Event Notification Report for November 11, 2015

SHIELD BUILDING VENT GAS RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 0826 CST on 11/11/2015, 1R-22, Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor, was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications - when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Unit 1 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 1R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-22 prior to its removal from service. The duration of this maintenance is scheduled for 24 hours and will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE AT 1547 EST ON 11/12/15 FROM PAUL FINHOLM TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The licensee indicated that the duration of maintenance was extended for approximately 24 hours to allow continued repair of the monitor.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Notified the R3DO (Kozak).

DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The following was received via email:

"At approximately 1000 [EST], a Troxler Gauge was run over by a road construction roller resulting in a cracked housing of the gauge. The instrument's source probe was not extended. Initial survey results indicated 0.5 mR/hr at 12 inches (background was less than 0.1 mR/hr). An ERCIT inspector was dispatched to investigate. [The inspector's] survey indicated 15 mR/hr on contact; his report is forthcoming."

The gauge contains Cesium-137 and Americium/Beryllium sources.

The gauge was transferred to the licensee's radwaste facility.

Florida Incident Report Number: FL-15-116

SEISMIC MONITOR INOPERABLE

"At 1344 CST on 11/11/15, the seismic monitor was found inoperable. The seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation.

"The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"[The NRC] Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER OVERDOSE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On November 13, 2015, a licensee notified the Agency that one its radiographers had an overexposure. The licensee stated the radiographer cranked out the source and waited the time for the shot, then thought he cranked the source back into the camera. When he went to retrieve the film, the radiographer noticed his survey metered was pegged off scale. He immediately went back to the truck and checked his pocket dosimeter and it was off scale also. He picked up the crank and retracted the source. He checked the area with the survey meter and the radiation level had dropped. He informed his supervisor that night and the corporate radiation safety officer had the radiographers monitoring badge sent off for processing. The badge reading was DDE [Deep Dose Equivalent] of 11,453 mRem and LDE [Lens of the eye Dose Equivalent] 11,494 mRem. The radiographer is being interviewed of the details of the incident and a detailed report will be provided. The radiographer has not had any health effects at this time nor are any expected."

This incident occurred on 11/11/2015 at a job site in Pecos, TX.

Texas Incident: I-9358

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL RADIATION WORKER OVEREXPOSURE

The following was received from New York via email:

"Possible [overexposure] event occurred when a radiochemist employed by Weill Cornell Medical College recorded an exposure of 1675 mRem during the October 1-October 31 monitoring period. This caused his year to date exposure for the year 2015 to exceed the annual maximum permissible personnel exposure of 5000 mRem per year. His year to date dose equivalent through October 31, 2015 is 5546 mRem. The radiochemist synthesizes radiopharmaceuticals for PET and PET/CT. He works primarily with Carbon-11 with a 511 keV gamma energy.
Investigation was performed by the licensee [New York Presbyterian Hospital]. They analyzed his workload, procedure methods and the quantities of the radiopharmaceuticals he worked with in October and confirmed that it did not vary from previous months in this year. Also other radiochemists working with him did not receive any elevated exposures nor were there any contaminations in the radiochemistry area. Since the radiochemist October exposure was 43 percent of what he had received in his previous 9 months, the licensee concluded that the dosimeter may have been accidentally contaminated. The investigation concluded that the radiochemist did not receive an overexposure of 1675 mRem."

New York Incident # NY150008

PART 21 - COMMERCIAL GRADE CAP SCREWS PROVIDED WITH SAFETY RELATED FISHER TYPE 3570 POSITIONERS

The following information was provided by the reporting organization via fax:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a failure to comply concerning Type 3570 positioners when provided as safety-related equipment.

"On November 11, 2015, Fisher became aware of an issue with the dedication of a Type 3570 positioner. When replacement Type 3570 positioners are ordered, the two cap screws (SAE J429 Grade 5 cap screws/size 3/8-16x1.5) used for mounting the positioner to the actuator cylinder are also included. It was not clearly communicated to the end user that these mounting cap screws are included with the positioner. Further, the dedication plan only addresses the 3570 positioner and does not include dedication of the mounting cap screws.

"As a result, these cap screws had not been dedicated on any safety-related Type 3570 positioner orders. There is no reason to believe any of the cap screws supplied were defective, only that they were not dedicated and were therefore supplied as commercial grade items. There have been no reported failures of the cap screws in question.

"An extent-of-condition investigation is underway to identify all potentially affected bolt-on accessories. Any identified affected products will be reported per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21 (b). This extent-of-condition review is expected to be completed by January 29, 2016.

"Corrective Action 1791 has been opened to document corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.

"Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249.

Individual informing the NRC: Chad Engle, Director, Nuclear Business Unit, Fisher Controls International LLC, phone (641) 754-3011.

* * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE BAITINGER TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX AT 1528 EST ON 2/2/16 * * *

The following information is summarized from a fax received from Emerson Process Management (Fisher Controls):

On January 22, 2016, Fisher Controls completed their extent-of-condition investigation and determined that seven of their thirty two product series have the potential to include non-dedicated cap screws and mounting studs.

The vendor plans to complete their final report within 45 days.

Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Musser), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Pick) and the Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM LYNN SANDERS TO DONG PARK VIA EMAIL AT 1749 EST ON 3/11/16 * * *

The following information is summarized from an email received from Emerson Process Management (Fisher Controls):

"The supplied instrument assemblies in question were subjected to the processing requirements of Fisher Controls FMP2K27 (Control of Commercial Grade Items to be Dedicated for Use in Nuclear Safety-Related Applications) and were supplied as safety-related components. However, Fisher supplied various mounting parts (in addition to the requested product) that were not processed under FMP2K27; thus, such parts were supplied as commercial items.

"This issue was first discovered in relation to the cap screws used for mounting a 3570 positioner (please see Interim Report dated 01/08/2016). Fisher conducted an extent-of-condition investigation to include all safety-related actuator-mounted accessories. In total, thirty -two (32) actuator-mounted item types were investigated. It is Fisher's opinion the failures to dedicate these mounting accessories do not pose an inherent safety risk.

"Additionally, there are no known field issues with respect to the affected equipment and all such non-dedicated equipment passed the required standard testing.

"Each affected customer needs to: (i) evaluate the application of each referenced item number for all respective orders; (ii) determine whether the incorrectly processed mounting parts are in violation of regulatory requirements; (iii) contact Fisher or otherwise arrange for the procurement of properly processed mounting parts for use in those applications found to be in violation. In addition, a Corrective Action Request (CAR 1791) has been initiated by Fisher to prevent reoccurrence of this issue."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Suggs), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Proulx), and the Part 21 group via email.