Event Notification Report for November 19, 2014

EAL REQUIRED GASEOUS WASTE EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Special Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING 4) monitors were removed from service for a planned equipment upgrade/replacement. During the replacement process certain Emergency Action Level (EAL) required monitors will not be functional, therefore, alternate methods of monitoring have been placed in effect. The replacement activities are expected to take approximately 60 days. A follow-up notification will be made after the required monitors are returned to service and declared functional.

"This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No BVPS Unit 2 systems will be adversely affected by the Unit 1 replacement activity.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK HARTIG TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1728 EST ON 2/27/15 * * *

"The planned equipment upgrade was completed and the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (PING) monitors were returned to service and declared functional at 1714 EST on 2/27/2015.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Gray).

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"On 11/19/2014, Wolf Creek determined that the alternative shutdown procedure for responding to a fire in the control room does not address all potential operating modes of the credited emergency diesel generator. During the 2014 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, it was postulated that a loss of offsite power following a fire in the control room would cause the Train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) to start and load to the bus. The fire is also postulated to cause damage to the Train B essential service water (ESW) pump control circuit and prevent the pump from automatically starting and cooling the EDG. Additionally, the fire is postulated to cause spurious operation of another large load that is not normally sequenced onto the bus following a loss of offsite power. This postulated scenario loads the EDG to approximately 53% of its rated load without cooling. This scenario was not considered when developing the control room fire response strategy. Preliminary calculations show that operators have 3.6 minutes to establish cooling prior to the EDG tripping on high jacket water temperature. Performance timing determined that operators would establish cooling in approximately 10 minutes.

"Based on this information, it was determined that this condition is unanalyzed and is potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). An hourly fire watch compensatory measure is in place in the control room, consistent with procedural requirements for a Post Fire Safe Shutdown circuit analysis deficiency."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FIRE PENETRATION NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS

"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire penetrations that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of a fire penetration was identified that was sufficient to prevent this penetration from meeting Appendix R requirements as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were put in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) for the degraded penetration in the affected fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected."

The degraded fire penetration is located between the turbine deck and the main control room. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.