Event Notification Report for July 12, 2015

ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM LIGHT SOURCE

The following information was received from the State of Arizona via email:

"On July 22, 2015, the licensee reported that they lost one gaseous tritium light source on approximately July 12, 2015. The licensee was removing each source from its subsequent device in order to make disposal more efficient. The lost source was part of a TLS Model 42000 drogue light. The model 42000 drogue light consists of two 450 millicuries (November 1988 assay date) mb-Microtec Model T4376-1 gaseous tritium light sources mounted in a stainless steel assembly. The sources are held in place with silicone. To remove the sources from the drogue light, the silicone (containing two sources) is removed from the stainless steel housing. The silicone is then placed in solvent to soften it. Once the silicone is soft, the sources are removed with little effort and with little or no silicone adhering to the source.

"The sources were placed in the solvent on July 12, 2015 and the nonradioactive components of the assemblies, including the silicone, were discarded as regular trash on that date. The source removal and consolidation was completed for all legacy sources on July 22, 2015, at which time, a complete inventory was performed and one source was discovered to be missing. The missing tritium source has a current activity of 100 millicuries.

"The Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency is continuing to investigate the event."

Arizona First Notice: 15-017

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- POTENTIAL RAD WORKER OVEREXPOSURE

The following report was provided by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"At approximately 2105 [EDT] on the night of July 12th, using our local access control program (i.e., Canberra HIS20) and a DMC 3000 series electronic dosimeter, an Erwin Resin Solutions employee was exiting the Radiological Controlled Area when he received a message stating that he had exceeded his TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent] limit. According to the access control program, a dose of 10002.2 mrem was received. The employee was immediately removed from the area and follow up surveys were conducted. Surveys indicated that general area dose rates were 2-15 mr/hr and that the highest individual package dose rate was 45 mr/hr. The individual had been in the area for approximately 0.47 hours and he recalls at one point looking down at his dosimeter to see a display of 2.4 mrem. The employee's TLD has been pulled and sent off to Mirion for an emergency read, results are expected within 24-48 hrs. The individual will remain out of the RCA until the investigation has concluded.

"Access records have been pulled from the HIS20 program and the doses given were not reflective of a normal entry. A START READ of 0 mrem was given and an END READ of 0 mrem was also given. A GAMMA COMPONENT READ of 10002.2 mrem was given but should have been the same as the END READ which was 0 mrem. All indicators lead to a faulty electronic dosimeter, the dosimeter in question is being sent to our instrument department for further evaluation.

"Tennessee Event Report ID No.: TN-15-101"