Event Notification Report for June 04, 2015

NOT MEETING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO OMISSION IN PREVIOUS LICENSE AMENDMENT

"On June 4, 2015, plant personnel notified the Diablo Canyon shift manager that three casks loaded during the current ISFSI campaign were not in verbatim compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 2.3. These three casks utilized regionalized loading. TS 2.3 (Alternate MPC-32 Fuel Selection Criteria) specifies fuel assembly selection criteria based using information from corresponding Tables 2.1-7 (uniform loading) or 2.1-9 (regionalized loading). However, the associated formula in TS 2.3 refers only to using the values in Table 2.1-7 (uniform loading).

"Engineering has performed an evaluation and determined there is no impact on the fuel stored in the three casks. Table 2.1-9 is described as being acceptable in Technical Specification 2.3, although omitted from the formula in TS 2.3.

"It appears that the inconsistency in TS 2.3 was due to an error of omission in the previous License Amendment Request, which did not appropriately add the reference to Table 2.1-9 to the formula presented in TS 2.3 as originally intended.

"This concern did not result in any adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1728 EDT ON 06/30/15 FROM DARRELL JOHNSON TO STEVE VITTO * * *

"The fuel assembly loading of the three casks discussed in the original event notification has been re-evaluated. This evaluation was performed to determine that compliance to ISFSI Technical Specification 2.3.b was maintained using the uniform loading values of Table 2.1-7. The calculation revision demonstrates that the fuel placed in region 1 and 2 of the regionalized casks loads complied with the ISFSI Technical Specification requirements as written.

"Therefore, the requirements of TS 2.3 were met for the subject casks and this event notification is being retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector, R4DO(O'Keefe), and NMSS Events (via email) have been notified.

STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER

The following was received via email:

"On June 4, 2015 at approximately 0830 [EDT], [the Radiation Safety Officer] was contacted by radiation trained employees at the licensee's Hot Rolling Facility. The employees indicated that the shutter on one of the slab detection radiation gauges would not close. The employee also indicated he noticed a shiny metallic material adjacent to the gauge housing on one side. As a result, they contacted the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and [he] proceeded to the site to investigate.

"[The RSO] informed them to barricade the area until [he] arrived. Upon arrival, [the RSO] conducted a survey of the area and compared the levels to prior surveys (including the installation survey). [The RSO] found no significant difference in radiation levels. [He] also performed a wipe test on the gauge and checked it with a survey meter and pancake probe, finding no detectable radiation. The melted metallic material appeared to possibly be lead from the device shielding. As a result, [he] believes some shielding may have overheated and blocked the shutter open.

"Because radiation levels were normal and the device was functioning normally, the device was left in its operating position on the furnace. This was the safest possible scenario until resources can be obtained to safely remove and store the device with the shutter open. The RSO will obtain a container that will house the device safely and will transport the device to a secure location in the plant (controlled by the RSO) until it can be retrieved and repaired by Ronan Engineering (manufacturer). The furnace will be in operation until the device is removed so there is no physical possibility of anyone being inside the furnace and being exposed."

PART 21 - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF A TIME RELAY

The following was received via facsimile:

"Allen Bradley relay base model 700RTC contains an unevaluated CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device). This was an unpublished design change that did not result in a part number change from Allen Bradley. There was no change to the appearance of the relay that would identify any design changes made to the relay configuration. Allen Bradley has indicated that the change occurred in mid-2009 and that it was a rolling change with no specific manufacturing date to distinguish between the old and new configuration. Based on this information, all units manufactured during 2009 and later are suspect.

"Nutherm International, Inc. has concluded its review of all procurements of the 700RTC series relays and have found two (2) units manufactured during or after 2009 dedicated and shipped to customers. The following facility was determined to be impacted by this condition:
Utility: Exelon
Plant: Quad Cities
Purchase Order: 00447625
Part Number: 700-RTC11110U1
Nutherm Traceability Number: 11340-02R01 1/01, 11340-02R01 1/02.

"In a separate 10CFR Part 21 notification, Event Number 51095, reported to the NRC [on] 5/28/2015 indicated that the CPLD can be affected by electrical noise from operation of nearby relays which can reset the timing of the relay. The plant should evaluate whether the installed relays are subjected to unevaluated EMI/RFI [electromagnetic interference/radio-frequency interference] conditions when installed in the plant."

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE

A non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.

"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.

"2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (HAAG).


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10088142"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).


* * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved.

"CR 10108999."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Nease).


* * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10113740, CR 10113745"

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).


* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104.

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.

"3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Rose).

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GUY GRIFFIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1815 EDT ON 09/04/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building and Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in Fire Area's where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Torus Suction Valve, 1E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 1 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable required for Torus Suction Valve, 2E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024.

"3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. The fire impacts a cable required for MCC 1C, 1R23-S003 to remain energized. This MCC supports the operation of Air Handling Unit B, 1Z41-B003B which is required in support of Main Control Room HVAC. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0031 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. These AHUs are required in support of MCR HVAC. MCR HVAC was not required in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, and thus these failures were not evaluated in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0031.

"5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for Station Battery Chargers 2A (2R42-S026) 2B (2R42-S027) and 2C (2R42-S028) to remain energized. These chargers support 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016), which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014.

"6) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016) to remain energized. This is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014.

"7) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact cables required for Station Battery Chargers 1D (1R42-S029), 1E (1R42-S030), and 1F (1R42-S031) to remain energized. These chargers support 125VDC Switchgear 1B (1R22-S017) which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 2 Safe Shutdown. Path 1 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10118312, CR 10118328, CR10118333, CR10118338, CR10118345"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Seymour)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:

"An inspection of Evoqua Water Technologies was conducted on 4/30/15. During the inspection, a device listed on Generally Licensed Device Registration Form #664 could not be found. The device was a model 4000 [SN 732], manufactured by Metorex Inc, and contained 10 mCi of Am-241. The device was listed as being at the facility since 1989. However, no current employee remembered the device being in use for several years. On 5/15/15, the original unit was discovered, but without the attached probe which contained the source. On 6/4/15, after repeated search attempts, the probe was declared lost."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL TREATMENT INCORRECT DOSE

The following was received via email:

"On June 5, 2015, the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) received notification from the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of a possible medical event that occurred during an Yttrium-90 TheraSpheres procedure on June 4, 2015. The licensee has not completed the investigation and has provided limited information to determine if the procedure constituted a medical event.

"The patient was treated with Y-90 TheraSpheres. The written directive prescribed a dose of 114 Gy, but received a dose of 18.3 Gy. Preliminary findings seem to indicate that an incorrect dose may have been administered to the patient.

"The patient and referring physician have been notified.

"The licensee and ADH are continuing to investigate this event. ADH considers this event to be opened and will provide more information as it becomes available.

"A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient."

ARKANSAS EVENT #2015-005

* * * RETRACTION FROM JARED THOMPSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/6/2015 AT 1614 EDT * * *

The following information was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"The Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) is requesting the retraction of NRC Event Number [51130].

"ADH received a report from the licensee dated June 18, 2015. The report and investigation conducted by the licensee determined that this event did not qualify as a reportable medical event. A review of the written directive indicated that the radiation dose that was prescribed by the authorized user was delivered to the patient. The authorized user had intended to prescribe 114 Gray.

"This was confirmed by ADH after further review of the documentation obtained during the on-site investigation.

"The patient completed this treatment on June 29, 2015.

"The licensee has implemented revisions in the treatment procedures for further safety improvements.

"The ADH considers this event to be closed."

Notified the R4DO (Haire) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.