Event Notification Report for August 25, 2015

ABANDONED GAUGE FOUND IN SCRAP METAL

The following report was received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health Office of Radiation Control via fax:

"On August 25, 2015, Sam Price, Environmental Health & Safety for Nucor Steel, Birmingham, Alabama notified the Office of Radiation Control that a load of scrap received from Covington, Georgia had set off radiation monitors and was reading 11.0 mR/hr and had been identified as Cs-137.

"Representatives from the Office of Radiation Control investigated the load and confirmed all measurements that were previously taken. The load was segregated and a single fixed type gauge was discovered in the load. The gauge contained only an unreadable general license label which was still attached. No other labels or markings were identified. The shutter appeared intact, but partially open.

"The gauge has been secured in place and is awaiting pick-up by an appropriate driver being provided by the scrap metal dealer in Covington, Georgia.

"The State of Georgia has been notified of the incident.

"As of today [August 26, 2015], 8:45 a.m. CDT, the gauge remains secure in place at Nucor Steel, Birmingham, Alabama."

Alabama Incident 15-38

UNPLANNED LOSS OF PRIMARY AND BACKUP METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

"On August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2.

"The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

PART 21 FURMANITE NUCLEAR GRADE LEAK SEAL MATERIAL FSC-N-1B

"Furmanite FSC-N-1B Batch #1026 was discovered (post-delivery) to have Chloride levels above acceptable limits. As Discovered: 2400 ppm Chloride. Furmanite Specification: 100 ppm Chloride.

"Part Name: Nuclear Grade Leak Seal Material FSC-N-1B.

"Specification: Furmanite Material Specification 1220.1 R2.

"Furmanite Notice Number: 25.08.2015

"Potential affected customers:
America Electric Power - DC Cook
Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde
DTE Energy - Fermi Power Plant 2
Duke - Catawba Nuclear Station
Duke - McGuire Nuclear Station
Exelon Nuclear - Limerick Generating Station
Florida Power & Light Co. - St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Florida Power & Light Co. - Turkey Point Nuclear Plant"

* * * UPDATE AT 1629 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM EDWARD RICH TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was received via email:

"This is an update to part 21 report 2015-63-00. Event # ML15243A174

"The remaining in process items 4 and 5 of the attached report have been completed.

"4. Team Furmanite has contacted all affected customers and has accounted for all boxes of batch # 26 that were manufactured. No material was installed and the boxes were either returned or destroyed by the plant.

"5. Root cause and corrective actions are complete and are listed below.

"Root cause:

"Inadequate controls during manufacturing process. Testing of concentration levels only at one time during process and it was determined this was not adequate to detect contamination.

"Corrective action:

"New procedure PRG.000284.022 was developed with concentration levels being checked at raw material stage and after final packaging. Compound is placed in a hold area before being shipped until third party test results have shown the batch to be acceptable."

Contact information for additional questions:
Edward Rich
Director of Quality - Team Furmanite
Phone: (281) 388-5567

Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy), Part 21 Reactors group (via email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION IN AN UNCONTROLLED AREA

The State of Oklahoma reported that contamination from a leaking Ba-137 generator was discovered in a 'shed' at the University of Tulsa. It is estimated that approximately 1 milliCurie of Cs-137, used in the generator, was leaked. The licensee, Tracerco, licensed by the State of Texas, was using the generator for tracer studies on University of Tulsa equipment under a reciprocity agreement with the State of Oklahoma. The contamination occurred between October and November of 2014. Tracerco discovered the generator leakage at their Texas facility in May, 2015 but only recently informed the University of Tulsa. The Radiation Safety Officer at the University of Tulsa surveyed the area on 8/25/15 and obtained count rates as high as 100,000 cpm inside the shed. Contamination was also found outside of the shed's location. According to Tracerco, it is estimated that approximately 1 milliCurie of Cs-137 was leaked at the University of Tulsa.

The University of Tulsa reported that approximately eight individuals work in the area at least some of the time, however, the University is working on obtaining occupancy information at the contaminated location. The shed has been quarantined.

The Ba-137 generator, which contained 50 milliCuries of Cs-137, was manufactured by the China Institute of Atomic Energy.

The State of Oklahoma will be investigating the event and will be determining the amount of exposure to the individuals. Tracerco is continuing evaluating the event.

The State of Texas reported the leaking generator under NRC EN #51102


* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1640 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On August 27, 2015 the Oklahoma Environmental Agency Radiation Management Section performed a reactive inspection of this facility. The facility consists of a closed flow-loop pipeline which water or petroleum was pumped through. A port was used to inject radioactive tracers into the material to study its behavior in the flow-loop. Normally the crew from Tracerco would set up the generator at the injection port which was located on a platform about 12 feet above grade. However for some reason, possibly bad weather, the crew that performed the work last year decided to set up in an enclosed pump house immediately adjacent to the pipeline. At some point during the procedure an estimated 0.1 mCi of Cs-137 (not 1 mCi as previously reported) was released in the interior of the structure. The material was in the form of small resin spheres, about the size of a poppy seed, with the Cesium coating the surface. Sometime around May of this year, after Tracerco discovered that the generator was leaking and their own facility was contaminated, they sent staff back to the University to survey for contamination. However, they were unaware that the previous crew had used the pump house, and only surveyed around the injection port where they found no contamination. No further action was taken until August 24 when Tracerco employees again visited the site and surveyed the pump house. After finding the contamination they decontaminated the area using adhesive tape to pick up the material. Two office chairs and a floor mat were also found to be contaminated and removed to an area the university uses for radioactive storage. None of the University employees who worked at the facility were badged.

"During our inspection we noted that the background radiation level was elevated in the vicinity of the pump house and flow-loop (approx. 100 microR/hr as measured with a Victoreen 450P, this was about 10 X background off the facility). It should be noted the University has it's own license and uses or stores about 25 fixed gauges, with a total possession limit of 15 Ci., either on or near the flow-loop. Surveys inside the pump house showed isolated areas of contamination with radiation levels as high as 500 micro-R/hr. Multiple areas (usually concrete joints or gravel at the edge of the concrete) around the exterior of the pump house were also found to be contaminated with dose rates around 200 microR/hr. One trailer adjacent to the pump house was found to have a small spot of contamination in the carpet just inside the door. This was surveyed at 260 micro-R/hr. This trailer was used for office space for two persons, one of whom is a member of the public. 14 samples were collected at various points and will be counted next week. The University has restricted access to the contaminated areas but has continued to allow essential radiation workers to enter when necessary to operate the flow-loop. They were instructed to require anyone entering to wear disposable gloves and shoe covers.

"Tracerco has arranged for Chase Environmental to characterize and remediate the facility. This will begin on August 31 and is expected to take 5 to 7 days. Tracerco has also arranged for any university staff who desire to be scanned at a full-body counter in Houston."

Notified R4DO (Campbell) and via E-mail the NMSS Events Notification group.

LOST I-125 SEED

"Late on 8/25/15, the [Chief Physicist] was informed that the I-125 seed count in storage does not reconcile with the Written Directives and the pathology log. The storage vial is one seed short. Instead of 30 seeds, there are only 29 seeds. Also there is a non-radioactive marker/clip in the storage container along with 29 Iodine-125 seeds. All seeds are of nominal activity of 0.3 mCi. The lead container housing the sources was brought down to Radiation Oncology source storage room on 8/26/2015.

"So far our findings are as follows:
Radiation survey of the pathology lab was performed by the pathology lab supervisor. Survey revealed no presence of radioactivity. Radiation survey of the stored tissue specimens for these cases revealed no radioactivity. [Licensee staff] reviewed the radiographs of each tissue specimen and the count was 30 seeds. It would seem that the pathology assistant mistook the marker/clip to be an iodine seed and put it in storage container and the actual seed somehow got discarded as hazardous waste, in spite of the documented procedure to survey everything which comes in contact with specimen to be surveyed with Geiger counter. By reviewing the radiographs of each specimen we have ruled out the possibility that a source was left in the patient. On 8/26/2015, another independent radiation survey of the Pathology Lab was performed by Nuclear Medicine using a scintillation detector and once again no seed was found."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf