Event Notification Report for December 06, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/05/2015 - 12/06/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51587
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JASON WILLIS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JASON WILLIS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/06/2015
Notification Time: 05:28 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 03:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2015
Notification Time: 05:28 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 03:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE DUE TO ICING OF INTAKE SUPPLY PLENUM SCREENS
"On December 06, 2015 at 0350 [EST], Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) [degrading vacuum] when the intake supply plenum screens were found to be iced over. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"Snow melt heaters were manually started to melt the ice allowing restoration of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than 0.25 inch WC at 0434 on December 06, 2015.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On December 06, 2015 at 0350 [EST], Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) [degrading vacuum] when the intake supply plenum screens were found to be iced over. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"Snow melt heaters were manually started to melt the ice allowing restoration of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than 0.25 inch WC at 0434 on December 06, 2015.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51588
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 12/06/2015
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 05:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2015
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 05:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE DUE TO EXHAUST FAN TRIP
"On December 06, 2015 at 0546 [EST], Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) [degrading vacuum] when the running Reactor Building Zone 1 exhaust fan tripped. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"The standby fan automatically started, restoring of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than -0.25 inch WC. Field operators confirmed proper system response at 0553 [EST] December 06, 2015.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. "
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On December 06, 2015 at 0546 [EST], Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) [degrading vacuum] when the running Reactor Building Zone 1 exhaust fan tripped. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"The standby fan automatically started, restoring of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than -0.25 inch WC. Field operators confirmed proper system response at 0553 [EST] December 06, 2015.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. "
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 51672
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: GREENVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-33172-C19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: APPLIED TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: GREENVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-33172-C19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2016
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE DUE TO DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE
The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email:
"On December 6, 2015 at approximately 1300 EST, an exposure device D6032, (880 Delta) containing Source S/N SE4869, 50 Ci of Se-75, fell from its position on top of a flange assembly approximately six feet to the finished floor. Upon impact, the guide tube was crimped preventing the source from being able to return to the camera. The source was able to be returned to the collimator reducing the radiation present. Technicians secured a true two mR boundary and notified plant safety personnel and the RSO. The lead technician onsite was source retrieval certified and took charge of the retrieval process. The source was further shielded in a larger diameter pipe and covered with sand bags to reduce radiation levels. Using a pair of pliers, the technician was able to 're-round' the guide tube opening to allow the source to be returned to the camera. The guide tube, camera and control assembly was taken out of service pending inspection. The guide tube was damaged beyond use; the source 'pigtail' and control cable were inspected and tested using a no-go gauge. The guide tube was removed from service and the control assembly will be sent to the manufacturer for further evaluation (ball end connector). Source retrieval technician received a total dose of 150 mR during the event."
Tennessee Report No.: TN-16-012
The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email:
"On December 6, 2015 at approximately 1300 EST, an exposure device D6032, (880 Delta) containing Source S/N SE4869, 50 Ci of Se-75, fell from its position on top of a flange assembly approximately six feet to the finished floor. Upon impact, the guide tube was crimped preventing the source from being able to return to the camera. The source was able to be returned to the collimator reducing the radiation present. Technicians secured a true two mR boundary and notified plant safety personnel and the RSO. The lead technician onsite was source retrieval certified and took charge of the retrieval process. The source was further shielded in a larger diameter pipe and covered with sand bags to reduce radiation levels. Using a pair of pliers, the technician was able to 're-round' the guide tube opening to allow the source to be returned to the camera. The guide tube, camera and control assembly was taken out of service pending inspection. The guide tube was damaged beyond use; the source 'pigtail' and control cable were inspected and tested using a no-go gauge. The guide tube was removed from service and the control assembly will be sent to the manufacturer for further evaluation (ball end connector). Source retrieval technician received a total dose of 150 mR during the event."
Tennessee Report No.: TN-16-012