Event Notification Report for September 28, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/27/2015 - 09/28/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51428
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STENGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STENGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 14:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 14:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
INVALID SEISMIC EVENT ALARM
"At 1444 CDT on September 28, 2015, the station's seismic instrumentation generated a seismic event alarm that was determined to be invalid based upon no seismic activity being felt on site, and no activity detected in the area by either the National Earthquake Information Center, or nearby nuclear plants. The instrumentation that actuated recorded steady values of -0.3 to -0.4g on three axes of one instrument, which is greater than the +/- 0.02g threshold value in the Emergency Action Level in the station's emergency procedures; however, no other instrument channel or axis indicated a valid event exceeding the 0.02g threshold. Since the event alarm was determined to be invalid as described above, no EAL thresholds were met.
"The seismic instrumentation was declared non-functional since it would not generate a seismic event alarm during an actual event until the invalid event was reset. The alarm was reset through the alarm reset process. The seismic instrumentation alarm capability was restored and returned to service at 1746. The Seismic Instrumentation remains non-functional pending troubleshooting.
"This resulted in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while the seismic instrumentation was out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
This is a recurring event. See EN #51263 and EN #51282.
"At 1444 CDT on September 28, 2015, the station's seismic instrumentation generated a seismic event alarm that was determined to be invalid based upon no seismic activity being felt on site, and no activity detected in the area by either the National Earthquake Information Center, or nearby nuclear plants. The instrumentation that actuated recorded steady values of -0.3 to -0.4g on three axes of one instrument, which is greater than the +/- 0.02g threshold value in the Emergency Action Level in the station's emergency procedures; however, no other instrument channel or axis indicated a valid event exceeding the 0.02g threshold. Since the event alarm was determined to be invalid as described above, no EAL thresholds were met.
"The seismic instrumentation was declared non-functional since it would not generate a seismic event alarm during an actual event until the invalid event was reset. The alarm was reset through the alarm reset process. The seismic instrumentation alarm capability was restored and returned to service at 1746. The Seismic Instrumentation remains non-functional pending troubleshooting.
"This resulted in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while the seismic instrumentation was out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
This is a recurring event. See EN #51263 and EN #51282.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51429
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 13:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2015
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 13:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE AT THE SAME TIME
"At approximately 1327 CDT on September 28, 2015, both D1 and D2 Diesel Generators (EDG) were inoperable simultaneously until corrected at 1345 CDT. The D2 Diesel Generator had been declared inoperable for the planned performance of SP1307, D2 Diesel Generator 6 Month Fast Start Test. Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1 Condition B had been entered for D2 Diesel Generator. Subsequently, D1 Diesel Generator was determined to be inoperable but available due to Train A Cooling Water Header being inoperable during post maintenance testing of SV-33133, Backwash Water Supply to the 121 Safeguards Traveling Screen. Tech Spec LCO 3.7.8 Condition B was entered for the Cooling Water Header inoperability, which forced a cascade to Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B for D1 Diesel Generator. With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was entered, which required the restoration of one Emergency Diesel Generator to operable status within 2 hours. D2 was returned to operable status through completion of SP 1307, and Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was exited at 1345 CDT.
"With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.
"The plant remains safe, and this condition does not pose any additional risk to the public. Additionally, our defense in depth strategies are relied upon to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public. D2 Diesel Generator remained available with full cooling water flow during this time. The safety significance of this event is low, as engineering hydraulic analysis has demonstrated that with the safeguards traveling screen backwash water supply valve fully opened, the Cooling Water System would have continued to provide full cooling flow to the D1 Diesel Generator.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/4/15 AT 1510 EST FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONG PARK * * *
"An evaluation has been performed and it has been determined that SV-33133 and SV-33134 do not have an active close safety function. The Cooling Water System analysis of record, calculation ENG-ME-820, Rev 0B shows that the Cooling Water System continues to have flow margin with screen wash control valves SV-33133 and SV-33134 open.
"Therefore, there is no need for the valves to close to ensure the Cooling Water System's safety function. Because the valves do not have a safety function to close, this event was not an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC [structures, systems and components] required to mitigate the consequences of an accident and, therefore, did not require an 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., accident mitigation) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The notification is hereby retracted.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).
"At approximately 1327 CDT on September 28, 2015, both D1 and D2 Diesel Generators (EDG) were inoperable simultaneously until corrected at 1345 CDT. The D2 Diesel Generator had been declared inoperable for the planned performance of SP1307, D2 Diesel Generator 6 Month Fast Start Test. Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1 Condition B had been entered for D2 Diesel Generator. Subsequently, D1 Diesel Generator was determined to be inoperable but available due to Train A Cooling Water Header being inoperable during post maintenance testing of SV-33133, Backwash Water Supply to the 121 Safeguards Traveling Screen. Tech Spec LCO 3.7.8 Condition B was entered for the Cooling Water Header inoperability, which forced a cascade to Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B for D1 Diesel Generator. With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was entered, which required the restoration of one Emergency Diesel Generator to operable status within 2 hours. D2 was returned to operable status through completion of SP 1307, and Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition E was exited at 1345 CDT.
"With both Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.
"The plant remains safe, and this condition does not pose any additional risk to the public. Additionally, our defense in depth strategies are relied upon to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public. D2 Diesel Generator remained available with full cooling water flow during this time. The safety significance of this event is low, as engineering hydraulic analysis has demonstrated that with the safeguards traveling screen backwash water supply valve fully opened, the Cooling Water System would have continued to provide full cooling flow to the D1 Diesel Generator.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/4/15 AT 1510 EST FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONG PARK * * *
"An evaluation has been performed and it has been determined that SV-33133 and SV-33134 do not have an active close safety function. The Cooling Water System analysis of record, calculation ENG-ME-820, Rev 0B shows that the Cooling Water System continues to have flow margin with screen wash control valves SV-33133 and SV-33134 open.
"Therefore, there is no need for the valves to close to ensure the Cooling Water System's safety function. Because the valves do not have a safety function to close, this event was not an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC [structures, systems and components] required to mitigate the consequences of an accident and, therefore, did not require an 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., accident mitigation) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The notification is hereby retracted.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51430
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICHARD FICARRA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICHARD FICARRA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 20:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2015
Event Time: 20:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING TRIP OF BOTH REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS
"On September 28, 2015 at 2046 EDT, the Hope Creek reactor scrammed following a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps.
"All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The Outage Control Center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram.
"The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek township of the event.
"On September 28, 2015 at 2046 EDT, the Hope Creek reactor scrammed following a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps.
"All control rods fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as designed and expected. There was no radiological release. The unit is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves rejecting steam to the main condenser. Normal feedwater level control is providing makeup to the reactor vessel.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The Outage Control Center has been staffed to determine the cause of the reactor scram.
"The Hope Creek NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek township of the event.