Event Notification Report for January 21, 2015

60-DAY OPTIONAL NOTIFICATION - INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL

"This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves.

"On January 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) received a partial primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:

"Containment Monitoring System
Drywell floor drain sump and
Drywell equipment drain sump

"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The containment isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a relay for Hi Drywell Pressure on Channel 11 during surveillance testing of the same relay on Channel 12. Drywell pressure was reading normal at the time of the relay failure. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.

"The event was entered into the corrective action program as Issue Report 02440213. The moveable contacts on the failed relay were replaced and retested satisfactorily. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

UNPLANNED FIRE IN BUILDING 110 R&D LABORATORY VENTILATION HOOD

"During calcining of a water-rinsed polypropylene cartridge filter, flames were observed at the top of the furnace door. The flames were contained in ventilation hood H-103. The flames lasted for 5-10 minutes, always limited to the top of the furnace door. The glass in the sash for hood H-103 broke, most likely from the heat of the flame. The glass is spider-webbed, but contained in the sash. The testing in the hood has been stopped and the hood and furnace have been tagged out of service.

"There were no actual consequences due to this event. Potential consequences could have involved worker exposure and/or environmental releases."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR FACILITY

The following information was obtained from the licensee via email:

"Notification of Reportable Occurrence at the Texas A&M University AGN 201M Reactor: Transgression of Technical Specification 5.3 Reactor Room, Reactor Control Room, Accelerator Room (item d).

"During a review of the AGN 201M reactor facility boundary, it was discovered that the facility was not in compliance with Technical Specification 5.3.d. More specifically, the reactor control console is located in the reactor room contrary to the specification. This specification reads: 'The reactor room, reactor control room, and accelerator room are separate rooms in the Zachry Engineering Center, constructed with adequate shielding and other radiation protective features to limit doses in restricted and unrestricted areas to levels no greater than permitted by 10 CFR 20, under normal operating conditions, and to a level below criterion 19, Appendix A, 10 CFR 50 recommendations under accident conditions.'

"On April 2, 1984, a memo was sent to the Texas A&M University Reactor Safety Board (RSB) Chairman requesting the control console be moved to the reactor room. In this memo, it was noted that a submittal of changes to the security plan and emergency plan would be required to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Approval for this modification was authorized by the RSB on April 20, 1984. The reactor control console was relocated to the reactor room on September 20, 1984. The University subsequently submitted the revised security plan and emergency plan to the NRC, dated October 11, 1984. Upon review of the changes, the NRC agreed with the changes to the emergency plan and requested further review at Headquarters for implementation of the new security plan. The University then requested a license amendment on September 2, 1985 for implementation of the revised security plan. This amendment (No. 13) was issued on November 5, 1985.

"It appears Technical Specification 5.3.d was not taken into account during the process of moving the control console to its current location in 1984. Currently the AGN 201M is not operating in accordance with Confirmatory Action Letter EA-2013-154, limiting the impact to the health and safety of facility personnel.

"Prior to restoration of reactor operations, this issue will be addressed and an appropriate solution will be implemented. Solutions are being investigated to return the facility to compliance."

DRY CONVERSION PROCESS IMPROPERLY ANALYZED IN THE CURRENT INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

"During a GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at approximately 3:00 PM (EST) yesterday (1/21/15) that a quantitative risk assessment associated with the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) cylinder cold trap operation was improperly analyzed in the current ISA. The item relied on for safety (IROFS) and other controls associated with preventing overfilling the cold trap system remained available and reliable. However, the initiating event frequency for a particular accident sequence was determined to be higher than that documented resulting in a failure to meet performance requirements.

"At no time was the postulated condition present; therefore no potential unsafe condition occurred. The affected equipment has been shut down and an investigation is underway to provide additional corrective actions and determine extent of condition.

"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."

The licensee will be notifying the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Division and the New Hanover City of Environmental Management.

The NRC Region II office and NRC Project Manager will be notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING 10 MILLICURIE CS-137 SOURCE

The following information was received from the State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Assessment Division via fax:

"On 11/21/2014, Berthold Technologies reported that Morehouse Bioenergies, LLC called to replace a density gauge source, 10 mCi Cs-137, for a gauge they were installing on a process. However, Berthold Technologies had sold and shipped the whole unit to BioEnergies in March 2014. The reorder peaked the interest of Berthold Technologies who notified the LDEQ. Attempts to reach Drax Biomass International, Inc., the radiation responsible company and owners of Morehouse Bioenergies, LLC, were unsuccessful on numerous occasions.

"Berthold Technologies supplied shipping documents, quarterly distribution records and signed records of receipts for the source/gauge. The record of receipt was signed and transferred back to the construction foreman and the site on March 25, 2014. The location of the source from March to November 2014, is unknown and continues to be a mystery.

"This site is a wood yard for manufacturing wooden pellets. Its location is in the deep woods of north Louisiana and is only accessible from the state of Arkansas. The scintillation detector has been installed, but the box with the Cs-137 source is nowhere to be found. All communication with Drax Biomass International, Inc. is done by remote access and usually by return phone call.

"The gauge was a Berthold Technologies unit shielding Model LB 7440-F-CR, Serial Number 37625-11972. The source was 10 mCi of Cs-137 serial number 0038/13.

"Event Location: The Morehouse Bioenergies, 7070 Carl Road, Bastrop, LA 71220. This was a construction site for a wood pellet plant. An investigator made a site visit, but there was only a person with Haskell Contractors to interview.

"Event Type: This was a loss of control incident that has not been resolved to this date. The freight company delivered the gauge to the site and it has since disappeared. This incident is considered still open."

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Radiation Assessment report number: LA-150003, T160317.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf