Event Notification Report for January 02, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/01/2015 - 01/02/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50713
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANNY BRADFORD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANNY BRADFORD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/02/2015
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2015
Event Time: 03:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2015
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2015
Event Time: 03:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"At 0314 [CST] on 01/02/2015, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution Systems caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions.
"The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation.
"An investigation by Meter and Relay Technicians revealed no abnormal conditions/damaged equipment. The supply breaker was re-closed at 0915 on 01/02/2015. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers and proper operation was verified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0314 [CST] on 01/02/2015, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution Systems caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions.
"The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation.
"An investigation by Meter and Relay Technicians revealed no abnormal conditions/damaged equipment. The supply breaker was re-closed at 0915 on 01/02/2015. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers and proper operation was verified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50714
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DIRK DRINKARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DIRK DRINKARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/02/2015
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2015
Event Time: 09:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2015
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2015
Event Time: 09:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO VOIDS IDENTIFIED IN PIPING
"At 0925 [EST] on 1/2/2015, Engineering personnel identified a gas void in each of two Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) discharge lines which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg HHSI flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. The voids were vented and Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was exited at 1032.
"The testing for gas voids conducted on 1/2/2015 was a follow-up to a gas void found in one Unit 4 HHSI line on 12/26/2014. On 12/26/14, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1020 and exited at 1048 after the gas void was vented. After further review, the 12/26/2014 event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Engineering evaluation will be performed for both events to determine the specific impact of the gas voids on HHSI system function. Cause evaluation is being conducted to determine the source of the gas and any needed corrective actions."
Unit 3 was verified to not have this voiding issue.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN BLOOM TO VINCE KLCO AT 1120 EDT ON 3/11/15 * * *
"On 1/2/2015 at 1645 [EST], Event Notification 50714 reported to the NRCOC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center] gas voids detected on 12/26/2014 and 1/2/2015 in Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria.
"Subsequent analysis has determined that if a HHSI pump started with the measured gas voids present, the resulting system conditions would not have impacted the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) and therefore its safety related function would not be impaired.
"The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the voids present, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 1/2/2015 at 1645 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is hereby retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).
"At 0925 [EST] on 1/2/2015, Engineering personnel identified a gas void in each of two Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) discharge lines which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg HHSI flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. The voids were vented and Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was exited at 1032.
"The testing for gas voids conducted on 1/2/2015 was a follow-up to a gas void found in one Unit 4 HHSI line on 12/26/2014. On 12/26/14, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1020 and exited at 1048 after the gas void was vented. After further review, the 12/26/2014 event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Engineering evaluation will be performed for both events to determine the specific impact of the gas voids on HHSI system function. Cause evaluation is being conducted to determine the source of the gas and any needed corrective actions."
Unit 3 was verified to not have this voiding issue.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN BLOOM TO VINCE KLCO AT 1120 EDT ON 3/11/15 * * *
"On 1/2/2015 at 1645 [EST], Event Notification 50714 reported to the NRCOC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center] gas voids detected on 12/26/2014 and 1/2/2015 in Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria.
"Subsequent analysis has determined that if a HHSI pump started with the measured gas voids present, the resulting system conditions would not have impacted the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) and therefore its safety related function would not be impaired.
"The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the voids present, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 1/2/2015 at 1645 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is hereby retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).