Event Notification Report for March 13, 2015

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email and fax:

"The Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] received a phone call on March 13, 2015 regarding a lost/missing nuclear density gauge. This event is reportable within 24-hours per 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(i).

"The gauge was last used on December 16, 2014 at a job site in New Brighton, PA and discovered missing during the next routine quarterly inventory. The case and lock were both intact inside a locked storage area. There were no signs of forced entry and nothing else was missing. The employee, after being questioned, claims no knowledge of the whereabouts of the gauge.

"[Gauge] Model: Troxler 3411B
Serial #: 8254
Isotope: Cs-137 & Am-241
Activity: 9 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241

"The police have been notified. The Department will conduct an in depth reactive inspection. A press release will be issued requesting information from the public. More information will be provided upon receipt."

Event Report ID No: PA 150006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

IMPROPER WELD USED ON GATE VALVE COVER

The following was received from the licensee via email:

"This notification is being submitted pursuant to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21 to report that, during the manufacturing of a replacement cover for a 24 inch gate valve on the reactor recirc line at Exelon LaSalle, Weir Valves and Controls used a weld that was not compliant to ASME Ill Subsection NB requirements.

"During review of the weld at site, the question was raised based on site procedures required a 2:1 profile in accordance to EPRI guidelines. During review of the documentation to determine if the 2:1 profile was required in this case, Weir Valves and Controls determined that improper weld call out was used on the design prints. The weld was corrected at site to meet the both ASME Ill Subsection NB requirements and EPRI guidelines.

"Weir Valves and Controls has performed an extent condition review and has concluded that no other undersized welds were made and delivered to any other operating sites.

"The root-cause of the issue was the improper call-out of the weld by design engineering.

"Weir Valves and Controls is performing corrective actions to ensure future re-occurrences cannot occur in design engineering."

PLANT EMPLOYEE TESTED POSITIVE FOR BANNED SUBSTANCE

A non-licensed corporate employee tested positive for a banned substance. The individual's unescorted access has been revoked.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

POSITIVE RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST RESULT

A contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This condition is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). On 3/12/15, during surveillance testing on LPCI [Low Pressure Coolant Injection] Loop Select Instrumentation, a degraded component was discovered. At 1230 CDT on 3/13/15, LPCI was declared INOPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. All remaining ECCS systems remain available and operable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE AT 0210 EDT ON 03/14/15 FROM SCOTT AREBAUGH TO S. SANDIN * * *

"At 0105 CDT on 3/14/15, the subject component has been replaced and retested with satisfactory results. LPCI INOPERABLE condition was exited at 0105 CDT and the LPCI System is OPERABLE."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth).

* * * RETRACTION AT 1737 EDT ON 04/23/15 FROM BOB MURRELL TO DONG PARK * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/13/15 at 1859 EDT. Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of an event where Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) was declared inoperable due to the discovery of a degraded LPCI Loop Select timing relay.

"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the LPCI Loop Select timing relay was tested in a configuration that affected time delay measurements. This testing configuration was revised in 2012 following a modification to the LPCI Loop Select Logic, STP 3.3.5.1-29. The inadequate testing configuration adversely affected the time delay when the test equipment was installed. A revision to STP 3.3.5.1-29 was completed to resolve the inadequate testing configuration. Subsequent bench testing, performed to mimic plant installed configuration, of the affected relay, was completed. This testing demonstrated that the relay could be tested in a manner that provided acceptable results, and it has been concluded that the relay would have performed its required safety function up to when it was tested on 3/13/15.

"Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Valos).

FUEL ASSEMBLY MIS-ORIENTED RESULTING IN A UNANALYZED CONDITION

"On March 13, 2015 at 0100 [CDT], it was identified that fuel assembly QAD224 was mis-oriented 180 degrees at core location 51-40. The intended orientation was [southeast]. However the assembly was identified as being [northwest]. This issue was identified during the core verification process. In the current core configuration, there is not a bounding analysis that assures adequate Shutdown Margin.

"This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM RICK MOON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1051 EDT ON 4/7/15 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on March 13, 2015 (ENS 50882). An evaluation has determined that Shutdown Margin was met with the mis-oriented fuel bundle. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as a degraded or unanalyzed condition was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R3DO (Skowkowski).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OSHA DUE TO ONSITE PLANT EMPLOYEE PASSING AWAY

"On March 13, 2015 at 0928 EDT, a notification to OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] was initiated due to an employee experiencing a non-work related medical event that resulted in the employee passing. When the issue was identified, the station first aid team responded to administer first aid. Subsequent to the employee passing, a report was made to OSHA in accordance with federal requirements. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since another governmental agency was notified of this employer referral medical event."

The plant employee was in a building within the protected area and was not contaminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local government of the event.

LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO VENTILATION PLENUM DOOR OPEN

"On March 13, 2015 at 0919 [EDT], Secondary Containment became inoperable, requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"The inoperability was caused by Zone 2 differential pressure lowering to less than 0.25 inches WC [water column] when an air handling plenum door was opened for an extended period.

"The plenum door was closed and differential pressure restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC at 0930 on March 13, 2015.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 Section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION

"On March 13, 2015, Watts Bar determined that information received from Westinghouse represented an unanalyzed condition. The information challenged the current Unit 1 Fire Protection Report (FPR) analysis for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. The current FPR analysis used a duration of 120 seconds before a low pressurizer pressure safety injection (SI) signal would be received due to a postulated failed open pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) from an Appendix R fire outside of the control building. During discussions with Westinghouse, Watts Bar determined that the 120 second value was non-conservative and not intended for this application. Recent information from Westinghouse indicates that a Sl signal would be received in approximately 34 seconds.

"This information places Watts Bar Unit 1 in an unanalyzed condition because the original analysis assumed that a Sl signal would not be received from fire-induced failures in the associated fire areas. While the existing Watts Bar Unit 1 Appendix R procedures direct operators to isolate the pressurizer PORV, the procedures did not have steps to mitigate and terminate the Sl. Without mitigating actions, the Sl would likely challenge the reactor coolant system boundary due to water relief through the remaining pressurizer PORV and/or safety valves.

"As a compensatory measure, Watts Bar has established administrative equipment controls to preclude the consequences of a spuriously opening pressurizer PORV. In addition, a compensatory measure in the form of fire watches has been established in areas where a fire could result in a spurious opening of a pressurizer PORV.

"This issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"The Watts Bar Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA FAILED SOURCE DISCONNECT/MISCONNECT TEST

The following was received from the State of Louisiana via email:

"A radiography inspection was being performed on a Central Testing crew at the Tri-7 facility in Sulphur, LA. At a point during the inspection, the inspector requested that the crew demonstrate a misconnect/disconnect test on the camera and drive cables in use. The crew stated that the equipment had passed the test before the equipment was put into service for the day. However, during the demonstration, the 'control assembly' on the crankout set functioned in a test failure mode. The control assembly easily slipped into position without the drive cable being attached to the source assembly, 'pigtail.' With this failure, the RSO was contacted and an additional set of crankouts were brought to the jobsite.

"The crankout was evaluated and it was determined that the control assembly is what failed during the test. The control assembly was replaced on the crankout and it corrected the misconnect/disconnect test failure. This test is to be performed on the equipment daily with use. This is a requirement of LA Radioactive Material License LA-2393-L01A, Condition # 16.

"The exposure device was a SPEC Model 150 camera, S/N 1057, loaded with a 63 Ci Ir-192 source, SPEC Model G-60. The associated equipment was manufactured by SPEC, crankout and control assembly, with unknown model and s/ns. When the equipment was replaced, the radiography crew was allowed to resume their work."

LA Event Report ID: LA 15-0004