Event Notification Report for June 11, 2015

LOSS OF TONE ALERT RADIO SYSTEM

"At 2205 [EDT] on June 11, 2015, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County 911 Center notified JAF that the tone alert weather radios had been out of service since 2056 [EDT].

"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the JAF Nuclear Power Plant. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The [Oswego] County alert sirens which also function as part of the public prompt notification system remain operable.

"The loss of the tone alert radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the prompt notification system be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.

"JAF was notified by Oswego County 911 Center that the tone alert radio system was restored to service at 2257 [EDT].

"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the [NRC] Resident Inspector has been briefed."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY PLAN SIREN ACTUATION

"This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"On 6/11/15, at 0822 [EDT], Miami-Dade Fire Department notified the site of an alarming single Emergency Plan siren. Investigation is ongoing for alarming siren. At no time was there an emergency requiring the siren activation. FPL [Florida Power and Light] has not issued a news release.

"This notification is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi).

"The Senior NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM ALEX CHOMAT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1552 EDT ON 6/11/15 * * *

"The investigation of the reported alarming EP siren did not confirm that it had been activated or had malfunctioned. The notification received from the Miami-Dade Fire Department apparently resulted from an erroneous call from a member of the public.

"This event notification is retracted based on the fact that no EP siren activation occurred necessitating notifications.

"The Senior NRC Resident [Inspector] has been updated."

Notified R2DO (Guthrie)

DEGRADED CONTAINMENT SPRAY FLOW CHECK VALVE

During containment spray pump inservice testing the minimum flow recirculation line recorded negative flow indicating reverse flow in the line. After the troubleshooting, it was determined that a degraded minimum flow check valve was allowing a path to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) for certain post loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. The minimum flow isolation has been closed to eliminate the path. No actuation occurred during this time.

The NRC Resident Inspector, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) Hartford, and Watertown Dispatch have been notified.


* * * UPDATE FROM TOM CLEARY TO STEVEN VITTO ON 06/16/15 AT 1349 EDT * * *

"The purpose of this call is to correct the record for the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) event report provided on June 11, 2015. Event report number 51149 states: 'During containment spray pump inservice testing ...' The condition of the degraded containment spray flow check valve was identified: 'During high pressure safety injection pump inservice testing...'."

Notified R1DO (Bickett)

* * * UPDATE FROM WILLIAM McCOLLUM TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1724 EDT ON 7/10/15 * * *

"The purpose of this call is to update the record for the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) event report provided on June 11, 2015. During subsequent investigation, it has been determined that a second release path may have existed through ECCS system relief valves under certain post LOCA conditions as a result of the degraded check valve described in the original report."

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Cahill).

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT ON P/N 535-601 MOORE INDUSTRIES MILLIAMP MODULES

The following information is a summary that was excerpted from a facsimile received from ATC-Nuclear:

"The basic component which is the subject of this notification is identified as Moore Industries Milliamp Module with part number (P/N) 535-601 (alternate P/N: 535-601-SSTRV) which has been provided individually and/or contained within a STS 535 Single Loop Process Controller.

"On December 22, 2014, ATC Nuclear received a 535 controller from Detroit Edison (DTE) with a failed Milliamp Module (P/N 535-601). The customer requested ATC Nuclear to perform a failure analysis to determine the cause of no output (0 Ma) on output 2 of the 535 controller. ATC Nuclear initiated a failure analysis in January 2015 that was broken down into several stages to determine the cause of the Milliamp Module failure. ATC Nuclear is continuing to evaluate the cause of the Milliamp Module failure and has preliminarily identified workmanship issues with a surface-mount fuse that is installed in the Milliamp Modules. ATC Nuclear has provided the results of the analysis to Moore Industries and Littelfuse to support or refute the workmanship concerns.

"Preliminary information provided by Littelfuse on June 11, 2015, was sufficient evidence to identify the existence of a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard (i.e., discovery as defined in 10 CFR Part 21). This information was documented as part of CAR 15T-24. Evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 was not able to be completed within the 60 day evaluation period.

"The discovery date of the deviation requiring evaluation under 10 CFR Part 21 is June 11, 2015.

"ATC Nuclear has preliminarily identified a total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 that have been supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 2010. However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses (P/N 0448.100MR) installed. ATC Nuclear will continue to work with Moore Industries and Littelfuse to define the population of Milliamp
Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. This information will become available once our 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation is completed.

"ATC Nuclear is reviewing customer purchase orders for Milliamp Modules to identify the population of Milliamp Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. Additionally, ATC Nuclear is working with Moore Industries to purge its stock of potentially defective fuses. Additional time is needed to evaluate the condition of new surface-mount fuses and it is expected that this evaluation will be completed no later than October 9, 2015.

"Littelfuse identified a very low failure rate (< 0.001 %) in a preliminary report issued June 2015 spanning approximately an eighteen month period commencing January 2014. There were 356,250 fuses manufactured during this period. Littelfuse is conducting a more thorough review of this failure mechanism. There is no additional advice at this time."

For additional information, contact the following;

Ray Chalifoux
Vice President QA, ATC-Nuclear
777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830
(865) 384-0124


* * * UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1602 EDT ON 10/9/2015 * * *

The following information is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

ATC Nuclear has concluded that the identified deviation could be considered a defect on the surface-mount fuses supplied by Littelfuse. However, ATC Nuclear determined that it does not have the capability to complete a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to determine if a substantial safety hazard exists.

A total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 have been supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 2010. However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses installed. ATC Nuclear identified Milliamp Modules supplied in the January 2013 - June 18, 2015 timeframe as potentially having defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses. Nuclear plants that received Milliamp Modules which potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse were as follows: LaSalle, Fermi 2, Limerick, and Clinton.

ATC Nuclear has developed a Technical Bulletin to direct the purchasers and/or affected licensees for inspections to determined if the manufacturing defect could be present in their applications.

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R3DO (Stone), and via E-mail Part 21 Group.