Event Notification Report for October 01, 2015

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN

The following report was received via fax:

"An OHMART gauge was discovered with the shutters malfunctioning on a level gauge installed on processes. The shutters were stuck in the open position due to the buildup of grime and corrosive material from the operational environment. This device does not pose a radiation exposure hazard or a threat the work force or the general public. The device will remain in operation on the processes until the repair or replacement.

"The detected malfunction was discovered during the annual inventory/operational checks. These checks are required by condition # 7 of the radioactive material license, LA-2316-L01. The repairs will be made and documentation will be reviewed during the next inspection.

"The gauge detected was an OHMART Corp. gauge, Model Number SHF-2. The gauge/device S/N unknown is loaded with approximately 671 mCi of Cs-137 with source S/N 5895GK. BBP Sales was contacted to fix the problem by repairing the gauge or replacing the device."

Louisiana Event: LA-150016

MODE CHANGE WITH TURBINE TRIP LEADS LIFTED

"At 0906 [CDT], it was determined that U1 [Unit 1] was in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the turbine trip safety function and TS [Tech Spec] 3.0.3 was entered. Leads had been lifted to disable the turbine trip function on both SSPS [Solid State Protection System] trains while U1 was in Mode 4 (which is outside the mode of applicability). However, at 0059 [CDT], U1 entered Mode 3 with these leads still lifted. In Mode 3, both trains of the turbine trip function are required to be operable per TS 3.3.2. The turbine was subsequently tripped at 0932 [EDT] and the leads were re-landed enabling the turbine trip function at 0946 [CDT], TS 3.0.3 was subsequently exited. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The Byron NRC site Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."

The licensee has notified the State of Illinois.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SOURCE DISCONNECTED

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On October 1, 2015 the Agency was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer that a source was disconnected and dropped into a vessel. [This was caused by] a shutter malfunction which occurred on October 1, 2015 at 0930 [CDT] on a nuclear gauge. The source is an Ohmart Model MDTS, Serial Number 8480GK, Cesium 137, 9.5 mCi source. The shutter malfunction occurred during a routine check of the shutter operation. This particular device utilizes a tape which is connected to the source. The tape allows the source to be lowered and raised inside a well within the vessel. During the routine shutter checks, the tape disconnected from the source. At this time, the source is located inside the well near its normal operational position. A radiation survey was conducted at areas which would contain general employee access. All radiation readings were at background level. This event did not cause any additional radiation exposure than normal day to day operations. The gauge manufacturer has been notified and will be on-site October 7, 2015 to repair the device. Updates will be provided in accordance with SA-300 guidelines."

Texas Incident: I-9342

RADIATION WORKER OVER EXPOSURE

Lantheus Medical Imaging received notification that the dosimeter of an employed radiation worker indicated a whole body over exposure for the month of August 2015. The indicated dose is 7929 mRem for August and the 2015 total is 8500 mRem. The employee is a technician in charge of operating the cyclotron and has been removed from radiation work. The licensee has notified the employee and is conducting an investigation.

PART 21 - HYDRAULIC SNUBBER SEAL MATERIAL DEVIATION INTERIM REPORT

"Anvil Engineered Pipe Supports (EPS) supplied 14 Fig. 200N Configuration 'A' style hydraulic snubbers to the Exelon owned and operated Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) in 2013. During the course of routine refueling outage activities in October 2015, it was discovered that 9 of these 14 snubbers had no hydraulic fluid in the reservoir. The cause of the hydraulic fluid loss was premature aging of the reservoir piston seal due to vibration induced frictional heat. Subsequent laboratory testing of both replacement and degraded seal material by Exelon Power Labs suggested that a material substitution had been made from the Anvil approved Ethylene Propylene (EP) compound to a different grade of EP rubber.

"On February 17, 2016, Anvil determined that a material substitution was made by the seal vendor. A machined seal that was fabricated by the manufacturer was substituted for a seal molded with the approved Anvil compound. Prior to its installation in Fig. 200N/201N Configuration 'A' hydraulic snubbers, the machined seal compound was not tested to establish a service life for the compound.

"Anvil has bounded the extent of condition to 4 specific seal batches of 4" and 5" Fig. 200N/201N Configuration 'A' reservoir piston seals provided after January 1, 2013. Based on its Part 21 investigation, Anvil has yet to determine that a specific defect exists, based on the demonstrated operability of the snubbers at PBAPS despite severe service conditions beyond their published operational limits, and the compatibility of the EP base polymer with Anvil hydraulic fluids.

"Anvil is conducting a test campaign to approve and establish a service life for the machined seal compound. This testing will either qualify the machined compound for use at currently published Anvil service conditions (157 degrees F for 25 years with a total lifetime dose not to exceed 2e8 rads), or establish a reduced service life for the snubbers in which a material substitution was made. This testing is being conducted on an assembled reservoir with the substitute machined compound. It will include irradiation of the reservoir to 6.4e7 rads, accelerated temperature aging, and a final radiation exposure to bring the cumulative dose to 2e8 rads. As of 3/14/16, the reservoir specimen had been irradiated to 6.4e7 rads with no effect on the seal.

"Anvil expects to have this testing complete by May 1, 2016, with a formal evaluation to follow. PBAPS has been notified of the material substitution, and a full accounting of the affected snubbers by serial number, PO number, site, and utility is being assembled. Anvil will notify affected sites when the testing and equivalency evaluation is complete.

"Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or require any additional information.

"Sincerely,
Mark R Ward
Operations Manager
Anvil Engineered Pipe Supports
160 Frenchtown Road
North Kingstown, Rl, 02852"

* * * UPDATE ON 4/26/2016 AT 12:25 EDT FROM MARK WARD (VIA FAX) TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is a summary of information received from Anvil EPS:

Anvil performed qualification testing of the machined compound with satisfactory results. The machined compound is now qualified for a service life equivalent to the published service life of the molded compound when used as a reservoir piston seal for the Fig. 200N/201N Configuration "A". Anvil has determined that a specific defect does not exist and no action by licensees is needed. Fifty-nine (59) total snubbers were shipped to NRC licensees (Farley, Peach Bottom, Oconee, ANO, and Diablo Canyon); Anvil will advise sites.

Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R4DO (Groom) and NRR Part 21 Group.

PART 21 - EATON A200 STARTERS DID NOT OPEN WHEN POWER WAS REMOVED

The following is a synopsis of the Part 21 received:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ Nuclear is providing initial written notification of the identification of a deviation.

"PDMS material has been identified in the Eaton A200 series starters/contactors with date code T4115 (41st week of 2015) which is outside the range of May 2008 to December 2012 that were originally identified in NRC Event Number 51611 from 2015. This resulted in a few instances where the starter did not immediately open when the power was removed."

Point of contact for additional information:
Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance
AZZ Nuclear
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118