Event Notification Report for August 26, 2015

PART 21 REPORT - SPEED SWITCH CAPACITOR FAILURE

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile:

"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10 CFR 21 evaluation on August 26, 2015 upon notification by Harris Nuclear Plant of a ground fault condition after installing two speed switches, P/N ESI50267B, supplied by ESI. Subsequent investigation revealed the condition was due to a failed capacitor installed across the relay output to ground within each speed switch. The evaluation was concluded on October 22, 2015 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10 CFR Part 21 . The speed switch output contacts are utilized in the engine's start circuitry and failure of the contacts to function properly could adversely affect the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set.

"This issue only affects one part number (qty 6) supplied on one customer purchase order:
ESI Sales Order: 3013958
Part Number: ESI50267B
Customer: Duke Energy Progress - Harris Nuclear Plant
Customer P.O.: 00763117
ESI Serial Numbers: 3013598-1.1-1, 3013598-1.1-2, 3013598-1.1-3, 3013598-1.1-4, 3013598-1.1-5, 3013598-1.1-6
C of C Date: April 10, 2015

"Point of Contact: Tom Horner, Quality Assurance Manager, Engine Systems, Inc., phone (252) 977-2720"

PART 21 REPORT - PRESSURE SEAL VALVE NONCOMPLIANCE

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile:

"Pressure Seal Valve orders may potentially have misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for segment ring designs.

"Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, provides guidance for appropriate material and NDE [Non Destructive Test] requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62, which is ASME B&PV Section Ill, 2015 Edition, Non-Mandatory Appendix HH 'Rules for Valve Internal and External Items'.

"A pressure seal valve segment ring requires the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62). A segment ring may have been processed to material requirements not as pressure retaining material per NX-2000 of the Code resulting in the incorrect material specification and non-destructive examination specified.

"Limited to (1) CNI [Crane Nuclear, INC.] SO# 069000408, Dominion, Millstone. P.O. 954282 and Purchase Req. No. N90136-01- Quantity shipped = 1, Crane, 8'', Fig. 55009-12CF8M-WE, Class 900, ASME Class 1, 1986 Ed.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940"

TREE BRANCH FELL ON AMTRAK POWER LINE AND CAUSED BRUSH FIRE

"A small brush fire occurred adjacent to an AMTRAK railroad right of way that passes through the Millstone Power Station owner controlled area, due to a downed tree branch that knocked down an AMTRAK electrified power line. The fire is outside the protected area of the site, and poses no public hazard or threat to building or structures. Outside assistance has been requested. Waterford Fire Department and AMTRAK have responded, and have eliminated the source and extinguished the fire. This report is being made pursuant of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There is no radioactive release associated with this event. Dominion may respond to public inquiry, but no press release is planned."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The Connecticut State Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and Waterford Dispatch were notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"On August 26, 2015, [Nordion] shipped three packages containing approximately 200 mCi of Yttrium-90 to Hoag Hospital by [a commercial shipping company]. One of the three packages did not arrive at Hoag Hospital. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported that [Nordion] was contacted on 8/27/15, to report that one of the three packages had not arrived. [Nordion] told the RSO that they reported this event to the Canadian authority and that [the commercial shipping company] was the responsible party since [Nordion] had turned the packages over to [the commercial shipping company] for shipping. The [commercial shipping company] health physics consultant contacted [California Department of Public Health/Radiologic Health Branch] CDPH/RHB on 9/11/15, (this was the first CDPH/RHB learned of this event) to report that a [commercial shipping company] investigation had identified that the missing package had fallen off of a conveyor belt in the [the commercial shipping company's] Costa Mesa, CA sorting facility and landed in a waste container. This information was identified by [the commercial shipping company] personnel review of video within their facilities. The package was not noticed to have fallen into the waste container, and the waste container was subsequently emptied into a larger trash receptacle by a cleaning crew. The larger trash receptacle was picked up for disposal at a local landfill. The half life of the Y-90 is 64 hours."

California report #091015

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO APPENDIX R POSTULATED FIRE

"On 8/26/2015 at 1215 [EDT], a review of the Salem Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis in response to the Byron Event Notification #51334 and Braidwood Event Notification #51335, identified a fire scenario that could cause spurious operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) (PR1 and PR2) and also prevent the ability to close the PORV block valves (PR6 and PR7) until AC power is restored to close the block valves. This scenario would result in the loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory and pressure control that is not accounted for in safe shutdown analysis. The above fire scenario is applicable to a fire in the Control Room and Relay Room fire areas.

"Hourly fire watches of the Relay Room have been implemented. In addition, the Control Room is continuously staffed by the Operating Shift. In addition, the Relay Room is equipped with automatic detection and suppression.

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Township, the State of New Jersey and the State of Delaware.

SPURIOUS INTERMITTENT ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIREN

"At 05:48 [EDT] BVPS [Beaver Valley Power Station] received notification that siren #6, Potter Township Municipal Building, was sounding intermittently. The fire department activation cable to the siren was severed by a motor vehicle. The ENS activation function remains functional.

"This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.'

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING MATERIAL BEING RELEASED AND RECOVERED

"On 8/26/2015, it was determined that a report to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) may have been missed. The station is making this report due to the station making a courtesy call to a State agency regarding release of radioactive waste from the site as non-radioactive material.

"The original event involved a release of 14 bags of debris from the Administration Building roof prior to survey results being obtained. The bags were recovered from the local landfill and a determination was made that the amount of material temporarily removed from the Protected Area was below NRC reporting limits per 10 CFR 20.2201 'Reports of theft or loss of licensed material.'

"On 5/29/13 a courtesy phone call was made to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (Radiation Control Program) informing the authority of the event. There were no state notification requirements based on the low level of licensed material released (and then recovered) from the site.

"This is a four hour report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.'

"There was no overexposure to a member of the public.

"The NRC Resident and State of Nebraska have been informed."

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test', Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b. (1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f. was entered due to the exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started.

"Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' exhaust fan.

"Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) (D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition' and (D) 'mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable.'"

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1328 EDT ON 8/31/2015 * * *

"The following is a correction to a non-emergency event notification from Waterford 3 originally made on 8/26/2015:

"On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b and d were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test,' Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start'
to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2(e)6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f was entered due to the room exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started.

"Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EDG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' room exhaust fan.

"Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Warnick)