Event Notification Report for May 27, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/26/2015 - 05/27/2015
EVENT NUMBERS
5110251092510935109451099
Agreement State
Event Number: 51102
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 03096
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 03096
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 18:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 18:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CS-137 SOURCE
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 27, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] that while performing a routine survey of its source storage area, it discovered that a Barium-137 generator, originally containing 50 millicuries of Cesium-137, had leaked. The licensee investigated and found small amounts of the Cesium had been tracked into its office area (floor only and it has been remediated) and some of the licensee's work vehicles. Employees' vehicles were surveyed and no contamination was detected. The licensee continues its surveys of tools, tool boxes, and other items in the trucks. The area where the generator was stored is a restricted area (security). Access has been further restricted for greater than 24 hours due to the contamination. The licensee is working to identify and remediate all contamination outside the storage room before beginning to remediate there. The licensee has placed the generator into a type A drum to contain the material. The licensee was unable to determine the source or cause of the leak prior to placing it in the drum. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9316
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 27, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] that while performing a routine survey of its source storage area, it discovered that a Barium-137 generator, originally containing 50 millicuries of Cesium-137, had leaked. The licensee investigated and found small amounts of the Cesium had been tracked into its office area (floor only and it has been remediated) and some of the licensee's work vehicles. Employees' vehicles were surveyed and no contamination was detected. The licensee continues its surveys of tools, tool boxes, and other items in the trucks. The area where the generator was stored is a restricted area (security). Access has been further restricted for greater than 24 hours due to the contamination. The licensee is working to identify and remediate all contamination outside the storage room before beginning to remediate there. The licensee has placed the generator into a type A drum to contain the material. The licensee was unable to determine the source or cause of the leak prior to placing it in the drum. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9316
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51092
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/27/2015
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2015
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On 5/27/15, planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed on the Braidwood Generating Station Technical Support Center (TSC), Ventilation System. The work will be completed within approximately 10 hours. This activity includes preventative maintenance that requires the TSC ventilation system to be out of service which will render the TSC ventilation system non-functional.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff as necessary.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The planned maintenance will not be able to restore the TSC condensing unit or ventilation system to service within the facility activation time specified in the emergency plan (1 hour) in the event of an accident. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM PETER MOODIE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/27/2015 AT 2153 EDT * * *
Planned work is complete and the Technical Support Center was restored to service on May 27, 2015 at 1808 CDT.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Lipa).
"On 5/27/15, planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed on the Braidwood Generating Station Technical Support Center (TSC), Ventilation System. The work will be completed within approximately 10 hours. This activity includes preventative maintenance that requires the TSC ventilation system to be out of service which will render the TSC ventilation system non-functional.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff as necessary.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The planned maintenance will not be able to restore the TSC condensing unit or ventilation system to service within the facility activation time specified in the emergency plan (1 hour) in the event of an accident. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM PETER MOODIE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/27/2015 AT 2153 EDT * * *
Planned work is complete and the Technical Support Center was restored to service on May 27, 2015 at 1808 CDT.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Lipa).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51093
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRED MUHLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRED MUHLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 05/27/2015
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 09:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2015
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 09:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On May 27, 2015, at 0952 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to opening a ventilation duct hatch to facilitate fire damper inspection without administrative controls. The hatch was opened and upon discovery was immediately shut, re-establishing the boundary of the Control Room Envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered and subsequently exited.
"The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility.
"At 0955, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope was exited.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On May 27, 2015, at 0952 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to opening a ventilation duct hatch to facilitate fire damper inspection without administrative controls. The hatch was opened and upon discovery was immediately shut, re-establishing the boundary of the Control Room Envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered and subsequently exited.
"The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility.
"At 0955, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope was exited.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51094
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/28/2015
Notification Time: 03:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 22:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2015
Notification Time: 03:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 22:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
AREA RADIATION MONITORS NON-FUNCTIONAL DURING PLANNED BUS OUTAGE
"A planned outage of the Division 2 medium voltage switchgear (SM-8) was initiated at 22:17 PDT on 5/27/15. The bus outage results in all area radiation monitors required for emergency classification being non-functional. Compensatory measure monitoring equipment has been established prior to the loss to provide alternate means of monitoring area radiation levels. The SM-8 outage window is scheduled to last 124 hours. Although the monitoring function is maintained by the compensatory monitoring equipment, the planned loss of area radiation monitors for greater than 72 hours is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"A planned outage of the Division 2 medium voltage switchgear (SM-8) was initiated at 22:17 PDT on 5/27/15. The bus outage results in all area radiation monitors required for emergency classification being non-functional. Compensatory measure monitoring equipment has been established prior to the loss to provide alternate means of monitoring area radiation levels. The SM-8 outage window is scheduled to last 124 hours. Although the monitoring function is maintained by the compensatory monitoring equipment, the planned loss of area radiation monitors for greater than 72 hours is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 51099
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: NOT PROVIDED
Region: 4
City: NOT PROVIDED State: TX
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: NOT PROVIDED
Region: 4
City: NOT PROVIDED State: TX
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IODINE-125 MEDICAL SEEDS
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 29, 2015, a licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that it was unable to locate a package containing approximately 41.2 millicuries of Iodine-125 seeds. The package had been received at the licensee's facility on May 26, 2015, and per the licensee's procedures, it was delivered to the nuclear medicine department and left in the designated area. However, the staff in the nuclear medicine department had been allowed to leave due to a slow schedule. On May 27, 2015, when staff returned, they were unable to locate the package. The licensee conducted a facility wide search. The [licensee's] materials management employee that placed the package in the nuclear medicine department and the housekeeping employee that cleaned the department the previous night were interviewed. The housekeeper reported, [to have] not removed any boxes from the department. The licensee was unable to identify anyone else had entered the department. The facility's waste container had been picked up and taken to the landfill earlier that morning. The licensee checked with the landfill and learned it does have a radiation monitor but the container from the hospital had not set it off. The contents of the container had already been covered over in the landfill. The patient's procedure was canceled and re-scheduled. The licensee has changed its procedures for radioactive material package delivery by the facility's materials management to the nuclear medicine department to prevent reoccurrence. The licensee is continuing its search for the package. An investigation into this event is ongoing. The Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] has withheld the name of the licensee [and license number and location] in accordance with Texas state law. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9317
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 29, 2015, a licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that it was unable to locate a package containing approximately 41.2 millicuries of Iodine-125 seeds. The package had been received at the licensee's facility on May 26, 2015, and per the licensee's procedures, it was delivered to the nuclear medicine department and left in the designated area. However, the staff in the nuclear medicine department had been allowed to leave due to a slow schedule. On May 27, 2015, when staff returned, they were unable to locate the package. The licensee conducted a facility wide search. The [licensee's] materials management employee that placed the package in the nuclear medicine department and the housekeeping employee that cleaned the department the previous night were interviewed. The housekeeper reported, [to have] not removed any boxes from the department. The licensee was unable to identify anyone else had entered the department. The facility's waste container had been picked up and taken to the landfill earlier that morning. The licensee checked with the landfill and learned it does have a radiation monitor but the container from the hospital had not set it off. The contents of the container had already been covered over in the landfill. The patient's procedure was canceled and re-scheduled. The licensee has changed its procedures for radioactive material package delivery by the facility's materials management to the nuclear medicine department to prevent reoccurrence. The licensee is continuing its search for the package. An investigation into this event is ongoing. The Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] has withheld the name of the licensee [and license number and location] in accordance with Texas state law. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9317
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf