Event Notification Report for August 03, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/02/2015 - 08/03/2015
Agreement State
Event Number: 51284
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: RABA-KISTNER CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 01571
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: RABA-KISTNER CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 01571
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/03/2015
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2015
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED HUMBOLDT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On August 3, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its technicians had run over and damaged a Humboldt 5001 EZ moisture/density gauge at a temporary job site in Belton, Texas. The gauge contained a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The technician had started the test and the cesium source was extended four inches into the ground. The technician decided to move his pickup and while doing so he backed over the gauge and then pulled forward over it again. The source rod handle broke completely off of the gauge. A boundary around the gauge was marked and the licensee's radiation safety officer called a licensed service company. The service company responded and reported that the source was inside the gauge and not down in the hole, that it had apparently been pulled back into the gauge when it was run over. The service technician performed surveys and found no contamination. No member of the public received any exposure as a result of this event. No elevated exposures are anticipated for the technicians. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtain in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9329
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On August 3, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its technicians had run over and damaged a Humboldt 5001 EZ moisture/density gauge at a temporary job site in Belton, Texas. The gauge contained a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The technician had started the test and the cesium source was extended four inches into the ground. The technician decided to move his pickup and while doing so he backed over the gauge and then pulled forward over it again. The source rod handle broke completely off of the gauge. A boundary around the gauge was marked and the licensee's radiation safety officer called a licensed service company. The service company responded and reported that the source was inside the gauge and not down in the hole, that it had apparently been pulled back into the gauge when it was run over. The service technician performed surveys and found no contamination. No member of the public received any exposure as a result of this event. No elevated exposures are anticipated for the technicians. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtain in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9329
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51321
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KEITH HUFF
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KEITH HUFF
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/14/2015
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2015
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SIRENS DUE TO LOSS OF POWER
"On August 14, 2015, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) determined that less than 75% of the population in the ten mile EPZ could have been notified using the alert notification system (sirens). This condition existed between the time period starting sometime after 1800 [CDT] on Friday, July 31, 2015 until 1630 [CDT] on Monday August 3, 2015.
"The completion of this notification was delayed because at the time of discovery the available information and built in system redundancy supported a conclusion that greater than 75% of the population could have been notified using the siren system. The diversity of the systems required repairs and testing to be coordinated with local officials in both Mississippi and Louisiana.
"At 1000 CDT hours on August 3, 2015, GGNS was informed that the Claiborne County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) siren activation equipment had lost power over the weekend. Investigations and repairs were initiated by Claiborne County Emergency management upon discovery. The system was repaired and functional at 1630 hours on August 3, 2015."
The licensee reported that 30 of 42 sirens lost power.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID BURRUS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1243 EDT ON 9/23/15 * * *
"Based on a detailed investigation (an apparent cause evaluation performed by the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station) into the events surrounding the power interruption at the Claiborne County EOC, Entergy has determined that the emergency power source for the Claiborne County EOC was available and would have been manually established by the Claiborne County EOC Emergency Director if the facility was activated.
"Upon discovery of the problem, maintenance was immediately performed on the system to reestablish the normal source of power to the Claiborne County EOC. This maintenance required approximately 8 hours to complete. This maintenance activity required the lock-out tag-out of all power (normal and back-up) to the facility.
"During the time period that all power was removed from the facility, the pre-established and pre-approved back-up notification system was available and would have been utilized to complete the required public notifications.
"Supplement 1 to Revision 3 of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), states in part the following: NEI 13-01 proposes that for extended unplanned losses of the primary public alerting system, a report would not be required if the FEMA approved backup alerting method was available and the primary public alerting system was returned to service within 24 hours This 24-hour cap is put into place to limit reliance on a less capable backup alerting method. However, because some backup capability exists, NRC action or awareness is not likely warranted in such scenarios for which the loss of the primary capability is limited in duration. As a result, a report would not be required
"Therefore, Entergy is updating the above notification based on the developed information that the Claiborne County EOC Emergency Director understood how and would have manually established electrical power to the alert notification system if required and because the maintenance period was less than the 24 hour allowable period established in Supplement 1 to Revision 3 of NUREG-1022."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Pick).
"On August 14, 2015, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) determined that less than 75% of the population in the ten mile EPZ could have been notified using the alert notification system (sirens). This condition existed between the time period starting sometime after 1800 [CDT] on Friday, July 31, 2015 until 1630 [CDT] on Monday August 3, 2015.
"The completion of this notification was delayed because at the time of discovery the available information and built in system redundancy supported a conclusion that greater than 75% of the population could have been notified using the siren system. The diversity of the systems required repairs and testing to be coordinated with local officials in both Mississippi and Louisiana.
"At 1000 CDT hours on August 3, 2015, GGNS was informed that the Claiborne County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) siren activation equipment had lost power over the weekend. Investigations and repairs were initiated by Claiborne County Emergency management upon discovery. The system was repaired and functional at 1630 hours on August 3, 2015."
The licensee reported that 30 of 42 sirens lost power.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID BURRUS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1243 EDT ON 9/23/15 * * *
"Based on a detailed investigation (an apparent cause evaluation performed by the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station) into the events surrounding the power interruption at the Claiborne County EOC, Entergy has determined that the emergency power source for the Claiborne County EOC was available and would have been manually established by the Claiborne County EOC Emergency Director if the facility was activated.
"Upon discovery of the problem, maintenance was immediately performed on the system to reestablish the normal source of power to the Claiborne County EOC. This maintenance required approximately 8 hours to complete. This maintenance activity required the lock-out tag-out of all power (normal and back-up) to the facility.
"During the time period that all power was removed from the facility, the pre-established and pre-approved back-up notification system was available and would have been utilized to complete the required public notifications.
"Supplement 1 to Revision 3 of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), states in part the following: NEI 13-01 proposes that for extended unplanned losses of the primary public alerting system, a report would not be required if the FEMA approved backup alerting method was available and the primary public alerting system was returned to service within 24 hours This 24-hour cap is put into place to limit reliance on a less capable backup alerting method. However, because some backup capability exists, NRC action or awareness is not likely warranted in such scenarios for which the loss of the primary capability is limited in duration. As a result, a report would not be required
"Therefore, Entergy is updating the above notification based on the developed information that the Claiborne County EOC Emergency Director understood how and would have manually established electrical power to the alert notification system if required and because the maintenance period was less than the 24 hour allowable period established in Supplement 1 to Revision 3 of NUREG-1022."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Pick).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51599
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JACK MCCOY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JACK MCCOY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/11/2015
Notification Time: 02:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2015
Notification Time: 02:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR CONDENSATE SPILL IN THE TURBINE BUILDING
"On August 1, 2015, during tagging activities to support planned maintenance on a condensate demineralizer, operators incorrectly positioned certain air-operated components which, combined with apparent leakage past a solenoid valve, resulted in a drain opening on a demineralizer that was in service. Flow through the drain line caused a turbine building sump to overflow to the floor of the 67 foot elevation of the Turbine Building. Immediate actions were taken to stop the leak.
"The spill volume was approximately 60,000 gallons of condensate. The tritium activity of the water is estimated at 1.32E-2 microCi/ml. Gamma activity was from noble gases only in a concentration of approximately 2.30E-6 microCi/ml. The spill was confined to the Turbine Building. The affected area contains degraded floor seals which might allow the spill to reach groundwater.
"The reason for this notification is that industry and governmental officials were notified of this event on August 3, 2015. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and informal notification was made to the NRC Region IV office, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and West Feliciana Parish government authorities. The Nuclear Energy Institute was informed as specified in their ground water protection initiative.
"Plant cleanup activities arising from the spill are complete."
"On August 1, 2015, during tagging activities to support planned maintenance on a condensate demineralizer, operators incorrectly positioned certain air-operated components which, combined with apparent leakage past a solenoid valve, resulted in a drain opening on a demineralizer that was in service. Flow through the drain line caused a turbine building sump to overflow to the floor of the 67 foot elevation of the Turbine Building. Immediate actions were taken to stop the leak.
"The spill volume was approximately 60,000 gallons of condensate. The tritium activity of the water is estimated at 1.32E-2 microCi/ml. Gamma activity was from noble gases only in a concentration of approximately 2.30E-6 microCi/ml. The spill was confined to the Turbine Building. The affected area contains degraded floor seals which might allow the spill to reach groundwater.
"The reason for this notification is that industry and governmental officials were notified of this event on August 3, 2015. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and informal notification was made to the NRC Region IV office, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and West Feliciana Parish government authorities. The Nuclear Energy Institute was informed as specified in their ground water protection initiative.
"Plant cleanup activities arising from the spill are complete."