Event Notification Report for September 02, 2015

LOUISIANA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DELIVERY OF CATEGORY 3 SOURCE TO WRONG ADDRESS

The following information was provided State of Louisiana via email:

"On 09/02/2015, the RSO for A&O [Alpha-Omega Services, Inc.] called in a mis-delivery/wrong delivery of 11.6 Ci Ir-192 source intended for the Radiation Oncology Center at Sibley Memorial Hospital (SMH) in Washington, DC. SMH is a client/customer of A&O in association with ELEKTA. SMH purchased and attempted to possess the radioactive source under a license NRC 08-07398-03. A&O packaged the Ir-192 source and addressed it to SMH, Dept. of Radiation Oncology, 5255 Loughboro Road NW, Washington, DC 20016. The source was shipped from the [A&O] Vinton, LA address to SMH on August 31, 2015. However, [common carrier] delivered the source to Howard University Hospital, Cancer Center, 2041 Georgia Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20060 [on September 2, 2015]."

Common carrier was notified of the delivery error and took possession of the source on September 3, 2015 and delivered to the proper address [SMH] that day. The source shielding and shipping container was intact during the incident. It was not damaged nor was the container opened until it reached the final destination.

Source information: Elekta Model 105.002 source: 11.6 Ci Ir-192, Serial Number - D36F5755

LA Event Report ID No.: LA-150015; T165946


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

PART-21 REPORT - NUTHERM IRRADIATION CERTIFICATION WITH INSUFFICIENT MARGIN

The following report was received via fax:

"SOR Inc. was notified by Nutherm International, Inc. that irradiation certification performed by Steris Isomedix did not meet the additional 10 percent margin to meet the requirements of IEEE 323 due to measuring and test equipment uncertainties.

"This issue was originally identified by STERIS lsomedix Services, Whippany, New Jersey as part of NRC Inspection Report No. 99901445/2014-201. Nutherm International, Inc. has completed their evaluation of work performed for SOR, Inc. and has identified a potential impact to the conclusions of equipment qualification testing under SOR Inc. purchase order number 166984. Nutherm International, Inc. has reported this potential issue and forwarded an update to the NRC per Event Notification Report Number 50359.

"SOR Inc. is conducting an evaluation of projects to determine whether a defect or failure to comply exists as defined by 10 CFR Part 21. At the conclusion of the evaluation, any customer impacted by this issue will be notified and the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21.

"If you have any questions regarding this issue, please contact Mike Bequette, Vice President of-Engineering at (913) 888ú2630 or email mbequette@sorinc.com."

* * * UPDATE FROM MELANIE DIRKS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1729 EST ON 9/21/15 * * *

The following updated information was excerpted from a SOR, Inc. report received via email:

"As a result, corrections were made to test report SOR-12043R revision 1, approved 9/8/2015. The uncertainty calculations by the radiation lab used for the qualification program reduced the qualification level from 35 Mrad to 33.8 Mrad.

"SOR found that there were three switches potentially affected as shown [on table I provided with this report]. While these switches were shipped before completion of the of test report SOR-12043R, revision 0, it has been established that there was a contractual agreement between SOR and Xcel Energy-Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant that these switches would be equivalent to those to be qualified in the new test report. Also listed are recipients of the original test report SOR-12043R revision 0 [on table II provided with this report].

"In either Case, SOR does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a safety hazard exists as the specific customer application and end use is not known by SOR. Since the release of revision 0 of the test report, SOR has not provided certificate of conformance to any 141 series product shipped citing the 12043R test report other than qualification units for Excel Energy - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

Recipients, Customer, Utility Names:
- Xcel Energy - Monticello Nuclear
- Progress Energy - Brunswick
- Entergy Corporation - Pilgrim

"In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21, the customers listed have been notified regarding this issue to allow them to evaluate this deviation or failure to comply and its potential safety hazard."

lf you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact;

For technical issues;
Joe Modig
SOR Inc.
14685 W. 105th Street
Lenexa, KS 66215-2003
Ph: (913) 956-3046
jmodig@sorjnc.com

And for any other questions;
Melanie Dirks
Director of Quality Assurance
SOR Inc.
14685 W. 105th Street
Lenexa, KS 66215-2003
Ph: (913) 956-3160
Email: mdirks@sorinc.com

Notified R1DO (Welling), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Pick), and Part 21 Reactors and Part 21 Materials via email.

PLANNED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) MAINTENANCE

"Planned maintenance activities will commence today (September 2, 2015) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves inspection and replacement of the TSC charcoal absorber trays and canisters on the filtration portion of the Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the charcoal absorbers affects habitability of the TSC during a declared emergency when radiological conditions require activation of the filtration portion of the AHU. The duration of maintenance is currently planned to begin on September 2, 2015 at 2100 hours [CDT] and is estimated to be completed by September 3, 2015 at 1100 hours [CDT], depending on any conditions discovered during the inspections. Since restoration from this maintenance activity is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC, this notification is being made.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified [and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency]."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ALAN MEURS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1625 EDT ON 09/03/2015 * * *

"At 1430 CDT on September 3, 2015, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO RADIOACTIVE ZIRCONIUM METAL CYLINDERS DISCOVERED AT METAL RECYLING CENTER

The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch via email:

"On November 11, 2014, an individual associated with the Orange County Science Education Center obtained two small metal cylinders that had caught his eye that were on a shelf at a metal recycling center (DBW Metals Recycling, Anaheim, CA). The metal recycler's analysis of a cylinder showed 96.76% Zirconium with 2% Nb and some Mo, Cr, Pd, Mn, BI, FE, Ni, & Cd.

"On August 14, 2015, the member of the public donated one of the Zirconium metal cylinders to the Geology Department at the California Institute of Technology. The location of the second Zirconium metal cylinder is unknown at this time. On August 21, 2015, the California Institute of Technology determined the zirconium metal cylinder was radioactive. The cylindrical metal item measured 3.3 cm D x 5 cm L and weighed 290 gm.

"The [State of California] Radiation Safety Office subsequently analyzed the item using a Germanium detector and determined it contained approximately 20 gm of U-238 and 8 gm of U-235 (28.6% enrichment). No fission products were detected, and only minor surface contamination was found (removable surface contamination <30 DPM over entire item. GM [Geiger Muller] meter survey results are as follows: 48,000 cpm on contact (mostly beta); 1 mrem/hr on contact; and 0.03 mR/hr at 1 foot (background of 0.02 mR/h). The Radiation Safety office believes the item is a portion of an unirradiated uranium fuel element.

"The Brea Office [State of California Radiation Health Branch] will follow-up under this 5010 to investigate the current location of the 2nd similar item and to ensure it is properly possessed, and will also investigate from whom the metal recycler received the two SNM [special nuclear material] items (what licensee apparently lost control of these SNM items).

"LA County also has a 5010 (090215) associated with this event to ensure that CalTech properly possesses the SNM and makes required reports."

California 5010 Number: 090315

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED VIA EMAIL FROM ROBERT GREGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1919 EDT ON 09/03/2015 * * *

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"After a discussion with the private party who received the SNM item from the local metal recycling facility, it appears that there is no second similar item. Rather the second item had significantly different visual characteristics. The individual indicated he no longer has the second item. [State of California] will attempt to verify the metal composition of the 2nd item with the metal recycling facility.

"The private party who received the SNM item from the recycling facility is associated with the Science Education Center of California, not the Orange County Science Education Center.

"The SNM item is not clad in zirconium or anything else, rather the SNM item is a mixture of zirconium and enriched uranium, with some other metals in significantly smaller amounts, and perhaps additional non-metals.

"The Caltech RSO indicated that he had not performed as good of an analysis as he would have liked to have done, and emphasized that the values he provided for the U-238 and U-235 weights were both approximate values, leaving the U-235 enrichment better represented as between 21-28 percent."

Notified the R4DO (Warnick), ILTAB (English) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ROBERT GREGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1544 EDT ON 09/09/2015 * * *

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"Personnel from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) were contacted to assist in evaluation of the apparent SNM item recovered from a metal recycler. The LANL personnel determined that the item did not contain SNM. Rather the item contained approximately 30-35 grams of unenriched processed uranium.

Notified the R4DO (Drake), ILTAB (English), CNSNS (Mexico) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART-21 REPORT - CLOSED SWITCH NOT ACTUATING WHEN VALVE IS FULLY CLOSED

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile:

"Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) per CNS Order 00178457 (Fisher Order Number 033-D800306145). Specifically, Fisher supplied an 8 inch Design A11 Butterfly Valve with a Type 1052 Actuator and TopWorx Switches, serial number F000458892 ('Equipment'). The issue is with the closed switch not actuating when the valve is fully closed.

"The purpose of this FIN is to alert CNS that as of 2 September 2015, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the Equipment, including its safety-related function.

"If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Ben Ahrens, Quality Manager, Emerson Process Management, Fisher Controls International LLC, 301 South 1st Avenue, Marshalltown, La 50158, Phone: (641) 754-2249, benjamin.ahrens@emerson.com"

* * * UPDATE ON 11/5/15 AT 1731 EST FROM CHAD ENGLE TO DONG PARK * * *

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile:

"The purpose of this document is to correct an erroneous serial number on FIN 2015-03, dated 22 October 2015."

Serial number F000458892 should read F000503836.

Notified R2DO (Desai) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On September 22nd at 1749 EDT. [The Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health] received a call from the Virginia Emergency Operations Center, stating that the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] from WRA [the licensee, Whitman, Requardt & Associates] was calling to report a missing gauge. [Virginia Department of Health] contacted the [licensee's] RSO who then informed [Virginia Department of Health] that one of their gauges was lost in shipment. [Virginia Department of Health] requested the RSO send an email detailing the event.

"On August 12th, WRA shipped a Troxler 3411B gauge (S/N: 5374), containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241, to Northeast Technical Services (NETS) for calibration. On September 1st, WRA was contacted by NETS that the calibration was completed and the gauge was being shipped back. On September 15th, WRA contacted NETS to say they had not received the gauge. On September 22nd, NETS contacted WRA to inform them that [the common shipper] was unable to locate the gauge and considered it to be unlikely recovered.

"NETS supplied [Virginia Department of Health] with the tracking number which indicated the gauge was picked up on September 1st, sent to the York, PA facility, then the Greencastle, PA facility. The results then say on September 2nd, the gauge was sent to the Winchester, VA facility and unloaded.

"On September 23rd, [Virginia Department of Health] contacted the [common shipper's] facility in Winchester, VA and spoke with the site manager. The manager stated that the gauge was not on the truck when it arrived at this facility on September 2nd, and that an 'All Points Bulletin' (APB) was submitted. [Virginia Department of Health] then contacted the Greencastle, PA facility and spoke to the OS&D/Customer Service Representative regarding the loss of this gauge. [Virginia Department of Health] discussed what actions had been taken to locate the gauge and supplied them with an email containing pictures of the transportation case and the gauge.

"At 1458 EDT on September 23rd, an APB from the Greencastle, PA facility was created and submitted to [the common shipper's] staff. They have checked the truck that was used on September 1st, and the gauge was not found in the truck. They are speaking with the driver of this truck and showing him pictures of the gauge and case.

"Currently, [the common shipper] is looking through the Greencastle, PA facility and contacting the Pittsburgh, PA facility regarding the gauge. The Greencastle OS&D/Customer Service Representative stated they will provide daily updates regarding the search.

"The Pennsylvania RMP [Radioactive Materials Program] has been notified and made aware of this event.

"The Virginia RMP will provide updates as they become available.

"There is no public health or safety impact at this time."

Commonwealth of Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-15-11

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE WELLING TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/24/15 AT 1156 EDT * * *

"On September 24th, it was discovered that the portable gauge was delivered to another Virginia licensee who also had sent a portable gauge to NETS for service. The gauge was returned to [common carrier] who is shipping it back to NETS to inspect. The gauge will then be sent to WRA.

"The investigation at [Common Carrier] is on-going with regards to how it was delivered to the wrong licensee."

Notified R1DO (Welling). Notified ILTAB (Johnson) and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING EXIT SIGNS

The following was received from the State of Colorado via email:

"After no response from the annual mailing to register active general licensee's in our radioactive materials unit, a public record search was conducted to discover the owner of the property. Research disclosed from county records the homeowner's name and contact address. He was mailed a letter on 9/2/15. The exit signs were from the manufacturer Isolite Corporation. Isolite provided Glasco Electric, 700 W Mississippi Avenue Denver, CO 80223, the exit signs that were designated to be used at 5744 N 71st Street, Longmont, CO 80223. The two (2) exit signs were model # 2040-50G-20WH, activity 11.5 Ci, serial numbers were not recorded on the manufacturers quarterly report dated 10/1/2001 to 12/31/2001.

"A response was received from the home owner. He provided the following information: The Association for Community Living occupied 5744 N 71st Street, in Longmont, CO 80503 at the time the exit signs were shipped. According to the historical information, the building was used as a school for the developmentally disabled. The school closed and the property was sold in 2013. The new owner began renovation of the property and removed the exit signs. The owner reported local city codes requires all deconstruction materials to be recycled. He took the exit signs to The Center for Resource Conservation located in Boulder, CO during the calendar year of 2014. The home owner was unaware of any regulations pertaining to the use or disposal of Tritium exit signs.

"The Center for Resource Conservation was contacted 11/4/15 to inquire about the exit signs possibly being at the location 6400 Arapahoe Road, Boulder, CO 80303. Management explained upon materials being dropped off the donor is given a receipt for the donation showing items donated. When large boxes are inspected smaller items may not get noticed and slip through the donation lane. Items are separated and maybe placed in a recycling roll off to be picked up by Evraz located in Denver, CO. It is unknown when they would have accepted the exit signs in 2014. It is unknown if the exit signs were resold or scrapped. No further information is available."

Event Report ID No.: CO15-I15-29

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf