Event Notification Report for February 17, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/16/2015 - 02/17/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50829
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 15:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 15:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WASTEWATER SPILL
"At approximately 1555 EST on February 17, 2015, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of North Carolina state agencies for an NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit event and a voluntary reporting of tritium. At approximately 2200 EST on February 16, 2015, plant personnel identified a wastewater spill of more than 100 gallons containing a low level of tritium (9,415 picocuries per liter, less than half the EPA drinking water limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter). No additional plant-related radionuclides were detected. The wastewater was released as a result of an overfilled basin and entered the plant's storm drain system. The storm drain system releases to an alternative discharge outfall. The release from the settling basin has been stopped. The report to the state of North Carolina also fulfills Harris Nuclear Plant's voluntary communication to state agencies in accordance with the NEI 07-07 Groundwater Protection Initiative.
"There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina.
"At approximately 1555 EST on February 17, 2015, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of North Carolina state agencies for an NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit event and a voluntary reporting of tritium. At approximately 2200 EST on February 16, 2015, plant personnel identified a wastewater spill of more than 100 gallons containing a low level of tritium (9,415 picocuries per liter, less than half the EPA drinking water limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter). No additional plant-related radionuclides were detected. The wastewater was released as a result of an overfilled basin and entered the plant's storm drain system. The storm drain system releases to an alternative discharge outfall. The release from the settling basin has been stopped. The report to the state of North Carolina also fulfills Harris Nuclear Plant's voluntary communication to state agencies in accordance with the NEI 07-07 Groundwater Protection Initiative.
"There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50827
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 11:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 11:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO INTERLOCK DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. LaSalle's Station Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 for its scheduled refuel outage. There was no movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS at the time. OPDRVs [Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel] were in progress in the secondary containment on Unit 2. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for somewhere between 5-10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met and this rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, in the main control room, was never observed to be less than -0.25 inches of water column. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. LaSalle's Station Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 for its scheduled refuel outage. There was no movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS at the time. OPDRVs [Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel] were in progress in the secondary containment on Unit 2. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for somewhere between 5-10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met and this rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, in the main control room, was never observed to be less than -0.25 inches of water column. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51158
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: JAMES SALTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: JAMES SALTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/16/2015
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2015
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2015
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES
"10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B associated with AP1000 nuclear power plant construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) at the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction site.
"This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) for V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criteria V and XV. It is concluded that Quality Assurance programmatic issues, as identified by CB&I Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539 investigated the causes that lead to impingement of safety related reinforcing steel and the steel containment vessel during concrete core drilling operations within the Unit 2 containment structure. No defect has been identified.
"This condition is associated with NRC special inspection report number 05200027/2015-009.
"This notification closes the Interim Part 21 report submitted on April 16th, 2015, by CB&I.
"This 50.55(e) Initial Notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B associated with AP1000 nuclear power plant construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) at the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction site.
"This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) for V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criteria V and XV. It is concluded that Quality Assurance programmatic issues, as identified by CB&I Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539 investigated the causes that lead to impingement of safety related reinforcing steel and the steel containment vessel during concrete core drilling operations within the Unit 2 containment structure. No defect has been identified.
"This condition is associated with NRC special inspection report number 05200027/2015-009.
"This notification closes the Interim Part 21 report submitted on April 16th, 2015, by CB&I.
"This 50.55(e) Initial Notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.