Event Notification Report for October 21, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/20/2015 - 10/21/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51487
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JULIE BISSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JULIE BISSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/21/2015
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2015
Event Time: 13:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2015
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2015
Event Time: 13:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO PRESSURIZER HEATER BANK POTENTIAL CIRCUIT FAILURE VULNERABILITY
"The isolation function when transferring control from the Main Control Room to the Alternate Shutdown Panel (AI-185) for Pressurizer Heater Bank No. 4 (including Groups No. 10, No. 11, and No. 12) has been identified as a potential circuit failure.
"Identification of the potential circuit failure vulnerability is for Pressurizer Heater Bank No. 4 when isolated from Alternate Shutdown Panel (AI-185) and operated locally from Motor Control Center (MCC-4C1) for Alternate Shutdown Fire Areas 41 (Cable Spreading Room) and 42 (Main Control Room).
"The vulnerability involves an external hot short affecting the conductor connecting to the control room switch which may keep the 94/10 relay energized and defeat MCC control of the heaters. In a postulated event, a fire in the control room could prevent the heaters from energizing when demanded, or cause the heaters to unintentionally energize.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, fire watch is an adequate compensatory measure. Therefore, this vulnerability has been added to the existing NFPA 805 Fire Protection compensatory measure for Fire Area 41. For Fire Area 42, the Main Control Room is continuously staffed, which has been credited as the compensatory measure.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The isolation function when transferring control from the Main Control Room to the Alternate Shutdown Panel (AI-185) for Pressurizer Heater Bank No. 4 (including Groups No. 10, No. 11, and No. 12) has been identified as a potential circuit failure.
"Identification of the potential circuit failure vulnerability is for Pressurizer Heater Bank No. 4 when isolated from Alternate Shutdown Panel (AI-185) and operated locally from Motor Control Center (MCC-4C1) for Alternate Shutdown Fire Areas 41 (Cable Spreading Room) and 42 (Main Control Room).
"The vulnerability involves an external hot short affecting the conductor connecting to the control room switch which may keep the 94/10 relay energized and defeat MCC control of the heaters. In a postulated event, a fire in the control room could prevent the heaters from energizing when demanded, or cause the heaters to unintentionally energize.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, fire watch is an adequate compensatory measure. Therefore, this vulnerability has been added to the existing NFPA 805 Fire Protection compensatory measure for Fire Area 41. For Fire Area 42, the Main Control Room is continuously staffed, which has been credited as the compensatory measure.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51604
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JOACHIMCZYK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JOACHIMCZYK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/14/2015
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2015
Event Time: 00:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2015
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2015
Event Time: 00:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DIESEL GENERATOR START DUE TO INVALID SIGNAL
"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on October 21, 2015, during the performance of a Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test. The Emergency AC Electrical Power system, including Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"During the performance of the Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test restoration steps a human performance error, while taking resistance readings on a relay, resulted in the unintentional start of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator. The testing was aborted and the affected Diesel Generator was restored to standby service in accordance with plant procedures. This is defined as an 'invalid signal' in that the 'A' Diesel Generator did not start as the result of an actual initiating condition.
"The start signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), however the system was not fully removed from service. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. The actuation signal was considered complete since all necessary components responded as would have been expected if there had been a valid signal.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
The licensee has determined that shorter test probe tips, when taking resistance readings, are necessary to prevent reoccurrence of this event.
"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on October 21, 2015, during the performance of a Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test. The Emergency AC Electrical Power system, including Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"During the performance of the Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test restoration steps a human performance error, while taking resistance readings on a relay, resulted in the unintentional start of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator. The testing was aborted and the affected Diesel Generator was restored to standby service in accordance with plant procedures. This is defined as an 'invalid signal' in that the 'A' Diesel Generator did not start as the result of an actual initiating condition.
"The start signal is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), however the system was not fully removed from service. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. The actuation signal was considered complete since all necessary components responded as would have been expected if there had been a valid signal.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
The licensee has determined that shorter test probe tips, when taking resistance readings, are necessary to prevent reoccurrence of this event.