Event Notification Report for January 29, 2016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION FOUND ON RECEIPT INSPECTION

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

"Moravek received a package of tritium from Merck and Company (Rahway, New Jersey) on 1/29/16 by [common carrier] delivery (non-exclusive use). Upon performing the receipt radiological survey, Moravek personnel reported finding removable contamination of tritium on the external package surfaces up to 44.75 dpm/square cm. The applicable regulatory limit is 22 dpm/square cm based on wiping a 300 square cm area. Moravek personnel reported they estimate they wiped 100 square cm areas. The results of 5 wipes (approximately 500 square cm) performed by Moravek personnel of the package surfaces yielded an average of 26.4 dpm/square cm.

"The contamination regulatory limit is identical for all beta and gamma emitting radionuclides. However, the safety significance of the contamination is nuclide specific, and ranges up to a factor in excess of 10,000 for common beta/gamma emitting radionuclides. Tritium is on the very low end of the safety significance spectrum, with for example, the safety significance of tritium contamination being approximately a factor of 4000 less than the safety significance of a similar contamination level of Cs-137. The dose consequences of the highest wipe concentration of 44.75 dpm/square cm of tritium found on the package is therefore very minor.

"The [common carrier] RSO was notified of the contamination wipe results. The New Jersey radiation control program will also be notified."

California 5010 Number: 012916

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of Nebraska via email:

"The Radiation Safety Officer for the Nebraska Radioactive Materials licensee reported that a Humboldt Model 5001, Serial Number 5624 industrial gauge had been damaged today (1/29/2016) at a temporary job site in Falls City, NE. The gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be. The user had left the gauge unattended for a brief time, and upon returning, found that a construction vehicle had run over the gauge. The gauge handle was broken and the case damaged. The source was able to be retracted, however the shutter was damaged and could not be completely closed. Wipe tests verified that there was no leakage from the source. Office of Radiological Health staff were dispatched to the scene."

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION AFTER LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE

"On January 29, 2016, at 1518 CST, with the plant in cold shutdown, power was lost on reserve station service (RSS) line no. 1. This is one of two sources of offsite power required by Technical Specifications. The power loss de-energized the Division 1 onsite AC safety-related switchgear, causing an automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG). The Division 1 reactor protection system (RPS) bus was also de-energized, causing a half-scram signal. Approximately 8 minutes later, a full actuation of the RPS occurred due to a high water level condition in the control rod drive hydraulic system scram discharge volume header. All reactor control rods were already fully inserted.

"The loss of Division 1 RPS also caused the actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation logic. The Division 1 isolation valves in the balance-of-plant systems closed as designed. Both trains of the standby gas treatment system actuated.

"The loss of RSS no. 1 occurred during post-modification testing on relays at the local 230kV switchyard. The exact cause of the event is under investigation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The unit remains in cold shutdown with 1 source of offsite power and all 3 [EDG] available.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT DISCHARGE LIMIT EXCEEDED

"On January 29, 2016 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) received notification from the site Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) operators that the January 6, 2016 monthly settleable solids result for the STP was 0.2 ml/L/hr [milliliter/liter/hour]. This value exceeds the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit limit of 0.1 ml/L/hr (daily maximum).

"The STP operators conduct daily process control tests at the STP and did not identify any system upset issues around the January 6, 2016 sample date, or any time since, that would be symptomatic of the slightly elevated settleable solids result.

"The JAF environmental engineer concluded that a notification to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) was not required for this event; however, a courtesy notification for permit noncompliance was made. The NYSDEC has been notified.

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), this condition is being reported as an event or situation for which notification to a government agency has been made. The NRC resident has been notified.

"JAF is currently at 0 percent power in Mode 2 following a forced outage resultant of events on January 23, 2016."

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/29/16 AT 1630 EST FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DONG PARK * * *

"Based on further review of the NRC reporting guidance relative to this criteria, JAF has concluded that this condition is below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG-1022 Revision 3. NUREG-1022 states the following (page 54), 'Licensees generally do not have to report media and government interactions unless they are related to the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment.'

"The condition originally reported in ENS 51694 is considered a minor deviation in sewage process limits, and has no impact on the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment. Therefore, JAF is retracting ENS 51694."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett).

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"At 1322 EST, with the unit operating at approximately 100% full power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 4. The cause of the RPS actuation is being investigated at this time. Nuclear Instrumentation calibration for RPS Channel 2 was in progress at the time of the trip, with Channel 2 in bypass and Channel 1 in trip. All control rods fully inserted. Immediately post trip, the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System actuated due to high Steam Generator 1 level due to unknown causes. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed and Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Secondary side relief valves lifted in response to the trip, with two of the relief valves (one on each header) not properly reseating until operators manually lowered Main Steam Header pressure. The Bayshore 345 kV Offsite Electrical Distribution Circuit automatically isolated at the time of the unit trip. This was unexpected. The remaining offsite circuits remain in service.

"The unit is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable, at approximately 550 degrees F and 2155 psig. Steam is being discharged through the Atmospheric Vent Valves for decay heat removal. There is no known primary to secondary leakage, and all safety systems functioned as expected.

"Both primary Source Range nuclear instruments automatically energized, however, they were previously declared inoperable due to an administrative issue. Both Source Range instruments are functional and indicating properly. Both alternate Source Range instruments are operable, and all required Technical Specification actions have been completed.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

OFFSITE POWER DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOWERING GENERATOR VOLTAGE

"At 0920 CST on 1/29/16, while performing main generator voltage adjustments at the direction of the transmission operator, Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) switchyard voltage lowered to the calculated point where offsite sources were considered inoperable. During this event, both onsite emergency diesel generators were fully operable and capable of performing their intended safety function.

"While no safety concerns arose, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.8.1.a Condition C was entered due to two offsite electric power circuits being inoperable. Immediate actions were taken to adjust main generator voltage to restore switchyard voltage. In less than 10 minutes, both offsite circuits were declared operable and LCO 3.8.1.a Condition C was exited. This resulted in a reportable event pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"During the time of reduced grid voltage, no bus low-voltage alarms nor any equipment issues occurred. The cause of this event is under investigation, and there are not any current operability concerns with the offsite power circuits."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT MURRELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1319 EST ON 02/05/2016 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 1/29/16 at 1709 (EST). NRC notification was initially made as a result of offsite power sources being declared inoperable due to the identification of a low voltage condition by the grid operator.

"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the offsite power grid conditions were above the required limit and were therefore operable. It was determined that a trip of the DAEC turbine/generator would not have led to fluctuations in voltages in the DAEC switchyard below the trip setpoints for Loss of Power. Based on this, the safety-related buses and loads were fully capable of performing their intended design basis function. The degraded voltage relays setpoint were not reached; therefore, the essential electrical buses remained connected to offsite power.

"Therefore, the low voltage condition does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Kozak).