Event Notification Report for December 12, 2014

WISCONSIN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the State of Wisconsin via email:

"The licensee reported that a radiography crew working at a temporary jobsite on the night of December 12, 2014, had a failure of a drive cable mechanism on a QSA Global Model 880D radiography camera. The drive cable severed, and the radiography crew was unable to retract the source into the camera. The crew re-established boundaries and maintained appropriate surveillance of the area. An individual who is licensed to perform source retrievals responded to the jobsite and was able to retract the source into the safe position in the camera. Direct-reading dosimeters did not indicate any exposures exceeding regulatory limits. The licensee has sent permanent record dosimetry for emergency processing, and the licensee has sent the failed equipment to QSA for analysis.

"The Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section will provide updates through NMED after receiving the licensee's written report."

Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI140014

* * * UPDATE FROM MEGAN SHOBER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1213 EST ON 12/17/14 * * *

The following information was obtained from the State of Wisconsin via email:

"The drive cable in question broke near the junction between the cable and the metal ball on the end of the cable. On December 17, 2014, the licensee submitted a report of the radiographer's permanent record dosimetry. Exposures from the source retrieval were less than regulatory limits.

"Because the radiography crew and equipment involved in this incident are based in Illinois, the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency."

Notified R3DO (McCraw) and NMSS Events Notification (via email).

AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR FAILED

"At 0248 CST on December 12, 2014, 2R-30, Auxiliary Building Normal Vent Radiation Monitor, failed. This monitor was the redundant monitor for 2R-37, Auxiliary Building Normal Vent Radiation Monitor, which was previously taken out of service for planned maintenance. With 2R-30 and 2R-37 out of service, there are no monitors that will allow for timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALS) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert Classifications. This results in a loss of emergency assessment capability while 2R-30 and 2R-37 are out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The Auxiliary Building ventilation effluent monitor readings were normal and there were no elevated readings in Auxiliary Building area monitors prior to the unavailability of these monitors.

"The health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.

"The activity to repair and return one of the monitors to service is continuous until restored.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOORS OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and no movement of irradiated fuel, core alterations, or OPDRVs [Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel] were in progress in the secondary containment.

"An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches of water column at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls [barricades and signs] have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION WITH REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING

"Engineering identified fuse and breaker coordination issues with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) valves operated at the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSDP). The coordination issues are such that, given a fire in the main control room, it is possible that RCIC valve power supply breakers could trip prior to tripping control power fuses. Operation of RCIC from the RSDP could be impaired in this scenario without compensatory actions to reset breakers. RCIC is the single credited source of makeup to the reactor pressure vessel during this scenario. The current licensing basis (Fire Protection Report) does not identify the compensatory actions required to reset breakers prior to RCIC operation at the RSDP. This condition is applicable to Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Event or Condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'."

Actions are being taken to amend the appropriate operating procedures to take the required steps to ensure proper operation of RCIC in the postulated scenario.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ISOLATION DOOR INOPERABLE

The boundary door between the A and B safety related switchgear rooms was found not to be latching. This door is credited in the high energy line break (HELB) analysis. Both trains of safety related switchgear were affected for approximately 36 minutes. The technical specification action statement was entered, the door was repaired, and the action statement was exited.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GENERALLY LICENSED SOURCE MISSING, LATER RECOVERED

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On 12/12/14, the Department of Health (DOH) became aware of this incident. A liquid scintillation counter [LSC] (25 years old and containing 10 microCuries of Radium 226) had been stored for three years. It could not be located on 12/12/14. An attorney in Estee Lauder's legal department was asked to contact the DOH to report that the LSC could not be located.

"DOH received a phone call from Estee Lauder's legal department to say that they had found where the missing LSC was shipped. Keith Machinery Corporation had purchased the LSC and then sold it.

"On 6/15/15, a letter was sent to Estee Lauder [from DOH] requesting a copy of the Keith Machinery Corporation Equipment Trade-In Credit Memo.

"On 6/17/15, DOH received a letter from Estee Lauder's RSO which had an attachment from Keith Machinery Corporation stating that they had received the Perkin Elmer LSC, Model 1217 Rackbeta. Keith Machinery Corporation stated by phone, on 6/29/15, that the LSC was to be shipped to Romania and he will send DOH a confirmatory letter that it was received in Romania if he can. If not, he will send a letter that it was shipped to Romania.

"On 8/18/15, [DOH was notified that] Keith Machinery Corporation had located the Perkin Elmer LSC, Model 1217 Rackbeta, which was awaiting shipment to Romania. Items are not shipped immediately and individually to places like Romania, but are accumulated until a large shipment is acquired, which is more efficient and cost effective. Keith Machinery Corporation was able to locate the LSC and return it to Estee Lauder. Estee Lauder shipped it to Radiac Research Corporation for disposal on 7/28/15. DOH received a copy of Radiac Research Corporation receipt. The Estee Lauder General License Registration can now be terminated according to their request."

NY State Event Report ID No.: NY-15-07

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf