Event Notification Report for March 02, 2016

TURBINE TRIP CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP

"The turbine tripped for an unknown cause followed by a reactor trip. All systems are functioning as designed. Operators have transitioned out of the EOP [Emergency Operating Procedure] network into normal operating procedures. The plant is stable in mode 3."

All control rods fully inserted during the trip and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Emergency Feedwater actuation occurred to restore steam generator levels. The plant expects to make a press release.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1043 EST ON 3/2/16 FROM BARRY BRADBURY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee will not issue a press release for this event.

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE

"On March 2, 2016 at 1330 hrs. [EST], Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3).

"The inoperability was caused when Unit 2 Reactor Building Airlock doors were inadvertently opened simultaneously.

"Secondary Containment was restored March 2, 2016 at 1331 hrs. when the doors were closed.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

VALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER

"On 3/2/2016, [at] 1312 hours EST, while in the process of a plant cooldown, a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) occurred when B steam generator levels were reduced to 20 [percent]. The lowering level was a result of the unanticipated tripping of the start up feed pump on low condensate storage level while it was the feed source to the steam generators. The start up feed pump was restarted and feed flow had been restored when the actuation took place. The EFW flow was secured per procedure and the start up feed pump remains the feed source to the steam generators.

"This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT WITH POSSIBLE SHALLOW DOSE EXCEEDING FEDERAL LIMITS

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"Notifications: The event occurred on March 2, 2016, the licensee discovered the event on March 3, 2016, and notified the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] on March 4, 2016, via a phone call. The event is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 20.2202(b)(1)(iii).

"Event Description: On March 2, 2016, a technologist was injecting a samarium-153 'Quadramet' dose (approximately 81 milliCuries) when there was a problem with the syringe/tubing connection. A 'blowback' occurred and a small amount, believed to be approximately 1-2 mCi, of the dose spilled. The patient was released [and sent] home. The technologist stated that he had gloves on, washed his hands, surveyed the area and called the lead technologist to notify her of the incident. Radiation Safety [at the hospital] was not notified until March 3rd. The technologist was surveyed and found to have contamination on his hands and forearms. An initial calculation indicated a skin dose above 50 rem. Radiation Safety then took smears throughout the department and contamination was found on various surfaces including the floor, other technologist's hands, gloves, shoes, survey meters, chairs, and clothing. Removable contamination was also found in a technologist's vehicle. Radiation Safety has decontaminated most areas. Surfaces and rooms that were not able to be decontaminated were closed off (for decay) or covered with paper to prevent any further spread of contamination. It is believed that after the spill, the technologist attempted to clean up the area. Apparently it was not sufficient, for when housekeeping did their routine cleaning, they may have unknowingly further spread the contamination with floor mopping and other cleaning. No biological effects are expected with any individual. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] feels that a 'medical event' did not occur with the patient. The patient returned for a scheduled scan on March 3rd, and that scan appeared normal. The patient did not show any signs of detectable contamination on her skin.

"Cause of the Event: Human error. The technologist may not have followed proper procedures, and contributed to the contamination spreading beyond initial spill area.

"Actions: A reactive inspection is planned by the Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection]. More information will be provided upon receipt."

Event Report ID No: PA160008

AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO BE RETRACTED

The following was received from the State of Louisiana via email:

"On March 17, 2016, Acuren Inspection, Inc. notified LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] during a telephone discussion, about a source retrieval on March 2, 2016, but did not use our 24-hour hotline number for these types of notifications within the regulatory guidelines prescribe time limits of 24 hours. The event occurred at Exxon Mobil Baton Rouge, 4045 Scenic Hwy., Baton Rouge, LA.

"The source could not be retracted due to a crimped guide tube. The total amount of Ir-192 for the industrial radiography camera was 64.7 Ci. The camera was:

"QSA Global: 880D, S/N: D4022, Curies: 64.7, Source S/N: 27719G."

Louisiana Event Report Identification Number: LA160006