Event Notification Report for January 22, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/21/2015 - 01/22/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50751
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN EASTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN EASTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 18:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 18:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 18:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 18:13 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2015
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS IN THE SECURITY DIESEL BUILDING
At 1801 EST, the control room received multiple fire alarms in the control room. At 1803, site security notified the control room of the presence of smoke in the security diesel building. At 1813, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to the presence of toxic gas in the security diesel building on the battery/UPS side of the building. The fire suppression (NOVEC) system had discharged. Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned.
The site fire brigade made entry into the building and saw no evidence of fire but they did see and smell an acrid odor from an apparent electrical fire as well as the presence of the NOVEC fire suppressant. Offsite assistance was requested but not required to mitigate the event. Investigation of the cause of the toxic gas is under investigation. At this time, no security equipment is affected.
Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned.
The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSOCK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1936 EST ON 1/22/15 * * *
At time 1923 EST, the Notification of Unusual Event was terminated after normal access to the security diesel building was restored. The cause of the event is under investigation.
The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (McCoy), IRD (Stapleton), NRR (Evans), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
At 1801 EST, the control room received multiple fire alarms in the control room. At 1803, site security notified the control room of the presence of smoke in the security diesel building. At 1813, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to the presence of toxic gas in the security diesel building on the battery/UPS side of the building. The fire suppression (NOVEC) system had discharged. Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned.
The site fire brigade made entry into the building and saw no evidence of fire but they did see and smell an acrid odor from an apparent electrical fire as well as the presence of the NOVEC fire suppressant. Offsite assistance was requested but not required to mitigate the event. Investigation of the cause of the toxic gas is under investigation. At this time, no security equipment is affected.
Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned.
The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSOCK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1936 EST ON 1/22/15 * * *
At time 1923 EST, the Notification of Unusual Event was terminated after normal access to the security diesel building was restored. The cause of the event is under investigation.
The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (McCoy), IRD (Stapleton), NRR (Evans), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50752
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BOB MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BOB MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 17:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2015
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 17:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED HEAT EXCHANGER LINEUP COULD EXCEED DESIGN BASIS TEMPERATURES
"On 1/20/15, it was determined that a certain line up of component cooling heat exchangers and shutdown cooling heat exchangers could exceed the design basis temperatures for the component cooling water system following a design basis accident. Although not a safety concern at this time because of low ultimate heat sink temperatures (which cools component cooling water), in the past the ultimate heat sink temperatures have been high enough to create this condition. This particular heat exchanger line up was unanalyzed in that the ultimate heat sink temperature limits were not known until 1/22/15. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program.
"A review of Control Room logs for 2014 showed that in 1 instance for Unit 1 and 1 instance for Unit 2, the Units were in an unanalyzed lineup with ultimate heat sink temperature greater than the maximum now calculated. During these instances, both Units had an unanalyzed condition that had potential to significantly degrade plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTED ON 03/03/15 AT 1410 EST FROM CHARLES MORGAN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Further engineering analysis has refined the ultimate heat sink temperature that provides an acceptable safety system response with the component cooling water and shutdown cooling heat exchanger lineups in question. The revised information demonstrates that the system lineups that occurred in the last 12 months did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. This event notification is retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The R1DO (Burritt) was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/12/15 AT 1303 EDT FROM ED SCHINNER TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
"The retraction statement provided on 3/3/15 incorrectly addressed system lineups limited to the last 12 months. The original withdrawal was prematurely submitted and therefore the original notification (Event report 50752) is not retracted and remains valid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The R1DO (Cook) was notified.
"On 1/20/15, it was determined that a certain line up of component cooling heat exchangers and shutdown cooling heat exchangers could exceed the design basis temperatures for the component cooling water system following a design basis accident. Although not a safety concern at this time because of low ultimate heat sink temperatures (which cools component cooling water), in the past the ultimate heat sink temperatures have been high enough to create this condition. This particular heat exchanger line up was unanalyzed in that the ultimate heat sink temperature limits were not known until 1/22/15. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program.
"A review of Control Room logs for 2014 showed that in 1 instance for Unit 1 and 1 instance for Unit 2, the Units were in an unanalyzed lineup with ultimate heat sink temperature greater than the maximum now calculated. During these instances, both Units had an unanalyzed condition that had potential to significantly degrade plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTED ON 03/03/15 AT 1410 EST FROM CHARLES MORGAN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Further engineering analysis has refined the ultimate heat sink temperature that provides an acceptable safety system response with the component cooling water and shutdown cooling heat exchanger lineups in question. The revised information demonstrates that the system lineups that occurred in the last 12 months did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. This event notification is retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The R1DO (Burritt) was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/12/15 AT 1303 EDT FROM ED SCHINNER TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
"The retraction statement provided on 3/3/15 incorrectly addressed system lineups limited to the last 12 months. The original withdrawal was prematurely submitted and therefore the original notification (Event report 50752) is not retracted and remains valid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The R1DO (Cook) was notified.
Part 21
Event Number: 50848
Rep Org: DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
Licensee: ASEA BROWN BOVARI
Region: 1
City: MILLSTONE State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARYLOU CALDERONE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: ASEA BROWN BOVARI
Region: 1
City: MILLSTONE State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARYLOU CALDERONE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 02/25/2015
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015
Notification Time: 10:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
ABB K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY CLOSE LATCH BINDING
The following was received from the licensee via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) concerning a defect identified in ABB K-Line secondary close latches at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). A written report to the NRC will follow within 20 days.
"On January 12, 2015, during the overhaul of an ABB K600 load center circuit breaker at MPS3, a defect in a new safety-related secondary close latch (Part No. 716610K01, Batch No. 0000150471) was identified when the latch did not fit properly into the breaker mechanism. The vertical piece on the front edge of the latch was contacting the manual close lever. Upon closer inspection, it was found that the angle of the bend in the secondary close latch was not correct, causing it to bind on the manual close lever when actuated. When the manual close lever was actuated, it too would bind due to the secondary latch pressing it into the left mechanism side sheet.
"Of the eight (8) additional secondary close latches in stock in the Millstone warehouse, all four (4) latches from Batch No. 0000150471, as well as two (2) latches from Batch No. 0000153854, were found to have improper bends. The two (2) remaining latches from Batch No. 0000119420 were found to have the correct bend angle.
"DNC determined that the defect meets the criteria of a substantial safety hazard since it could prevent a breaker from staying open following a trip signal.
"DNC notified ABB of this defect on January 22, 2015. Following this notification, one of the defective latches was returned to the vendor for evaluation."
The following was received from the licensee via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) concerning a defect identified in ABB K-Line secondary close latches at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). A written report to the NRC will follow within 20 days.
"On January 12, 2015, during the overhaul of an ABB K600 load center circuit breaker at MPS3, a defect in a new safety-related secondary close latch (Part No. 716610K01, Batch No. 0000150471) was identified when the latch did not fit properly into the breaker mechanism. The vertical piece on the front edge of the latch was contacting the manual close lever. Upon closer inspection, it was found that the angle of the bend in the secondary close latch was not correct, causing it to bind on the manual close lever when actuated. When the manual close lever was actuated, it too would bind due to the secondary latch pressing it into the left mechanism side sheet.
"Of the eight (8) additional secondary close latches in stock in the Millstone warehouse, all four (4) latches from Batch No. 0000150471, as well as two (2) latches from Batch No. 0000153854, were found to have improper bends. The two (2) remaining latches from Batch No. 0000119420 were found to have the correct bend angle.
"DNC determined that the defect meets the criteria of a substantial safety hazard since it could prevent a breaker from staying open following a trip signal.
"DNC notified ABB of this defect on January 22, 2015. Following this notification, one of the defective latches was returned to the vendor for evaluation."