Event Notification Report for September 09, 2015

POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED EMPLOYEE TRANSPORTED OFFSITE FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

"On Wednesday, September 9, 2015 at 1102 PDT, while trouble shooting process equipment in the ceramic area, an instrument technician got his right thumb caught between two pieces of equipment and severed the nail and part of the end of his thumb. The individual received first aid in the health and safety technician (HST) office and was surveyed for radioactive contamination and was found clean (the injured gloved hand was bandaged and was not surveyed). The injured individual, accompanied by an HST and survey instruments, was transported to a medical facility for treatment.

"After the injured individual was unbandaged by medical personnel, the HST surveyed the injured individual and portions of the medical facility and confirmed that no radioactive contamination was on the injured individual's hand nor had any spread to the facility. The bandage and damaged glove was returned to the plant and laboratory instrumentation was used to confirm that it was also free from contamination.

"This report is being made under 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, Section C, 'concurrent reporting,' because the severed thumb requires a 24 hour report to Washington State Division of Occupational Safety & Health per Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 296-27-031. It is also conservatively being reported under 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(3), 'treatment of an individual with radioactive contamination,' because a small portion of the individual had not been surveyed and confirmed to not have any contamination prior to transporting the individual to a medical facility."

The Licensee will notify NRC Region 4 during business hours on 9/10/15.

* * * UPDATE FROM CALVIN MANNING TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1822 EDT ON 9/29/15 * * *

"On September 9, 2015, the AREVA Inc. Richland facility reported per the requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, section C, that an employee doing maintenance work severed the nail and part of the end of their thumb which required reporting to the Washington State Division of Occupational Safety & Health per Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 296-27-031.

"AREVA also conservatively reported, under 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3), treatment of an individual with radioactive contamination, because although the employee was surveyed for radioactive contamination and found to be free from such contamination prior to transport to a medical facility, a small portion of the individual had not been surveyed due to bandages on the injured hand. A Radiation Technician porting a radiation detection instrument accompanied the individual to the medical facility and when the bandage was removed confirmed that the hand, the bandage material and the medical facility room were all free from radioactive contamination. Based on this finding, AREVA retracts the portion of the report dealing pertaining to 10 CFR 70.50(b)(3).

"It is noted that a 60-day follow-up report is not required by 10 CFR 70 Appendix A for concurrent reporting (section C), therefore AREVA does not anticipate further correspondence with the NRC regarding this matter."

Notified R4DO (Vasquez), R2DO (Ayres), NMSS EO (Guttman), NMSS Events Resource (email).

INVALID ACTUATION OF A GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe invalid actuation containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On September 9, 2015 at 2103 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Unit 1 experienced a loss of electrical power to motor control center 1CB when the substation E6 feeder breaker tripped. The loss of power resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e. Drywell Equipment and Floor Drains, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, RHR Process Sample, and Traversing lncore Probe), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), and Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems). It has been determined that affected PCIVs appropriately closed. However, the limit switch within the motor operator of the inboard RWCU PCIV (i.e. 1-G31-F001) malfunctioned; resulting in an inaccurate remote position indication. Testing has confirmed that 1-G31-F001 properly closed and can perform its intended safety function.

"These PCIV isolations were the result of a substation E6 feeder breaker trip to motor control center 1CB and not in response to actual plant conditions (i.e., to mitigate the consequences of an event) and, therefore, were invalid.

"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.