Event Notification Report for January 07, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/06/2016 - 01/07/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51642
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/08/2016
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 19:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 19:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R CREDITED PROCEDURES NOT IN PLACE
"Prairie Island's Appendix R calculations credit a procedurally established repair instruction to the Train B Pressurizer Vent valves for a postulated fire in Fire Area 59 (Unit 1) and Fire Area 74 (Unit 2) to obtain Mode 5 during a postulated fire in the affected areas. At 1900 [CST] on 1/7/2016, during a review of corrective actions associated with Prairie Island's NFPA 805 transition, it was identified that the required procedures are not in place to make the analyzed repairs.
"It has been determined that this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"As compensatory measures, hourly fire watches are in place in the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building. The operating crew and Fire Brigade have been briefed on the impact of a fire in the affected area. This brief will continue to future operating shifts via a standing instruction. Fire detection equipment for the affected zones has been protected to ensure availability and operating crews are walking down the affected areas to verify any required transient combustibles in the affected areas are controlled in accordance with plant procedure. These compensatory measures, in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression capability in these fire areas, ensure protection of the potentially affected equipment until corrective actions can be completed.
"This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"Prairie Island's Appendix R calculations credit a procedurally established repair instruction to the Train B Pressurizer Vent valves for a postulated fire in Fire Area 59 (Unit 1) and Fire Area 74 (Unit 2) to obtain Mode 5 during a postulated fire in the affected areas. At 1900 [CST] on 1/7/2016, during a review of corrective actions associated with Prairie Island's NFPA 805 transition, it was identified that the required procedures are not in place to make the analyzed repairs.
"It has been determined that this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"As compensatory measures, hourly fire watches are in place in the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building. The operating crew and Fire Brigade have been briefed on the impact of a fire in the affected area. This brief will continue to future operating shifts via a standing instruction. Fire detection equipment for the affected zones has been protected to ensure availability and operating crews are walking down the affected areas to verify any required transient combustibles in the affected areas are controlled in accordance with plant procedure. These compensatory measures, in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression capability in these fire areas, ensure protection of the potentially affected equipment until corrective actions can be completed.
"This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51639
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAY LLOYD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAY LLOYD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/07/2016
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 07:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 07:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF BOTH METEOROLOGICAL TOWERS DUE TO POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
"At 0759 CST on 01/07/2016, a partial loss of the 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System caused an unplanned loss of both primary and backup meteorological towers at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. Loss of both meteorological towers constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. During the power loss, the National Weather Service was available to compensate for the on-site data loss. The 25kV system and both meteorological towers were restored at 0923 CST on 01/07/2016.
"The 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System feeds non-safety related equipment and does not affect plant operation, with the exception already described. The fault occurred due to an aged stress cone and faulty lightning arrestor. The fault was isolated and power was restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0759 CST on 01/07/2016, a partial loss of the 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System caused an unplanned loss of both primary and backup meteorological towers at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. Loss of both meteorological towers constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. During the power loss, the National Weather Service was available to compensate for the on-site data loss. The 25kV system and both meteorological towers were restored at 0923 CST on 01/07/2016.
"The 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System feeds non-safety related equipment and does not affect plant operation, with the exception already described. The fault occurred due to an aged stress cone and faulty lightning arrestor. The fault was isolated and power was restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.