Event Notification Report for December 08, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/07/2015 - 12/08/2015
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 51594
Rep Org: NASA GODDARD
Licensee: NASA GODDARD
Region: 1
City: GREENBELT State: MD
County:
License #: 19-05748-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: NASA GODDARD
Region: 1
City: GREENBELT State: MD
County:
License #: 19-05748-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/09/2015
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2015
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2015
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2015
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
IRRADIATOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE
"At approximately noon on December 8, 2015, the source located inside the right side of the J. L. Shepherd Model 81-24Q Beam Irradiator didn't move upward from its normal down shielded position to the normal operational position when the operator pressed the button on the operation console. A second attempt was made to have the source be raised to its normal operational position, but the source remained at its normal down shielded position. An emergency shutter built into the system was deployed just as a precaution. Facility Manager notified the Radiation Safety Officer in the Radiation Protection Office (RPO).
"Upon entering the room, it was noted that the source position indicator found on the operating tower mounted on the top of the irradiator showed that the source was located at its normal down shielded position in the irradiator. RPO staff conducted a radiation survey surrounding the irradiator and found that all readings were similar to levels noted in previous surveys conducted when the sources in the irradiator were in their shielding position and the highest reading was noted as 1 mR/hr on contact with the irradiator.
"Contact was made to J. L. Shepherd and arrangements are being made to have a representative come onsite to conduct an evaluation of the system. Arrangements are being made to have that evaluation be conducted during the week of December 14th and the Radiation Safety Officer has given direction for the irritator to not be used until this evaluation by the manufacture can be conducted."
No personnel exposures were reported.
"At approximately noon on December 8, 2015, the source located inside the right side of the J. L. Shepherd Model 81-24Q Beam Irradiator didn't move upward from its normal down shielded position to the normal operational position when the operator pressed the button on the operation console. A second attempt was made to have the source be raised to its normal operational position, but the source remained at its normal down shielded position. An emergency shutter built into the system was deployed just as a precaution. Facility Manager notified the Radiation Safety Officer in the Radiation Protection Office (RPO).
"Upon entering the room, it was noted that the source position indicator found on the operating tower mounted on the top of the irradiator showed that the source was located at its normal down shielded position in the irradiator. RPO staff conducted a radiation survey surrounding the irradiator and found that all readings were similar to levels noted in previous surveys conducted when the sources in the irradiator were in their shielding position and the highest reading was noted as 1 mR/hr on contact with the irradiator.
"Contact was made to J. L. Shepherd and arrangements are being made to have a representative come onsite to conduct an evaluation of the system. Arrangements are being made to have that evaluation be conducted during the week of December 14th and the Radiation Safety Officer has given direction for the irritator to not be used until this evaluation by the manufacture can be conducted."
No personnel exposures were reported.
Part 21
Event Number: 52403
Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR
Licensee: ATC NUCLEAR
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: ATC NUCLEAR
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/01/2016
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2016
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART 21 - PAWL FASTENERS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT STRUCTURAL SUPPORT
The following is an excerpt of a Part 21 received via email:
"On December 8, 2015, ATC Nuclear performed seismic qualification testing on an ATC Nuclear Assembly with a W-2 Electroswitch Switch, Part Number W2-45B640-84 and W2-45B640-85, for TVA Watts Bar 2. During the first Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) test run, the pawl fasteners used to secure the assembly in a test fixture failed to provide sufficient structural support, rendering the switch assembly non-captive.
"Based on the testing and analysis, ATC Nuclear concluded that the minimum force required to maintain structural integrity cannot be achieved with the existing pawl fasteners installed in the ATC Nuclear Assembly. This condition, if left uncorrected, could potentially cause a failure of the switch assembly to maintain its mounting configuration during a seismic event. This information provides the basis to establish a deviation in the pawl fasteners provided with the ATC Nuclear assembly that could be considered a potential defect as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. It is worth noting that there have been no failures identified by customers associated with this potential defect.
"If you have any questions or need additional information regarding this matter, please contact Ray Chalifoux at (865) 384-0124."
The following is an excerpt of a Part 21 received via email:
"On December 8, 2015, ATC Nuclear performed seismic qualification testing on an ATC Nuclear Assembly with a W-2 Electroswitch Switch, Part Number W2-45B640-84 and W2-45B640-85, for TVA Watts Bar 2. During the first Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) test run, the pawl fasteners used to secure the assembly in a test fixture failed to provide sufficient structural support, rendering the switch assembly non-captive.
"Based on the testing and analysis, ATC Nuclear concluded that the minimum force required to maintain structural integrity cannot be achieved with the existing pawl fasteners installed in the ATC Nuclear Assembly. This condition, if left uncorrected, could potentially cause a failure of the switch assembly to maintain its mounting configuration during a seismic event. This information provides the basis to establish a deviation in the pawl fasteners provided with the ATC Nuclear assembly that could be considered a potential defect as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. It is worth noting that there have been no failures identified by customers associated with this potential defect.
"If you have any questions or need additional information regarding this matter, please contact Ray Chalifoux at (865) 384-0124."