Event Notification Report for March 17, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/16/2015 - 03/17/2015
EVENT NUMBERS
5107950906509045090050910
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51079
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/18/2015
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 13:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2015
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 13:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING ELECTRICAL TESTING
"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.
"On March 17, 2015, at 1306 EDT, Watts Bar Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power, when during the performance of 6.9 Kv phase verifications for the FLEX Diesel Generator, maintenance technicians were installing a multimeter (Simpson 260 Series) which resulted in starting the Unit 1 train B: motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, centrifugal charging pump, component cooling pump and thermal barrier booster pump, and isolated steam generator 1 and 3 blowdown. A secondary 6 ampere fuse opened due to an overcurrent and actuated (dropped-out) the associated blackout relays which started the identified pumps. At the time of the event, the train B standby diesel generator was removed from service for maintenance. The 6.9 Kv shutdown board did not lose power during the event and safety injection system and standby diesel generator features were not actuated.
"The maintenance technicians performing the phase verifications immediately recognized that several supply breakers had closed after the last test lead was connected and promptly reported the event to the control room. Work was halted and TVA conducted a prompt investigation. While not conclusive, it is likely that the maintenance technicians created a shunt or ground condition while installing test equipment, causing a circuit overcurrent which opened the fuse, activating the black-out relays and actuating the identified pumps and valves. Plant operators responded appropriately to the event and the applicable Technical Specification Required Actions were exited at 1612 EDT, when equipment restoration had been completed. TVA is continuing to evaluate this event in accordance with the corrective action program (reference: PER nos.1003213 and 1027101).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.
"On March 17, 2015, at 1306 EDT, Watts Bar Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power, when during the performance of 6.9 Kv phase verifications for the FLEX Diesel Generator, maintenance technicians were installing a multimeter (Simpson 260 Series) which resulted in starting the Unit 1 train B: motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, centrifugal charging pump, component cooling pump and thermal barrier booster pump, and isolated steam generator 1 and 3 blowdown. A secondary 6 ampere fuse opened due to an overcurrent and actuated (dropped-out) the associated blackout relays which started the identified pumps. At the time of the event, the train B standby diesel generator was removed from service for maintenance. The 6.9 Kv shutdown board did not lose power during the event and safety injection system and standby diesel generator features were not actuated.
"The maintenance technicians performing the phase verifications immediately recognized that several supply breakers had closed after the last test lead was connected and promptly reported the event to the control room. Work was halted and TVA conducted a prompt investigation. While not conclusive, it is likely that the maintenance technicians created a shunt or ground condition while installing test equipment, causing a circuit overcurrent which opened the fuse, activating the black-out relays and actuating the identified pumps and valves. Plant operators responded appropriately to the event and the applicable Technical Specification Required Actions were exited at 1612 EDT, when equipment restoration had been completed. TVA is continuing to evaluate this event in accordance with the corrective action program (reference: PER nos.1003213 and 1027101).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 50906
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: PORT LAVACA State: TX
County:
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: PORT LAVACA State: TX
County:
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OHMART SH-F2 GAUGE SHUTTER HANDLE PIN SHEARED
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On March 19, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on March 17, 2015, while preparing for a shutdown for maintenance, it closed the shutter on an Ohmart SH-F2 gauge, which contained a 200 milliCurie cesium-137 source, and the pin on the shutter handle sheared off. The licensee performed a survey to confirm the source was in the fully shielded position and placed a lock on the shutter. No individual received any exposure as a result of this event. The licensee contacted a service company and the gauge was repaired and returned to service on March 19, 2015. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9286
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On March 19, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on March 17, 2015, while preparing for a shutdown for maintenance, it closed the shutter on an Ohmart SH-F2 gauge, which contained a 200 milliCurie cesium-137 source, and the pin on the shutter handle sheared off. The licensee performed a survey to confirm the source was in the fully shielded position and placed a lock on the shutter. No individual received any exposure as a result of this event. The licensee contacted a service company and the gauge was repaired and returned to service on March 19, 2015. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9286
Agreement State
Event Number: 50904
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: VITAL INSPECTION PROFESSIONALS
Region: 1
City: ALABASTER State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MYRON RILEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: VITAL INSPECTION PROFESSIONALS
Region: 1
City: ALABASTER State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MYRON RILEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/19/2015
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 21:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2015
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 21:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The following information was received via fax:
"On March 18, 2015, the Radiation Safety Officer for Vital Inspection Professionals, Alabaster, Alabama notified the Office of Radiation Control [for the State of Alabama] in regards to a potential overexposure which may have occurred while conducting radiography at the Alabama Power, Miller Steam Plant.
"On March 17, 2015 at approximately 2130 CDT, a crew was conducting radiography. The crew consisted of one radiographer and three assistants. They were completing two exposures lasting 35 seconds, and with a set-up time of approximately 15 to 18 minutes. After completing the two exposures, the radiographer noticed that his pocket dosimeter (200 mR) was off-scale. The first assistant's pocket dosimeter was reading 50 mR, the second assistant's pocket dosimeter was off scale and the third assistant was not wearing any dosimetry. The radiographer and first assistant acknowledged that their alarming rate meters were functioning correctly, the second assistant and third assistant were not wearing an alarming rate meter.
"The crew notified their Radiation Safety Officer at 2130 CDT, but did not contact him until around midnight. The crew immediately stopped work and was told to meet the Radiation Safety Officer the next morning to discuss the events. All available dosimetry was sent off for emergency processing and [dose information] should be received by noon, March 19, 2015. From the discussion it was determined that the survey meter had an apparent electrical short and was not measuring properly. The camera was checked and determined to be functioning properly. Based on the licensee's preliminary dose estimates it was determined that one crew member may have received up to 45 Rem whole body.
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 3/30/2015 FROM MYRON RILEY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health via fax:
"On March 25, 2015, Agency representatives visited Alabama Power Miller Steam Plant and met with representatives of the plant and reviewed the area where the incident took place. Also during this time the Radiation Safety Officer, the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer and the Radiographer, for Vital Inspection Professionals, were interviewed while at the plant.
"Starting the afternoon of March 25, 2015 and concluding the afternoon of March 26, 2015 visit, Agency representatives [Alabama Department of Public Health] met with personnel for Vital Inspection Professionals at their office and interviewed one shift foreman and the four individuals involved in the incident. The preliminary findings from interviews and a re-creation of the events is that the source was outside of its fully shielded position, but not in the guide tube.
"Since the incident, all four individuals involved have been seen by an Occupational Physician and have had blood samples sent to REAC/TS for review. Results should be received by April 3, 2015. Further review of all associated paperwork and training will be accomplished by April 1, 2015."
Alabama Incident 15-16
Notified R1DO(Kennedy), NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION via email
The following information was received via fax:
"On March 18, 2015, the Radiation Safety Officer for Vital Inspection Professionals, Alabaster, Alabama notified the Office of Radiation Control [for the State of Alabama] in regards to a potential overexposure which may have occurred while conducting radiography at the Alabama Power, Miller Steam Plant.
"On March 17, 2015 at approximately 2130 CDT, a crew was conducting radiography. The crew consisted of one radiographer and three assistants. They were completing two exposures lasting 35 seconds, and with a set-up time of approximately 15 to 18 minutes. After completing the two exposures, the radiographer noticed that his pocket dosimeter (200 mR) was off-scale. The first assistant's pocket dosimeter was reading 50 mR, the second assistant's pocket dosimeter was off scale and the third assistant was not wearing any dosimetry. The radiographer and first assistant acknowledged that their alarming rate meters were functioning correctly, the second assistant and third assistant were not wearing an alarming rate meter.
"The crew notified their Radiation Safety Officer at 2130 CDT, but did not contact him until around midnight. The crew immediately stopped work and was told to meet the Radiation Safety Officer the next morning to discuss the events. All available dosimetry was sent off for emergency processing and [dose information] should be received by noon, March 19, 2015. From the discussion it was determined that the survey meter had an apparent electrical short and was not measuring properly. The camera was checked and determined to be functioning properly. Based on the licensee's preliminary dose estimates it was determined that one crew member may have received up to 45 Rem whole body.
* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 3/30/2015 FROM MYRON RILEY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
The following update was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health via fax:
"On March 25, 2015, Agency representatives visited Alabama Power Miller Steam Plant and met with representatives of the plant and reviewed the area where the incident took place. Also during this time the Radiation Safety Officer, the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer and the Radiographer, for Vital Inspection Professionals, were interviewed while at the plant.
"Starting the afternoon of March 25, 2015 and concluding the afternoon of March 26, 2015 visit, Agency representatives [Alabama Department of Public Health] met with personnel for Vital Inspection Professionals at their office and interviewed one shift foreman and the four individuals involved in the incident. The preliminary findings from interviews and a re-creation of the events is that the source was outside of its fully shielded position, but not in the guide tube.
"Since the incident, all four individuals involved have been seen by an Occupational Physician and have had blood samples sent to REAC/TS for review. Results should be received by April 3, 2015. Further review of all associated paperwork and training will be accomplished by April 1, 2015."
Alabama Incident 15-16
Notified R1DO(Kennedy), NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION via email
Part 21
Event Number: 50900
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/17/2015
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL TEST INDUCED DEFECT IN A 0867F MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVES
The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email:
"This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
William Brunet
Director of Quality Assurance
James White
General Manager
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs.
"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed.
We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include;
a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications,
b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and
c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12
The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions.
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
Not applicable.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1355 EDT ON 5/1/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state that their root cause analysis is still in progress and they anticipate completion within 60 days.
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Gray), and R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1256 EDT ON 6/30/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state their root cause analysis findings and corrective actions. Corrective actions are estimated to be completed within 12 months.
"The following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
FitzPatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped = 24, Quantity on order= 12
"The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"Valves Currently Installed
"Target Rock recommends valves currently installed be inspected to ensure the main piston shoulder has contact with the main disc stem shoulder. These inspections should be scheduled based on plant-specific indications of the potential for fretting. These inspections can be performed by removing the base assembly from the main body and physically measuring for shoulder-to-shoulder contact.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Dimitriadis), and R2DO (Suggs).
* * * UPDATE AT 0803 EST ON 02/03/17 FROM JOHN DEBONIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Target Rock, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation (TR), previously submitted NID# 15428 (Ref. 1) regarding 0867F Series of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSSRV). The purpose of this letter is to provide a final update on the status of the actions identified in NID# 15428 (Ref. 1 ).
"TR has developed a design change that we have verified, though analysis and qualification testing, ensures testing on the available limited flow test facilities will not impart damage to our product. Qualification included both limited and full flow testing. Target Rock confirms this design change has no effect on either National Board certification or the performance required by the applicable Specification to support the plant safety analysis.TR will offer this design change as our recommended long term solution to all utilities who currently have installed or plan to install the 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valve model in their respective plants. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me [Alex DiMeo] at (631) 293-3800."
Notified R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Walker) and Part 21 Group.
The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email:
"This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
William Brunet
Director of Quality Assurance
James White
General Manager
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs.
"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed.
We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include;
a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications,
b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and
c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12
The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions.
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
Not applicable.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1355 EDT ON 5/1/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state that their root cause analysis is still in progress and they anticipate completion within 60 days.
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Gray), and R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1256 EDT ON 6/30/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state their root cause analysis findings and corrective actions. Corrective actions are estimated to be completed within 12 months.
"The following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
FitzPatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped = 24, Quantity on order= 12
"The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"Valves Currently Installed
"Target Rock recommends valves currently installed be inspected to ensure the main piston shoulder has contact with the main disc stem shoulder. These inspections should be scheduled based on plant-specific indications of the potential for fretting. These inspections can be performed by removing the base assembly from the main body and physically measuring for shoulder-to-shoulder contact.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Dimitriadis), and R2DO (Suggs).
* * * UPDATE AT 0803 EST ON 02/03/17 FROM JOHN DEBONIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Target Rock, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation (TR), previously submitted NID# 15428 (Ref. 1) regarding 0867F Series of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSSRV). The purpose of this letter is to provide a final update on the status of the actions identified in NID# 15428 (Ref. 1 ).
"TR has developed a design change that we have verified, though analysis and qualification testing, ensures testing on the available limited flow test facilities will not impart damage to our product. Qualification included both limited and full flow testing. Target Rock confirms this design change has no effect on either National Board certification or the performance required by the applicable Specification to support the plant safety analysis.TR will offer this design change as our recommended long term solution to all utilities who currently have installed or plan to install the 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valve model in their respective plants. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me [Alex DiMeo] at (631) 293-3800."
Notified R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Walker) and Part 21 Group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 50910
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ATI MIDLAND
Region: 1
City: MIDLAND State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ATI MIDLAND
Region: 1
City: MIDLAND State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/20/2015
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ORPHAN SOURCE FOUND IN SCRAP METAL
The following report was received via fax:
"The Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] received notification on March 18, 2015 regarding a source that set off an alarm at a steel mill facility.
"A truck load of scrap set off a radiation monitor alarm at the ATI Midland steel mill. ATI rejected the load and sent it back to the scrap yard which contacted an approved service provider. Applied Health Physics isolated and identified the source as Americium-241 (Am-241). Contact reading of the source was 30 mR/hr and 1 mR/hr at 1 meter.
"Source: Am-241
Manufacturer: Unknown
Manufacturer Date: 4-13-88
SN: # 7435LV"
Pennsylvania Report: PA150007
The following report was received via fax:
"The Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] received notification on March 18, 2015 regarding a source that set off an alarm at a steel mill facility.
"A truck load of scrap set off a radiation monitor alarm at the ATI Midland steel mill. ATI rejected the load and sent it back to the scrap yard which contacted an approved service provider. Applied Health Physics isolated and identified the source as Americium-241 (Am-241). Contact reading of the source was 30 mR/hr and 1 mR/hr at 1 meter.
"Source: Am-241
Manufacturer: Unknown
Manufacturer Date: 4-13-88
SN: # 7435LV"
Pennsylvania Report: PA150007