Event Notification Report for October 29, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/2015 - 10/29/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51506
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 10/29/2015
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2015
Event Time: 03:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2015
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2015
Event Time: 03:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
ACTUATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DUE TO MAIN TRANSFORMER LOCKOUT
"At 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation.
"This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation.
"This event did not affect the operating Unit 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation.
"This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation.
"This event did not affect the operating Unit 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51624
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/28/2015
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2015
Event Time: 11:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2015
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2015
Event Time: 11:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID ACTUATION OF UNIT 2 2C SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CABINET
"This is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) actuation due to an invalid signal.
"This report is being made per paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C SEC on October 29, 2015, during performance of maintenance on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
"Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation.
"On October 29, 2015, at approximately 1112 [EDT] during performance of maintenance to replace slave relays in the SSPS output test panel 131, the maintenance technician inadvertently made contact with the relay plunger for the 2C SEC. This caused a signal to be sent to the 2C SEC which actuated the equipment associated with it.
"The 2C SEC train responded to the signal as required. The equipment associated with the 2C SEC that was not previously removed from service for outage related activities or already in service responded as required.
"As a result of the actuation, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started but did not load (no undervoltage condition existed on the associated vital bus requiring loading), the Unit 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) started. The 22 Charging Pump (CVC) started, and the 22 Safety Injection Pump (SI) started (the Sl pump did not inject as it was isolated and in the process of being tagged out of service at the time of the invalid signal).
"The cause of the invalid actuation signal was a human performance error."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) actuation due to an invalid signal.
"This report is being made per paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C SEC on October 29, 2015, during performance of maintenance on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
"Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation.
"On October 29, 2015, at approximately 1112 [EDT] during performance of maintenance to replace slave relays in the SSPS output test panel 131, the maintenance technician inadvertently made contact with the relay plunger for the 2C SEC. This caused a signal to be sent to the 2C SEC which actuated the equipment associated with it.
"The 2C SEC train responded to the signal as required. The equipment associated with the 2C SEC that was not previously removed from service for outage related activities or already in service responded as required.
"As a result of the actuation, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started but did not load (no undervoltage condition existed on the associated vital bus requiring loading), the Unit 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) started. The 22 Charging Pump (CVC) started, and the 22 Safety Injection Pump (SI) started (the Sl pump did not inject as it was isolated and in the process of being tagged out of service at the time of the invalid signal).
"The cause of the invalid actuation signal was a human performance error."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.