Event Notification Report for April 05, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/04/2015 - 04/05/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51085
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL BALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL BALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 04:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 04:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 5, 2015 at 0435 CDT, during replacement of a failed fuse (2-FU1-64-16A-K33A), Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic received the B half of the Unit 2 Group 6 isolation signal. This caused initiation of the B and C Standby Gas Treatment, B Control Room Emergency Ventilation, isolation of the Unit 2 reactor zone and all three refueling zone ventilations. This was not a valid initiation of PCIS.
"Operations personal responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured that all equipment operated as designed, and returned the affected systems back to service.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as PER 1010651.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 5, 2015 at 0435 CDT, during replacement of a failed fuse (2-FU1-64-16A-K33A), Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic received the B half of the Unit 2 Group 6 isolation signal. This caused initiation of the B and C Standby Gas Treatment, B Control Room Emergency Ventilation, isolation of the Unit 2 reactor zone and all three refueling zone ventilations. This was not a valid initiation of PCIS.
"Operations personal responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured that all equipment operated as designed, and returned the affected systems back to service.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as PER 1010651.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50955
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DANIELS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DANIELS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/05/2015
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 08:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2015
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 08:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP METEOROLOGICAL TOWERS DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF 25kV POWER DISTRIBUTION
"At 0852 CDT on 04/05/2015, a partial loss of the 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. Loss of both Meteorological Towers constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions.
"The 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System feeds certain non-safety related equipment and does not affect plant operation.
"An investigation into the cause of the loss of power is in progress."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0852 CDT on 04/05/2015, a partial loss of the 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. Loss of both Meteorological Towers constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions.
"The 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System feeds certain non-safety related equipment and does not affect plant operation.
"An investigation into the cause of the loss of power is in progress."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50956
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/05/2015
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 15:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2015
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 15:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2015
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
DAVE LEW (R1RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
DAVE LEW (R1RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation |
ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN MOTOR CONTROL CENTER
"An Alert was declared due to a fire in a Unit 2 Division 2 Safeguard [250 volt] DC Motor Control Center. This has made the High Pressure Core Injection system inoperable and unavailable. The fire is out. The emergency response organization has been activated and investigation / repair planning will commence. Unit 2 is stable with no other system affects."
The fire was extinguished by on-site personnel. No off-site responders were required. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system remains operable. A Fire Watch has been stationed to monitor for fire reflash. There were no injuries resulting from this event. There was no effect on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies.
Notified the following organizations: DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, and Nuclear SSA.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN BOYLAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1812 EDT ON 04/05/15 * * *
The Alert was terminated at 1742 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies.
Notified R1DO (Kennedy), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Morris).
Notified the following organizations: DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, and Nuclear SSA.
"An Alert was declared due to a fire in a Unit 2 Division 2 Safeguard [250 volt] DC Motor Control Center. This has made the High Pressure Core Injection system inoperable and unavailable. The fire is out. The emergency response organization has been activated and investigation / repair planning will commence. Unit 2 is stable with no other system affects."
The fire was extinguished by on-site personnel. No off-site responders were required. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system remains operable. A Fire Watch has been stationed to monitor for fire reflash. There were no injuries resulting from this event. There was no effect on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies.
Notified the following organizations: DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, and Nuclear SSA.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN BOYLAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1812 EDT ON 04/05/15 * * *
The Alert was terminated at 1742 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies.
Notified R1DO (Kennedy), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Morris).
Notified the following organizations: DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, and Nuclear SSA.