Event Notification Report for February 19, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/18/2015 - 02/19/2015
EVENT NUMBERS
5083850834508355083150937
Agreement State
Event Number: 50838
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTIONS INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: L01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTIONS INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: L01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/20/2015
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 16:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2015
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 16:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT CAMERA SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On February 20, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that on February 19, 2015, one of its radiography crews working at a remote field site [near Kennedy, Texas] was unable to retract a 31.9 Curie Iridium 192 source into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers were examining a pipe on a pipe pad with the collimator being held in place with a magnetic stand. As the radiographer began to retract the source after a shot, the stand fell and struck the source guide tube crimping the tube to a point where the source could not be moved. The radiographers stopped work in the area and moved their boundaries to prevent exposures to members of the general public. The radiographers contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO), but he was located 8 hours from the work site. The RSO contacted the licensee's office in Corpus Christi, Texas and the RSO from that location responded to the event. The Corpus Christi RSO is [at the location] to perform source retrieval. The event occurred at 1630 [CST] and the source was retracted at 2400 [CST]. No over exposures occurred and no member of the general public received any additional exposure from this event. The guide tube has been removed from service for inspection. The dosimetry badges for the individuals involved in the event have been sent to the licensee's processor for reading. The licensee is investigating the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
"On February 20, 2015, the licensee agreed to send the source involved in this event to the manufacturer for inspection."
Texas Incident: I-9281
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On February 20, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that on February 19, 2015, one of its radiography crews working at a remote field site [near Kennedy, Texas] was unable to retract a 31.9 Curie Iridium 192 source into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers were examining a pipe on a pipe pad with the collimator being held in place with a magnetic stand. As the radiographer began to retract the source after a shot, the stand fell and struck the source guide tube crimping the tube to a point where the source could not be moved. The radiographers stopped work in the area and moved their boundaries to prevent exposures to members of the general public. The radiographers contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO), but he was located 8 hours from the work site. The RSO contacted the licensee's office in Corpus Christi, Texas and the RSO from that location responded to the event. The Corpus Christi RSO is [at the location] to perform source retrieval. The event occurred at 1630 [CST] and the source was retracted at 2400 [CST]. No over exposures occurred and no member of the general public received any additional exposure from this event. The guide tube has been removed from service for inspection. The dosimetry badges for the individuals involved in the event have been sent to the licensee's processor for reading. The licensee is investigating the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
"On February 20, 2015, the licensee agreed to send the source involved in this event to the manufacturer for inspection."
Texas Incident: I-9281
Agreement State
Event Number: 50834
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICAL
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: L00204
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICAL
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: L00204
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO CLOSE SHUTTER ON NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following information was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On February 19, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that during routine gauge testing, they were unable to close the shutter on a nuclear gauge. The gauge is an Ohmart model SHLG-2 containing 8,000 millicuries of cesium-137. The RSO stated the gauge is used for level indication on a vessel and open is the normal operating position for the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge does not present an increased exposure risk to their employees or members of the general public. The RSO stated they had lubricated the gauge operating mechanism in an attempt to free up the shutter, but the shutter remained stuck. The RSO stated they intend to contact the manufacturer for repairs to the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9280
The following information was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On February 19, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that during routine gauge testing, they were unable to close the shutter on a nuclear gauge. The gauge is an Ohmart model SHLG-2 containing 8,000 millicuries of cesium-137. The RSO stated the gauge is used for level indication on a vessel and open is the normal operating position for the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge does not present an increased exposure risk to their employees or members of the general public. The RSO stated they had lubricated the gauge operating mechanism in an attempt to free up the shutter, but the shutter remained stuck. The RSO stated they intend to contact the manufacturer for repairs to the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9280
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50835
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PATE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PATE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING NORMALLY CLOSED WATERTIGHT DOORS
"During Main Steam Safety Valve testing conducted prior to refueling outages, normally closed watertight doors are opened in support of the testing. If a postulated one square foot non-mechanistic crack were to occur within the Break Exclusion Area during the test, safety related equipment located just outside of these doors could be adversely affected. With these watertight doors open, compliance with the Comanche Peak licensing basis may not be assured.
"This condition has been conservatively determined to be reportable as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Currently, the watertight doors on both Units 1 and 2 are closed, therefore, all safety related equipment is currently operable. Comanche Peak Engineering is performing a review of the original Comanche Peak licensing basis regarding the non-mechanistic crack event to determine what equipment impacts are required to be assessed."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"During Main Steam Safety Valve testing conducted prior to refueling outages, normally closed watertight doors are opened in support of the testing. If a postulated one square foot non-mechanistic crack were to occur within the Break Exclusion Area during the test, safety related equipment located just outside of these doors could be adversely affected. With these watertight doors open, compliance with the Comanche Peak licensing basis may not be assured.
"This condition has been conservatively determined to be reportable as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Currently, the watertight doors on both Units 1 and 2 are closed, therefore, all safety related equipment is currently operable. Comanche Peak Engineering is performing a review of the original Comanche Peak licensing basis regarding the non-mechanistic crack event to determine what equipment impacts are required to be assessed."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50831
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRETT JEBBIA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/19/2015
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 03:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2015
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 03:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BUILDING DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VENTILATION SYSTEM TRIP
"At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation [a freeze protection feature].
"The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition.
"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *
"After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System.
"The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).
* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN PAUL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/15/15 AT 1348 EDT * * *
"Upon further review of NUREG-1022 section 3.2.7, the original Non-Emergency Event Notification, 50831, remains valid."
The NRC Resident Inspect has been informed. Notified R3DO (McCraw).
"At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation [a freeze protection feature].
"The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition.
"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *
"After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System.
"The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).
* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN PAUL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/15/15 AT 1348 EDT * * *
"Upon further review of NUREG-1022 section 3.2.7, the original Non-Emergency Event Notification, 50831, remains valid."
The NRC Resident Inspect has been informed. Notified R3DO (McCraw).
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 50937
Rep Org: CARMEUSE LIME & STONE
Licensee: CARMEUSE LIME & STONE
Region: 3
City: RIVER ROUGE State: MI
County: WAYNE
License #: 21-32513-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MOSIER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: CARMEUSE LIME & STONE
Region: 3
City: RIVER ROUGE State: MI
County: WAYNE
License #: 21-32513-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MOSIER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/28/2015
Notification Time: 12:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2015
Notification Time: 12:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
BROKEN SHUTTER SHIELDING BLOCK ON A FIXED PROCESS GAUGE
During a routine shutter check on 2/19/15, the licensee discovered the shutter shielding block had fallen off a fixed process gauge for the #2 lime conveyor.
The licensee had a representative from Vega America inspect the gauge on 3/25/15. Vega America determined that the shutter shield block cannot be repaired. The licensee is considering having Vega America replace the gauge with a new model and disposing of the old gauge. The shutter is normally open and the gauge remains in service. The gauge does not present a hazard to plant personnel due to it's normally inaccessible location.
The gauge is 1960s vintage, Ohmart SH-100, Model # A-2102, Serial #73799, with a 100 mCi Cs-137 source.
During a routine shutter check on 2/19/15, the licensee discovered the shutter shielding block had fallen off a fixed process gauge for the #2 lime conveyor.
The licensee had a representative from Vega America inspect the gauge on 3/25/15. Vega America determined that the shutter shield block cannot be repaired. The licensee is considering having Vega America replace the gauge with a new model and disposing of the old gauge. The shutter is normally open and the gauge remains in service. The gauge does not present a hazard to plant personnel due to it's normally inaccessible location.
The gauge is 1960s vintage, Ohmart SH-100, Model # A-2102, Serial #73799, with a 100 mCi Cs-137 source.