Event Notification Report for December 09, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/08/2014 - 12/09/2014
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 50667
Rep Org: HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR
Licensee: HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR
Region: 3
City: HEMLOCK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-32682-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELLY DEERING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: HEMLOCK SEMICONDUCTOR
Region: 3
City: HEMLOCK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-32682-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELLY DEERING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/10/2014
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2014
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)
FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION
"At approximately 2200 EST, on December 09, 2014, an area operator attempted to open the shutter on source holder 10071961 (Hemlock identifier). The shutter operation failed with the shutter stuck in the closed position. The operator then contacted an area Equipment Care Operator who verified the shutter would not operate. The area operator informed a day tech of the failed shutter operation on December 10, 2014. Operating the shutter was part of a routine annual calibration PM [preventive maintenance]. The process was previously shut down, therefore, this incident caused no loss of production. The source holder is located at S-457 on HP tank 35600."
Fixed gauge: Vega America Source Holder Model SHF 2-B with Cs-137 800 millicurie source.
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRISTOPHER VAN HAMPLER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0904 EST ON 12/15/2014 * * *
The licensee performed a radiation survey of the fixed gauge which indicated higher than expected radiation readings (40 mR/hr at <30 cm). Based on these readings, the licensee has determined that the shutter is stuck in a partially open position. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the device.
Notified R3DO (Skokowski) and NMSS Events Notification (via email)
"At approximately 2200 EST, on December 09, 2014, an area operator attempted to open the shutter on source holder 10071961 (Hemlock identifier). The shutter operation failed with the shutter stuck in the closed position. The operator then contacted an area Equipment Care Operator who verified the shutter would not operate. The area operator informed a day tech of the failed shutter operation on December 10, 2014. Operating the shutter was part of a routine annual calibration PM [preventive maintenance]. The process was previously shut down, therefore, this incident caused no loss of production. The source holder is located at S-457 on HP tank 35600."
Fixed gauge: Vega America Source Holder Model SHF 2-B with Cs-137 800 millicurie source.
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRISTOPHER VAN HAMPLER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0904 EST ON 12/15/2014 * * *
The licensee performed a radiation survey of the fixed gauge which indicated higher than expected radiation readings (40 mR/hr at <30 cm). Based on these readings, the licensee has determined that the shutter is stuck in a partially open position. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the device.
Notified R3DO (Skokowski) and NMSS Events Notification (via email)
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50662
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STANLEY STONE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STANLEY STONE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/09/2014
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-FUNCTIONAL FIRE BARRIER DISCOVERED AFFECTING BOTH SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS
"During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired.
"[Condition report No.] CR904013"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *
"Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional.
"Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley)
"During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired.
"[Condition report No.] CR904013"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *
"Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional.
"Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley)
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50663
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/10/2014
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2015
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOOR FOUND CLOSED
"At 1830 [CST] on December 9, 2014 Door 410B, a HELB (High Energy Line Break) door between the east and west sides of the ground floor of the reactor building, was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double doors that are normally open to provide a HELB energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The closed HELB door has the potential to impact safe shutdown by exposing both divisions of safe shutdown components to unanalyzed environmental conditions. With the potential loss of both divisions of safe shutdown equipment, no safe shutdown path would exist. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HELB door was immediately opened and returned to normal configuration. Door 410A remained open during the time that Door 410B was closed and provided an available, but not yet analyzed, release path that could have mitigated the consequences of this event. The health and safety of the general public was not impacted as a result of this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JON LAUDENBACH TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/30/15 AT 1513 EST * * *
"Further analysis has determined that the condition did not significantly degrade plant safety.
"Door 410B in the Reactor Building was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double door (Doors 410A and 410B) that normally open to provide a High Energy Line Break (HELB) energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The condition of one half of the double door closed was not previously analyzed.
"A subsequent completed engineering evaluation analyzed this condition, Door 410B being closed and Door 410A being open, for the following environmental conditions: peak compartment temperatures, block wall differential pressure, radiation dose, and flooding. The environmental conditions found the Reactor Building in response to Door 410B being closed with 410A being open does not affect the operability of safety related equipment housed within the Reactor Building or the ability to safely shut-down the plant and maintain the plant shutdown condition following a HELB event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Dickson).
"At 1830 [CST] on December 9, 2014 Door 410B, a HELB (High Energy Line Break) door between the east and west sides of the ground floor of the reactor building, was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double doors that are normally open to provide a HELB energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The closed HELB door has the potential to impact safe shutdown by exposing both divisions of safe shutdown components to unanalyzed environmental conditions. With the potential loss of both divisions of safe shutdown equipment, no safe shutdown path would exist. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HELB door was immediately opened and returned to normal configuration. Door 410A remained open during the time that Door 410B was closed and provided an available, but not yet analyzed, release path that could have mitigated the consequences of this event. The health and safety of the general public was not impacted as a result of this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JON LAUDENBACH TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/30/15 AT 1513 EST * * *
"Further analysis has determined that the condition did not significantly degrade plant safety.
"Door 410B in the Reactor Building was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double door (Doors 410A and 410B) that normally open to provide a High Energy Line Break (HELB) energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The condition of one half of the double door closed was not previously analyzed.
"A subsequent completed engineering evaluation analyzed this condition, Door 410B being closed and Door 410A being open, for the following environmental conditions: peak compartment temperatures, block wall differential pressure, radiation dose, and flooding. The environmental conditions found the Reactor Building in response to Door 410B being closed with 410A being open does not affect the operability of safety related equipment housed within the Reactor Building or the ability to safely shut-down the plant and maintain the plant shutdown condition following a HELB event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Dickson).