Event Notification Report for January 12, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2016 - 01/12/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51649
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/12/2016
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2016
Event Time: 12:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2016
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2016
Event Time: 12:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF VENTILATION SYSTEM TO EMERGENCY OFF-SITE FACILITY
"On January 12, 2016, during performance of an EOF [Emergency Off-Site Facility] Diesel Operability Test, the EOF Air Conditioning unit and EOF Air Return fan did not run as expected. Per plant procedure, the operators placed the system in filtration mode and then back in normal mode. Again, both units did not run as expected. The EOF was declared non-functional due to the failure of the air conditioning unit and fan.
"The EOF is available for emergency response purposes unless the temperature can not be maintained or a release is in progress. The backup EOF is available for use if needed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID LANTZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1517 EST ON 1/13/16 * * *
"The Emergency Off-Site Facility (EOF) was restored to functional status at 1223 CST on 01/13/2016."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Kellar)
"On January 12, 2016, during performance of an EOF [Emergency Off-Site Facility] Diesel Operability Test, the EOF Air Conditioning unit and EOF Air Return fan did not run as expected. Per plant procedure, the operators placed the system in filtration mode and then back in normal mode. Again, both units did not run as expected. The EOF was declared non-functional due to the failure of the air conditioning unit and fan.
"The EOF is available for emergency response purposes unless the temperature can not be maintained or a release is in progress. The backup EOF is available for use if needed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID LANTZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1517 EST ON 1/13/16 * * *
"The Emergency Off-Site Facility (EOF) was restored to functional status at 1223 CST on 01/13/2016."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Kellar)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51650
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GARY HEUSINKVELD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GARY HEUSINKVELD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/12/2016
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2016
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2016
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2016
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"On January 12, 2016, at 1340 CST, an alarm was received indicating secondary containment differential pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. A reactor building supply fan was immediately secured to restore differential pressure below the Technical Specification limit. The secondary containment differential pressure returned to below the Technical Specification limit within one minute. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby, and fully operable. At 1341 CST, the secured reactor building supply fan was restarted to restore the normal ventilation lineup. The secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification limit. Troubleshooting is in progress.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable.
"Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On January 12, 2016, at 1340 CST, an alarm was received indicating secondary containment differential pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. A reactor building supply fan was immediately secured to restore differential pressure below the Technical Specification limit. The secondary containment differential pressure returned to below the Technical Specification limit within one minute. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby, and fully operable. At 1341 CST, the secured reactor building supply fan was restarted to restore the normal ventilation lineup. The secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification limit. Troubleshooting is in progress.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable.
"Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."