Event Notification Report for December 19, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/18/2015 - 12/19/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51614
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KRIS STRAUSSER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KRIS STRAUSSER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/19/2015
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2015
Event Time: 07:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2015
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2015
Event Time: 07:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 6 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"At 0702 EST on 12/19/2015, the Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid reactor low level signal (12.5 inches). The reactor low level signal was caused by the trip of the in-service 2A Reactor Feedwater Pump, causing reactor level to lower, exceeding the low reactor level setpoint of 12.5 inches.
"The shutdown was normal. The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal reactor level, pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Condensate System.
"High level trip of the 2A Reactor Feedwater Pump was caused by high reactor level of +54 inches following opening of bypass valves during reactor start-up and pressurization. The cause is still being investigated."
All systems functioned as expected following the reactor scram. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0702 EST on 12/19/2015, the Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid reactor low level signal (12.5 inches). The reactor low level signal was caused by the trip of the in-service 2A Reactor Feedwater Pump, causing reactor level to lower, exceeding the low reactor level setpoint of 12.5 inches.
"The shutdown was normal. The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal reactor level, pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Condensate System.
"High level trip of the 2A Reactor Feedwater Pump was caused by high reactor level of +54 inches following opening of bypass valves during reactor start-up and pressurization. The cause is still being investigated."
All systems functioned as expected following the reactor scram. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51641
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: GEISMAR State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10986-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: GEISMAR State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10986-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/07/2016
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HUMAN ERROR PREVENTS A RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FROM RETRACTING
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On December 19, 2015, a crew from Mistras was working at a temporary jobsite [Donaldsonville, LA] located at CF Industries. The crew set up 2 mR boundaries for the duration of the 'shots'/exposures. The crew cranked out the source and made the exposure. When the crew tried to retract the source into the shielded position, [the source] would not [retract] because the guide tube was improperly connected to the exposure device. The source assembly remained out of the shielded position. When it was determined the source could not be retracted, immediately the area was cleared and the boundaries were reestablished for the 2 mR/hr distance.
"The lead radiographer contacted the RSO, and received instructions on how to secure/shield the area from potential/unnecessary exposures. The unshielded source and incident duration was from 1.5 hours to 2 hours.
"The initial notice to the Department [LA Department of Environmental Quality] was made at approximately 1257 CST after the source was secured in the shielded position. The RSO did the actual retrieval and securing of the source. His time in the radiation field was approximately 30 to 40 minutes. He used the standards of time, distance and shielding to protect himself. His direct read pocket dosimeter reading was approximately 60 mR. The crew members pocket dosimeter readings were 50 mR and 20 mR.
"The exposure device and associated equipment (crank out control and source guide tube) were SPEC 150 exposure device S/N 1106 and a SPEC G-60 source. The source was 61 Ci of Ir-192. The equipment was evaluated and passed the quality assurance requirements. The radiography staff was reinstructed in the Mistras' Operation and Equipment Manual. Specifically the setup and equipment assembly, connecting and cranking out of the source and operating in potentially occupied areas."
Louisiana Report: LA-150023
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On December 19, 2015, a crew from Mistras was working at a temporary jobsite [Donaldsonville, LA] located at CF Industries. The crew set up 2 mR boundaries for the duration of the 'shots'/exposures. The crew cranked out the source and made the exposure. When the crew tried to retract the source into the shielded position, [the source] would not [retract] because the guide tube was improperly connected to the exposure device. The source assembly remained out of the shielded position. When it was determined the source could not be retracted, immediately the area was cleared and the boundaries were reestablished for the 2 mR/hr distance.
"The lead radiographer contacted the RSO, and received instructions on how to secure/shield the area from potential/unnecessary exposures. The unshielded source and incident duration was from 1.5 hours to 2 hours.
"The initial notice to the Department [LA Department of Environmental Quality] was made at approximately 1257 CST after the source was secured in the shielded position. The RSO did the actual retrieval and securing of the source. His time in the radiation field was approximately 30 to 40 minutes. He used the standards of time, distance and shielding to protect himself. His direct read pocket dosimeter reading was approximately 60 mR. The crew members pocket dosimeter readings were 50 mR and 20 mR.
"The exposure device and associated equipment (crank out control and source guide tube) were SPEC 150 exposure device S/N 1106 and a SPEC G-60 source. The source was 61 Ci of Ir-192. The equipment was evaluated and passed the quality assurance requirements. The radiography staff was reinstructed in the Mistras' Operation and Equipment Manual. Specifically the setup and equipment assembly, connecting and cranking out of the source and operating in potentially occupied areas."
Louisiana Report: LA-150023