Event Notification Report for October 07, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2015 - 10/07/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51474
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BURIANEK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BURIANEK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/15/2015
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 06:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2015
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 06:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNPLANNED AFW ACTUATION DURING REFUELING OUTAGE TESTING
"On October 7, 2015, with McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 in Mode 4, operators were testing the main turbine and main feedwater pump turbines, 2A safety injection (SI) train trip functions. At the time of the test, the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps were in operation to provide make-up to the steam generators. The main feedwater system was not in service. During realignment activities from the 2A Sl test, the 2A AFW train actuation signal was unblocked when the '2A AFW auto start defeat' switch was returned to 'reset.' This caused the 2A AFW train control valves to fully open, and the associated steam generator sampling and blowdown valves to close. The actuation occurred as designed and there was no adverse impact to the Unit. Public health and safety were not impacted by this event.
"Based on a review of the Event Reporting Guidelines and the plant licensing basis, this event was initially determined to be an invalid actuation. However, after further review and discussions with the NRC, Duke Energy concluded the event should be reported as an 8-hour non-emergency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. A Nuclear Condition Report was initiated for the late notification.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On October 7, 2015, with McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 in Mode 4, operators were testing the main turbine and main feedwater pump turbines, 2A safety injection (SI) train trip functions. At the time of the test, the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps were in operation to provide make-up to the steam generators. The main feedwater system was not in service. During realignment activities from the 2A Sl test, the 2A AFW train actuation signal was unblocked when the '2A AFW auto start defeat' switch was returned to 'reset.' This caused the 2A AFW train control valves to fully open, and the associated steam generator sampling and blowdown valves to close. The actuation occurred as designed and there was no adverse impact to the Unit. Public health and safety were not impacted by this event.
"Based on a review of the Event Reporting Guidelines and the plant licensing basis, this event was initially determined to be an invalid actuation. However, after further review and discussions with the NRC, Duke Energy concluded the event should be reported as an 8-hour non-emergency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. A Nuclear Condition Report was initiated for the late notification.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51459
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/07/2015
Notification Time: 22:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2015
Notification Time: 22:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT RENDERED INOPERABLE
"At 1930 [CDT] on 10-7-2015, GGNS [Grand Gulf Nuclear Station] identified that on October 1, 2015, Secondary Containment was inoperable between 0324 and 0440 and therefore could have prevented fulfillment of its safety function. That event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), as any event or condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"During the Standby Gas Treatment drawdown surveillance performed October 1, 2015, Secondary Containment failed technical specification required average enclosure building pressure of less than or equal to -0.311 water gauge at 0324 [CDT] (LCO-1-TS-15-0360 entered).
"Secondary Containment has two boundaries that can be separately credited for meeting the Tech Spec requirements of TS 3.6.4.1.
"Two inner doors are required to be open during the surveillance in order to test the outer door. While open, those inner doors were attended by Security personnel provided with communications capability.
"Following completion of the surveillance, Secondary Containment was returned to operable status at 0440 on 10/1/15 by closing the inner doors and maintaining them closed.
"A subsequent Standby Gas Treatment drawdown surveillance test on October 6, 2015, was performed satisfactorily."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"At 1930 [CDT] on 10-7-2015, GGNS [Grand Gulf Nuclear Station] identified that on October 1, 2015, Secondary Containment was inoperable between 0324 and 0440 and therefore could have prevented fulfillment of its safety function. That event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), as any event or condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"During the Standby Gas Treatment drawdown surveillance performed October 1, 2015, Secondary Containment failed technical specification required average enclosure building pressure of less than or equal to -0.311 water gauge at 0324 [CDT] (LCO-1-TS-15-0360 entered).
"Secondary Containment has two boundaries that can be separately credited for meeting the Tech Spec requirements of TS 3.6.4.1.
"Two inner doors are required to be open during the surveillance in order to test the outer door. While open, those inner doors were attended by Security personnel provided with communications capability.
"Following completion of the surveillance, Secondary Containment was returned to operable status at 0440 on 10/1/15 by closing the inner doors and maintaining them closed.
"A subsequent Standby Gas Treatment drawdown surveillance test on October 6, 2015, was performed satisfactorily."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51460
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/08/2015
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 21:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2015
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2015
Event Time: 21:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOOR FOUND UNLATCHED
"At approximately 2147 EDT on October 7, 2015, a high energy line break (HELB) door between the Turbine Building (TB) and the safety related Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) was determined to be unlatched. The door was immediately closed (latched). Investigation determined the door was unlatched for approximately 47 minutes. At 1617 EDT on October 8, 2015, it was determined the Unit 2 ESGR was outside of the design analysis for a Unit 1 HELB. A high energy line break in the TB with the door open could result in equipment in the Unit 2 ESGR experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) & (B) & (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At approximately 2147 EDT on October 7, 2015, a high energy line break (HELB) door between the Turbine Building (TB) and the safety related Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) was determined to be unlatched. The door was immediately closed (latched). Investigation determined the door was unlatched for approximately 47 minutes. At 1617 EDT on October 8, 2015, it was determined the Unit 2 ESGR was outside of the design analysis for a Unit 1 HELB. A high energy line break in the TB with the door open could result in equipment in the Unit 2 ESGR experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) & (B) & (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."