary Building.
"During the ongoing NRC Component Design Basis Inspection at Braidwood Station, Inspectors asked about the acceptability of the diesel combustion air intake being located in the non-seismic Turbine Building. During the review of available documentation related to the AF diesel engine combustion air intake, it was identified that the documentation did not support operation of the diesel with High Energy Line Break (HELB) environmental conditions in the Turbine Building. This has been reviewed and determined to be applicable to Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2. Specifically, prior evaluations did not account for air displacement by steam release during the event. After running different models for the Turbine Building HELB, diesel driven AF pump operability was supported for all but the Main Feedwater (FW) HELB. For the FW HELB, the best air density obtained failed to remain above the required levels deemed acceptable for engine operation and remained suppressed for extended periods of time. Additional efforts to qualify the FW piping in the Turbine Building for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) to eliminate this piping from HELB considerations were not successful. This condition applies to both Units 1 and 2 but does not affect the motor driven AF pumps. This event does not constitute a loss of safety function at the point of discovery because the Braidwood opposite train motor driven AF pumps were operable on both Units 1 and 2.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee entered a 72-hour Action Statement and is preparing to address the issue with a configuration change.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system at Braidwood automatically supplies feedwater to the Steam Generators (SG) to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System following a loss of normal feedwater supply. The AF System consists of a motor driven pump (A) and a diesel driven pump (B) configured into two trains for each unit. Each pump provides 100% of the required AF capacity to the SGs as assumed in the accident analysis. One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) entry conditions. The diesel driven AF pump is powered from an independent diesel whose combustion air intake is located in the Seismic Category II (non-seismically qualified) Turbine Building but the diesel and pump are located in the Seismic Category I (seismically qualified) Auxiliary Building.
"During the ongoing NRC Component Design Basis Inspection at Braidwood Station, Inspectors asked about the acceptability of the diesel combustion air intake being located in the non-seismic Turbine Building. During the review of available documentation related to the AF diesel engine combustion air intake, it was identified that the documentation did not support operation of the diesel with High Energy Line Break (HELB) environmental conditions in the Turbine Building. This has been reviewed and determined to be applicable to Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2. Specifically, prior evaluations did not account for air displacement by steam release during the event. After running different models for the Turbine Building HELB, diesel driven AF pump operability was supported for all but the Main Feedwater (FW) HELB. For the FW HELB, the best air density obtained failed to remain above the required levels deemed acceptable for engine operation and remained suppressed for extended periods of time. Additional efforts to qualify the FW piping in the Turbine Building for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) to eliminate this piping from HELB considerations were not successful. This condition applies to both Units 1 and 2 but does not affect the motor driven AF pumps. This event does not constitute a loss of safety function at the point of discovery because the Braidwood opposite train motor driven AF pumps were operable on both Units 1 and 2.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee entered a 72-hour Action Statement and is preparing to address the issue with a configuration change.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51779
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: WORLD TESTING, INC.
Region: 1
City: MOUNT JULIET State: TN
County:
License #: MS-1035-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: WORLD TESTING, INC.
Region: 1
City: MOUNT JULIET State: TN
County:
License #: MS-1035-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/08/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 22:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2016
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2016
Event Time: 22:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE
The following report was received from the State of Mississippi via facsimile:
"The Licensee notified DRH [Mississippi Department of Radiation Health] on 3/7/2016, that an incident had occurred at 2233 [CST on 3/6/16], at the client's site [in Holly Springs, MS]. The Licensee's two (2) man radiography crew was performing radiography inside a twelve (12) foot, open end vessel, thirty six (36) feet long, and nine (9) foot off the ground. The radiography camera in use was a Sentinel model 880D, serial No. D1120. During one exposure the guide tube became crimped preventing the source from retracting back into the camera. This was due to the camera falling off the scaffolding to the vessel floor while the radiographer was retracting the source. The resulting action caused the guide tube connected to the camera and magnetic stand to become crimped at the camera connection point. The licensee's radiography supervisor was notified and the restricted area boundary was increased by the two (2) radiographers.
"Source retrieval was performed by the radiography supervisor with assistance from the radiography crew. A survey was performed using a NDS, ND-2000, SN: 20113, Calibration date: 1/15/2016, at the opposite end of the vessel thirty two (32) feet away from the source revealing a reading of two hundred twenty (220) mR/hr. A decision was made to pull the camera to one opening of the vessel by the camera cranks. The restricted area was then readjusted for two (2) mR/hr.
"While the camera was being lowered to the ground with a guide rope out of the vessel opening, the guide tube became straight enough to allow for source retraction. The guide tube and magnetic stand hung at the opening of the vessel causing the guide tube to straighten out from the weight of the camera below the vessel opening. The radiographers made another attempt to retract the source with success when the guide tube was straight. Once the camera was on the ground, the Licensee's survey of 46 mR/hr confirmed the source was retracted back into the camera.
"Doses to the radiography crew and supervisor were all below 60 millirems (mR). Instadose radiation badges were used with the highest dose reported of thirty nine (39) mR to both radiographers. Pocket dosimeters were also used with the highest dose reported by the radiography supervisor of fifty five (55) mR.
"Licensee's written report was received on 3/7/2016. The camera has been removed from service pending a sealed source and DU wipe test. Implemented corrective actions included adequate lighting at night and tying the camera off when it is used over twelve (12) inches off the ground."
The radiography camera contains a 79.9 Ci Ir-192 Source, model A424-9, serial number 28799G.
The State of Mississippi instructed the licensee to submit a 30 day written report and considers this case to be closed.
Mississippi State Report number: MS-16002.
The following report was received from the State of Mississippi via facsimile:
"The Licensee notified DRH [Mississippi Department of Radiation Health] on 3/7/2016, that an incident had occurred at 2233 [CST on 3/6/16], at the client's site [in Holly Springs, MS]. The Licensee's two (2) man radiography crew was performing radiography inside a twelve (12) foot, open end vessel, thirty six (36) feet long, and nine (9) foot off the ground. The radiography camera in use was a Sentinel model 880D, serial No. D1120. During one exposure the guide tube became crimped preventing the source from retracting back into the camera. This was due to the camera falling off the scaffolding to the vessel floor while the radiographer was retracting the source. The resulting action caused the guide tube connected to the camera and magnetic stand to become crimped at the camera connection point. The licensee's radiography supervisor was notified and the restricted area boundary was increased by the two (2) radiographers.
"Source retrieval was performed by the radiography supervisor with assistance from the radiography crew. A survey was performed using a NDS, ND-2000, SN: 20113, Calibration date: 1/15/2016, at the opposite end of the vessel thirty two (32) feet away from the source revealing a reading of two hundred twenty (220) mR/hr. A decision was made to pull the camera to one opening of the vessel by the camera cranks. The restricted area was then readjusted for two (2) mR/hr.
"While the camera was being lowered to the ground with a guide rope out of the vessel opening, the guide tube became straight enough to allow for source retraction. The guide tube and magnetic stand hung at the opening of the vessel causing the guide tube to straighten out from the weight of the camera below the vessel opening. The radiographers made another attempt to retract the source with success when the guide tube was straight. Once the camera was on the ground, the Licensee's survey of 46 mR/hr confirmed the source was retracted back into the camera.
"Doses to the radiography crew and supervisor were all below 60 millirems (mR). Instadose radiation badges were used with the highest dose reported of thirty nine (39) mR to both radiographers. Pocket dosimeters were also used with the highest dose reported by the radiography supervisor of fifty five (55) mR.
"Licensee's written report was received on 3/7/2016. The camera has been removed from service pending a sealed source and DU wipe test. Implemented corrective actions included adequate lighting at night and tying the camera off when it is used over twelve (12) inches off the ground."
The radiography camera contains a 79.9 Ci Ir-192 Source, model A424-9, serial number 28799G.
The State of Mississippi instructed the licensee to submit a 30 day written report and considers this case to be closed.
Mississippi State Report number: MS-16002.