Event Notification Report for February 20, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/19/2015 - 02/20/2015
Part 21
Event Number: 50846
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT
Licensee: QUALTECH NP, HUNTSVILLE
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BAMBI RHOADES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: QUALTECH NP, HUNTSVILLE
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BAMBI RHOADES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/23/2015
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2015
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21- POTENTIAL DEFECT IN A SOCKET USED SEPARATELY OR IN A CONNECTOR KIT
The following information was received by facsimile:
"[The Curtiss-Wright] letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in Socket (PIN: GB-1 A-5) sold separately or supplied as part of a GRAYBOOT 'A'' (GB-1A) Connector Kit. There is one affected lot of Sockets (Lot#: 092413). The potential defect is that the socket was not zone annealed which will possibly affect the ability to crimp the socket onto the wire conductor. Zone annealing is specified for the crimp barrel to return the crimp barrel to a soft condition to counteract the effects of previous heat treating required to develop spring tension in the socket tines that mate with the pin contact.
"The nine affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified by February 24, 2015 and supplied with the information we have at this time.
1. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916
2. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916
3. Decon International (HK) Ltd., P.O. DIL00590
4. Ringhals AB, P.O. 641511-090
5. Dremel Inc., P.O. 13-040
6. Bruce Power L.P., P.O. 00185336
7. Kanata Electronic Services Limited, P.O. 34513
8. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104057
9. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104345
"Based on our recent in-house testing of socket Lot #: 092413, the defective sockets appear to be more difficult to crimp than sockets that have been zone annealed. Some of the Lot #: 092413 sockets showed cracking or bending under magnification. We did not have any sockets actually break apart during the crimping process. All the test specimens crimp barrels remained intact. If a severe fracture had occurred at the time of crimping we believe it would have been very noticeable to the technician installing the contact. Once crimped, the socket appears to function well by conducting electricity and exhibiting acceptable electrical resistance. Many of these sockets from Lot #: 092413 may already be installed. Customers will need to determine if replacing the sockets is required.
"All customers listed may choose to replace already installed sockets. It is requested that any uninstalled sockets be returned for replacement. All customers requesting replacement sockets should contact Bambi Rhoades at brhoades@curtisswright.com or by phone at 256-924-7424 for arrangements or Jim Tumlinson, contact information listed below.
"Send all defective sockets to QualTech NP; 120 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customer can contact Cindy Tidwell at ctidwell@curtisswright.com or by phone at (256) 924-7436 for help with international or freight collect shipping instructions. Ship all defective sockets collect to UPS Account No. 35254E.
"Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once our report of the recent testing complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting [Jim Tomlinson; Office Phone: (256) 924-7429; email:jtomlinson@curtisswright.com]."
* * * UPDATE AT 1304 EST ON 11/23/2015 FROM BAMBI RHOADES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via fax:
"This letter provides for the formal close out of notification QTHuntsville 10CFR21-2015-01. The initial notification was made on February 20, 2015 (NRC Event# 50846). All customers were notified and received the test data. All customers were given the opportunity to receive replacement sockets, as they deemed necessary. These replacement parts have been delivered. All actions have been completed.
"To prevent reoccurrence in the future, the following internal documents have been revised. The procurement and dedication guidelines for both the original GRAYBOOT and GRAYBOOT 'A' connectors were revised.
"GRAYBOOT 'A' Report No.: SAIC-TR-l038.2-03 currently at Revision P, dated July 16, 2015. GRAYBOOT Report No.: EGS-TR-880708-01 currently at Revision Y, dated July 16, 2015.
"Both the reports above now contain additional destructive testing as well as visual inspection under magnification to provide more reasonable assurance that the annealing is acceptable. Also, additional training was conducted at our sub-supplier and additional requirements have been added to our purchase orders to prevent any reoccurrence .
"Based on the above information and corrective actions, this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this further, please contact Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office). 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com.
Notified the R2DO (Ernstes) and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).
The following information was received by facsimile:
"[The Curtiss-Wright] letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in Socket (PIN: GB-1 A-5) sold separately or supplied as part of a GRAYBOOT 'A'' (GB-1A) Connector Kit. There is one affected lot of Sockets (Lot#: 092413). The potential defect is that the socket was not zone annealed which will possibly affect the ability to crimp the socket onto the wire conductor. Zone annealing is specified for the crimp barrel to return the crimp barrel to a soft condition to counteract the effects of previous heat treating required to develop spring tension in the socket tines that mate with the pin contact.
"The nine affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified by February 24, 2015 and supplied with the information we have at this time.
1. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916
2. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916
3. Decon International (HK) Ltd., P.O. DIL00590
4. Ringhals AB, P.O. 641511-090
5. Dremel Inc., P.O. 13-040
6. Bruce Power L.P., P.O. 00185336
7. Kanata Electronic Services Limited, P.O. 34513
8. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104057
9. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104345
"Based on our recent in-house testing of socket Lot #: 092413, the defective sockets appear to be more difficult to crimp than sockets that have been zone annealed. Some of the Lot #: 092413 sockets showed cracking or bending under magnification. We did not have any sockets actually break apart during the crimping process. All the test specimens crimp barrels remained intact. If a severe fracture had occurred at the time of crimping we believe it would have been very noticeable to the technician installing the contact. Once crimped, the socket appears to function well by conducting electricity and exhibiting acceptable electrical resistance. Many of these sockets from Lot #: 092413 may already be installed. Customers will need to determine if replacing the sockets is required.
"All customers listed may choose to replace already installed sockets. It is requested that any uninstalled sockets be returned for replacement. All customers requesting replacement sockets should contact Bambi Rhoades at brhoades@curtisswright.com or by phone at 256-924-7424 for arrangements or Jim Tumlinson, contact information listed below.
"Send all defective sockets to QualTech NP; 120 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customer can contact Cindy Tidwell at ctidwell@curtisswright.com or by phone at (256) 924-7436 for help with international or freight collect shipping instructions. Ship all defective sockets collect to UPS Account No. 35254E.
"Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once our report of the recent testing complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting [Jim Tomlinson; Office Phone: (256) 924-7429; email:jtomlinson@curtisswright.com]."
* * * UPDATE AT 1304 EST ON 11/23/2015 FROM BAMBI RHOADES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via fax:
"This letter provides for the formal close out of notification QTHuntsville 10CFR21-2015-01. The initial notification was made on February 20, 2015 (NRC Event# 50846). All customers were notified and received the test data. All customers were given the opportunity to receive replacement sockets, as they deemed necessary. These replacement parts have been delivered. All actions have been completed.
"To prevent reoccurrence in the future, the following internal documents have been revised. The procurement and dedication guidelines for both the original GRAYBOOT and GRAYBOOT 'A' connectors were revised.
"GRAYBOOT 'A' Report No.: SAIC-TR-l038.2-03 currently at Revision P, dated July 16, 2015. GRAYBOOT Report No.: EGS-TR-880708-01 currently at Revision Y, dated July 16, 2015.
"Both the reports above now contain additional destructive testing as well as visual inspection under magnification to provide more reasonable assurance that the annealing is acceptable. Also, additional training was conducted at our sub-supplier and additional requirements have been added to our purchase orders to prevent any reoccurrence .
"Based on the above information and corrective actions, this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this further, please contact Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office). 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com.
Notified the R2DO (Ernstes) and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).
Part 21
Event Number: 51296
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON KLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON KLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/06/2015
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2015
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - CRANE NUCLEAR PRESSURE SEAL VALVE WITH RETAINING RINGS
The following summary was excerpted from a facsimile received from Crane Nuclear:
"This letter provides interim notification of Crane Nuclear's investigation into ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section Ill Code design Pressure Seal Valve orders for yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings.
"The information required for this notification is provided below:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager and Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality, Crane Nuclear, 860 Remington Blvd., Bolingbrook, IL 60440
"Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect: Pressure Seal Valve orders may potentially have misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for Yokes with integral hub retaining ring designs.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, provides guidance for appropriate material and NDE requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62, which is ASME B&PV Section III, 2015 Edition, Non-Mandatory Appendix HH 'Rules for Valve Internal and External Items'. A yoke incorporating a threaded hub should be treated in the same manner as a threaded retaining ring requiring the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62). However, yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings may have been processed to material requirements for a yoke per Procedure 03-107 and not a threaded retaining ring resulting in the incorrect material specification and non-destructive examination specified.
"Crane Nuclear has completed the sales orders search of the ASME Section III Code Pressure Seal Valve designs with retaining rings from 1992 to present. We identified a total of 112 orders that required review. Of these orders, three orders were supplied with non-compliant retaining ring material for the valve assemblies. The three orders are as follows:
"CNI SO# 24237-011, TVA, Browns Ferry, P.O. 00031943 - Quantity shipped = 1, Chapman, 8 inch, Figure L953, Class 900, ASME Class 2, 95 Ed., 96 Add., no N stamp
"CNI SO# 39501-01, Georgia Power, Hatch, P.O. SNG10016537 - Quantity shipped = 3, Crane, 3 inch, Figure 776U, Class 600, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., W71 Add.
"CNI SO# 39745-01, Southern California Edison, San Onofre, P.O. 4500456451 - Quantity shipped = 1, Aloyco, 4 inch, Figure N5247PSB, Class 900, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., S73 Add.
"Crane Nuclear is currently investigating sales orders from 1968 to 1992. We require an additional 30-60 days to complete our review.
"Corrective action being taken by Crane Nuclear is to review documentation of the supplied material on the affected orders to determine if the yokes can be recertified as currently supplied, amend Crane Nuclear Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations and clarify classifications, and train Engineering personnel by August 24, 2015.
"Crane Nuclear has notified the respective customers for the [three] orders that have been identified to date. Crane will notify the respective customers for any additional orders that are identified.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940."
The following summary was excerpted from a facsimile received from Crane Nuclear:
"This letter provides interim notification of Crane Nuclear's investigation into ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section Ill Code design Pressure Seal Valve orders for yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings.
"The information required for this notification is provided below:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager and Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality, Crane Nuclear, 860 Remington Blvd., Bolingbrook, IL 60440
"Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect: Pressure Seal Valve orders may potentially have misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for Yokes with integral hub retaining ring designs.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, provides guidance for appropriate material and NDE requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62, which is ASME B&PV Section III, 2015 Edition, Non-Mandatory Appendix HH 'Rules for Valve Internal and External Items'. A yoke incorporating a threaded hub should be treated in the same manner as a threaded retaining ring requiring the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62). However, yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings may have been processed to material requirements for a yoke per Procedure 03-107 and not a threaded retaining ring resulting in the incorrect material specification and non-destructive examination specified.
"Crane Nuclear has completed the sales orders search of the ASME Section III Code Pressure Seal Valve designs with retaining rings from 1992 to present. We identified a total of 112 orders that required review. Of these orders, three orders were supplied with non-compliant retaining ring material for the valve assemblies. The three orders are as follows:
"CNI SO# 24237-011, TVA, Browns Ferry, P.O. 00031943 - Quantity shipped = 1, Chapman, 8 inch, Figure L953, Class 900, ASME Class 2, 95 Ed., 96 Add., no N stamp
"CNI SO# 39501-01, Georgia Power, Hatch, P.O. SNG10016537 - Quantity shipped = 3, Crane, 3 inch, Figure 776U, Class 600, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., W71 Add.
"CNI SO# 39745-01, Southern California Edison, San Onofre, P.O. 4500456451 - Quantity shipped = 1, Aloyco, 4 inch, Figure N5247PSB, Class 900, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., S73 Add.
"Crane Nuclear is currently investigating sales orders from 1968 to 1992. We require an additional 30-60 days to complete our review.
"Corrective action being taken by Crane Nuclear is to review documentation of the supplied material on the affected orders to determine if the yokes can be recertified as currently supplied, amend Crane Nuclear Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations and clarify classifications, and train Engineering personnel by August 24, 2015.
"Crane Nuclear has notified the respective customers for the [three] orders that have been identified to date. Crane will notify the respective customers for any additional orders that are identified.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940."