Event Notification Report for April 30, 2015

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RUPTURED IODINE SEED DURING REMOVAL

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On May 4, 2015, licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that he had been notified today that on Thursday, April 30, 2015, a physician had ruptured an I-125 seed during removal from a patient. The seed was used for localization in a breast treatment procedure. The seed activity was 357 microCuries at the time of treatment on 4/30/15. The seed was identified as leaking after removal and in a container in the pathology department. The physician had screened the patient with a probe in the tissue/lesion and no radioactivity was found. No overexposure to the patient or doctor had occurred. The RSO stated he was preparing a full detailed report. Further information will be provided in accordance with SA300 guidelines."

Texas Incident # I-9310

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1347 EDT ON 05/20/15 FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *

This report is retracted based on the following:

"More complete information was obtained from the licensee. The seed covering was damaged by the physician during excision of tissue from patient. The patient was thoroughly checked following the excision (standard procedure) and there was no radiation detected. There was radioactivity detected in the excised tissue by pathology after seed was removed from the tissue. The licensee identified and remediated all contamination and managed processing of tissue to prevent further contamination. No aspect of the event met any reporting criteria. It has been determined this was not a reportable event."

Notified R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

POTENTIALLY UNQUALIFIED COMPONENT IN CERTAIN ALLEN BRADLEY TIMING RELAYS

The following is an excerpt from a document received from the licensee via email:

"Report of potential 10 CFR Part 21, Allen Bradley Timing Relay Model 700RTC

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential failure to comply.

"On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ/NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.

"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:

"As of 2009-2010, Allen Bradley relays base model 700RTC, contain an unevaluated CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device). This was an unpublished design change that was implemented to replace an obsolete integrated circuit chip. The undocumented design change did not result in a part number change from Allen-Bradley. There was no change to the appearance of the relay that would identify any design changes were made to the relay configuration. Therefore, NLI qualification/dedication of the relays after 2009 have not included additional testing for the new CPLD component.

"The timing relay model 700RTC has been dedicated/qualified for multiple applications for various plants.

"Between 2009-2010 Allen Bradley made a design change without changing the part number of the commercial relay or providing any documented evidence of a design change. The manufacturer specification data sheets maintain the classification that the relays are 'solid state', which would imply that there are no digital devices installed in the relay. However, after inspection of the internals of the timing relay (Figure 2), it has been identified that the unit does contain a CPLD which meets the definition of a digital device under the guidance of NEI 01-01."

Potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Ft. Calhoun, Perry, River Bend, South Texas Project, and St. Lucie.

* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY BOLT TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1744 EDT ON 4/8/16 * * *

AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 1.

Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Nease), R3DO(Skokowski), R4DO (Kellar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM LES TAGGART TO BETHANY CECERE AT 0951 EDT ON 5/26/16 * * *

AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided Revision 2 to Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015 to correct the referenced EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 3 to Rev. 4 and change 'timing' contacts to 'instantaneous' contacts as shown below:

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

"The relays that are currently in stock at NLI have been placed on hold until after the units have been determined to be qualified for the specific application. NU has completed the EMC qualification testing per the requirements of EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 4 for the following tests, as applicable: CE101, CE102, RE101, RE102, RS101, RS103, CS101, CS114, CS115 and CS116.

"The results were satisfactory with exception of the following condition: During Conducted Susceptibility CS114 onto the power lines, with the timing circuit in operation, the instantaneous contacts exhibited chatter in the range of 2.6 MHz to 20.3 MHz. The unit requires a ferrite to be installed onto the input power lines of the relay with 3 turns through the ferrite core. In this modified configuration, the relay was not susceptible to Conducted Susceptibility and successfully passed the required test per CS114."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO(Kunowski), R4DO (Werner), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY BOLT TO DONG PARK AT 1807 EDT ON 8/15/16 * * *

AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 3, correcting the date the change occurred to October 2008.

Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Proulx), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY BOLT TO DONG PARK AT 1833 EDT ON 8/26/16 * * *

AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics is making a word correction in Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 4.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Michel), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT

"Unusual Event (4.6.U.1) was declared by the Shift Manager at Oconee Nuclear Station at 1840 EDT on 4/30/15 due to scorched 4160V cable and a hole created in metal connector coming into the top of 1C condensate booster pump motor electrical junction box. Unit 1 experienced a decrease in power to approximately 98.6% power due to the perturbation in condensate flow from the loss of 1C condensate booster pump. Unit 1 is currently stable at 98.6%. 1A condensate booster pump auto-started as expected. Smoke was observed and quickly dissipated. No visible fire or flame was observed. No Fire Brigade response required."

The Unusual Event was terminated at 1945 EDT on 4/30/15.

The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan to issue a press release.

Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA).

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperable at 2344 CDT on 4/30/2015.

"The HPCS system at River Bend Station includes a test return line to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The test return line is isolated by two motor operated valves (E22-MOVF010 and E22-MOVF011), with both having a safety function to close on an ECCS initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. There is currently a blind flange installed downstream of these two valves. While the HPCS pump is normally aligned to the CST, the credited source of water for the pump is the suppression pool. Accordingly, the pump suction is realigned to the suppression pool on low level in the CST or when suppression pool level rises to a certain point. While performing maintenance on the downstream test return valve (E22-MOVF011), station personnel identified leakage past the upstream test return valve (E22-MOVF010) which was being used as an isolation boundary. In evaluating this condition, engineering personnel noted that the observed leakage past the upstream isolation MOV might be sufficient to deplete suppression pool inventory such that it would not be capable of performing its specified function for the duration of the 30-day mission time. The issue of concern is that once HPCS is aligned to the suppression pool post-LOCA, pool inventory would be lost due to the leaking upstream isolation valve (E22-MOVF010) and out the disassembled downstream isolation valve (E22-MOVF011).

"Based on that concern, the HPCS pump suction valve from the suppression pool was disabled in the closed position to preserve pool inventory. This action caused the HPCS system to be declared inoperable at 2344 CDT. This action results in a 14 day shutdown LCO and is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)D.

"The HPCS pump remained available with its suction aligned to the CST.

"Message has been left with NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1009 EDT ON 6/29/2015 FROM MICHAEL BRANSCUM TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"The licensee is retracting the report for Event No. 51028.

"On April 28, the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was inoperable to support planned maintenance. During repairs on the HPCS pump test return valves, leakage through the upstream isolation valve was observed when the downstream valve was disassembled. At 2315 [CDT] on April 30, it was conservatively determined that the leakage represented a potential challenge to the 30-day inventory of the suppression pool, and the pool was declared inoperable. At 2344 [CDT] on April 30, the HPCS pump suction valve to the suppression pool was closed to isolate that potential leakage path until the maintenance could be completed. This action returned the suppression pool to an operable status.

"On June 24, a quantitative leak rate test was performed on the upstream isolation valve (E22-MOVF010). That test determined that the leakage through the valve was not of such magnitude to have had the potential to deplete the 30-day inventory of the suppression pool during post-accident operation of the HPCS system. Additionally, when the HPCS pump suction valve on the suppression pool was closed on April 30, the system was already in a planned outage that commenced on April 28. As such, this condition need not have been reported."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Campbell).